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Abstract
Identity information, personal data and user's proles are key assets for organizations
and companies by becoming the use of identity management (IdM) infrastructures a pre-
requisite for most companies, since IdM systems allow them to perform their business
transactions by sharing information and customizing services for several purposes in more
ecient and eective ways.
Due to the importance of the identity management paradigm, a lot of work has been done
so far resulting in a set of standards and specications. According to them, under the
umbrella of the IdM paradigm a person's digital identity can be shared, linked and reused
across dierent domains by allowing users simple session management, etc. In this way,
users' information is widely collected and distributed to oer new added value services
and to enhance availability. Whereas these new services have a positive impact on users'
life, they also bring privacy problems.
To manage users' personal data, while protecting their privacy, IdM systems are the ideal
target where to deploy privacy solutions, since they handle users' attribute exchange.
Nevertheless, current IdM models and specications do not suciently address compre-
hensive privacy mechanisms or guidelines, which enable users to better control over the
use, divulging and revocation of their online identities. These are essential aspects, spe-
cially in sensitive environments where incorrect and unsecured management of user's data
may lead to attacks, privacy breaches, identity misuse or frauds.
Nowadays there are several approaches to IdM that have benets and shortcomings, from
the privacy perspective.
vii
In this thesis, the main goal is contributing to the privacy provisioning for federated
identity management platforms. And for this purpose, we propose a generic architecture
that extends current federation IdM systems. We have mainly focused our contributions
on health care environments, given their particularly sensitive nature. The two main
pillars of the proposed architecture, are the introduction of a selective privacy-enhanced
user prole management model and exibility in revocation consent by incorporating an
event-based hybrid IdM approach, which enables to replace time constraints and explicit
revocation by activating and deactivating authorization rights according to events. The
combination of both models enables to deal with both online and oine scenarios, as well
as to empower the user role, by letting her to bring together identity information from
dierent sources.
Regarding user's consent revocation, we propose an implicit revocation consent mecha-
nism based on events, that empowers a new concept, the sleepyhead credentials, which
is issued only once and would be used any time. Moreover, we integrate this concept
in IdM systems supporting a delegation protocol and we contribute with the denition
of mathematical model to determine event arrivals to the IdM system and how they are
managed to the corresponding entities, as well as its integration with the most widely
deployed specication, i.e., Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML).
In regard to user prole management, we dene a privacy-awareness user prole manage-
ment model to provide ecient selective information disclosure. With this contribution a
service provider would be able to accesses the specic personal information without be-
ing able to inspect any other details and keeping user control of her data by controlling
who can access. The structure that we consider for the user prole storage is based on
extensions of Merkle trees allowing for hash combining that would minimize the need of
individual verication of elements along a path. An algorithm for sorting the tree as we
envision frequently accessed attributes to be closer to the root (minimizing the access'
time) is also provided.
Formal validation of the above mentioned ideas has been carried out through simulations
and the development of prototypes. Besides, dissemination activities were performed in
projects, journals and conferences.
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Chapter1
Introduction
Digital identity can change balance sheets
and change our future. But solutions need
to put the customer front and center.
Only when there is trust that
organisations are handling information
responsibly and providing sucient
individual benet, will data be shared in a
sustainable way.
Liberty Global, 2012
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1.1 Motivation
The advent of the digital era and the growth of the Internet have improved the experience of
organizations and users when storing, analyzing and exchanging personal data. According
to [1] digital identity management is a critical component and a key pillar to reduce
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
complexity and enhance user experience in economic, governmental and social activities.
Modern federated IdM infrastructures enable users to share attributes among dierent
participants, typically between Identity Providers (IdPs), Service Providers (SPs) and
users. Thus, SPs can link a person's electronic identity stored across multiple distinct
domains and oer personalized services according to the user preferences.
In this way, identity information, user's prole and sensitive personal data have become
very valuable assets for companies and organizations. On the one hand, they allow cus-
tomization of services in a cost eective and faster manner. On the other hand, interactions
and transactions can be more eective. So, in a digital context, users' information is ex-
tensively collected and distributed to provide new added value services and to improve
availability. Whereas these new services have a positive impact on users' life, they also
bring privacy problems.
In this thesis, we understand privacy as the right that every person has to control access
to her own personal information.
For instance, in sensitive scenarios, such as health care environments, in the last few years
many initiatives have developed new ways to manage, share and organize medical infor-
mation. In such a way users can manage their data easily keeping, storing, sharing or
disposing, for example, their clinical diagnosis. Apart from these functionalities, emer-
gency access to sensitive information like health records is sometimes needed by carers
otherwise unrelated to the normal care of a patient. Such accesses can only be consented
in a general way, since the specic providers involved will not usually be known in advance.
Furthermore, due to its volume, information is stored locally and/or fetched from third
parties using cross domain services. However, misuse and unauthorized access to such
information may violate user's privacy, cause fraud or even crimes that may harm people's
health.
For these reasons, an adequate federated identity management system is necessary, since
the success of these kind of systems is directly related to users' condence in the system
to manage their personal data, while preserving their privacy. For this purpose, IdM
systems are the preferred target where to deploy privacy solutions, since they
mediate in every users' information exchange.
In this sense, nowadays we are experiencing a duality in our lives. There is our physical
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identity and there is our digital counterpart [2], which brings us to an important moment
in history for privacy on the Internet. Modern cloud-based platforms and social networks
are intensifying human interactions online whereas they are handling huge amounts of our
personal data. Moreover, a growing number of \digital natives" are actively broadcasting
parts of their lives through social networks. However, average users rarely have privacy
concerns, and feel comfortable accepting default privacy settings enforced by these services.
Most ignore the risks as minimal tradeos in comparison to the benets of accessing
services. This is specially worrying in youngsters, unconscious about the consequences of
spreading personal information over the Internet.
Figure 1.1: Sensitivities of data types for consumers (©[2]).
In the above mentioned, we cannot underestimate the value placed on our personal data
and need to appreciate why privacy is an essential part of our lives both on and oine.
The study realized in [2] and represented in Figure 1.1 illustrated that while low-sensitivity
data (e.g., age or gender) was shared by more than 40% of survey consumers even without
receiving a direct benet, most participants were unwilling to part with highly sensitive
information (like a health record) even for large rewards. Remarkably, social network posts
belong to the category of highly sensitive personal data.
To the individual, privacy is more than keeping sensitive information hidden. The iden-
tities we have developed online are complex and becoming increasingly important to us.
Sometimes, we look for complete anonymity and at others, we change our digital person-
alities depending on who we are interacting with. For many, full disclosure of our digital
selves would be unthinkable.
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Summarizing, individuals want to have control of their information since the improper
and unsecured management of their information may lead to attacks, frauds, and identity
misuse, as identity information can be exploited whenever authentication and authoriza-
tion based on those identity attributes are required. Nevertheless, the complexity of some
privacy agreements exposed by services providers and the increasing number of partic-
ipants overwhelm users. This issue can be appreciated in Figure 1.2, which shows the
relationship between expressed concern and privacy valuation. This \weak link" is not un-
precedented, arising that the disconnect between individuals' concern and behavior applies
to the broader array of data-sharing scenarios.
Figure 1.2: Expressed level of concern vs. valuation of personal data (©[2]).
The motivation behind this problem is the lack of comprehensive privacy frameworks.
Despite IdM systems are the ideal site to deploy privacy mechanisms, current IdM speci-
cations are not ready to deal with divulging and revocation of users' online identities.
It is essential to realize mechanisms for ne-grained control of sensitive data, storage and
maintenance, which enable controlled sharing across dierent stakeholders, while data
protection against unauthorized use and minimal disclosure according to user's consent
preferences is provided.
Moreover, user's consent revocation ts with the privacy view as control over the use and
ow of one's personal information [3]. Revoking consent allows users grant or withdraw
consent of specic actions over data to certain individuals. So, this mechanism is useful
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to enforce user's role in the task of preserving her privacy.
With these requirements in mind and aiming at contributing to improve the identity land-
scape, and more specically the above privacy aspects, we provide some contributions
to the privacy provisioning for federated identity management platforms.
1.2 Objectives
The overall objective of our research is oriented to extend the federated identity
management infrastructures with an adequate supply of the users' privacy at
dierent levels while required security services are covered. As Harriet Tubman
said: ``Every great dream begins with a dreamer. Always remember, you have within you
the strength, the patience, and the passion to reach for the stars to change the world".
Therefore, to achieve our objective, we will pursue the following specic goals:
 Realizing a study of the state of the art on current techniques used to
protect the user's privacy in sensitive and open environments, among which
include anonymity, semi-anonymity, pseudonyms, etc., identifying their shortcomings
and limitations.
 Analyzing the research challenges in privacy and security, paying special
attention to data protection models that could be applied in sensitive and open
environments.
 Analyzing security and privacy risks in the dierent open and distributed en-
vironments to detect potential threats, such as identity theft, information leakage,
manipulation of information, etc.
 Designing a privacy and security model that covers the requirements identied
in the previous analysis.
 Integrating the proposed privacy and security model within an identity
management infrastructure to optimize the ability of the system to use data and
minimize risks to user's privacy and data integration in a exible and distributed
environment. This model will oer users greater awareness of the use of their dig-
ital identity online by introducing monitoring systems in order to enable users to
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balance security, privacy and usability depending on their needs. Therefore, our
contribution will allow traceability of data and user interaction in the system to sup-
port audits. In addition, delegation, exible and time-independent revocation
consent mechanisms will be included, as well as representation schemes and
management of user credentials and attributes, to provide ecient selective
information disclosure in dynamic environments and emergency scenarios.
Furthermore, as it is also an important part in the development of a doctoral thesis, we
also aim to achieve the following goals:
 Evaluation and validation of the contributions. Such validation will be mainly per-
formed on health care scenarios. Other test scenarios, such as cloud computing
environments will be also considered. This will also allow us to verify that the thesis
contributions have practical applicability in the above scenarios. For instance, the
simulations with real data from hospital emergency services are considered relevant
to be environments where extremely sensitive information is handled.
 Dissemination of the results through publication, collaboration in research projects
and participation in conferences.
 Identication of new lines of research that can be derived from this work.
 Completion of the writing and public defense of the thesis dissertation.
1.3 Development Plan
This section describes the work methodology to carry out the elaboration of the doctoral
thesis, including some general and key points for its development:
1. Gather the bibliography related to identity management in order to study and ana-
lyze the existing gaps in regard to privacy-enhancing techniques.
2. Design an architecture with the necessary elements to permit eective consent revo-
cation and selective disclosure of users' identities.
3. Design an event-based model, which allows to substitute time constraints and explicit
revocation by activating and deactivating authorization rights according to events.
Our approach is to integrate this concept in IdM systems, which can be an
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interesting alternative for scenarios where revocation of consent and user privacy are
critical.
4. Design and develop a exible, ecient and standards-based solution to guarantee
selective identity information disclosure and preserve user's privacy. We propose
a privacy-aware prole management approach that empowers the user
role, allowing her to amalgamate several service providers as well as user-
generated claims into a single credential.
5. Perform evaluation and validation tests of the designed models in order to demon-
strate the benets of the proposal and its feasibility.
6. Obtain the main conclusions from the performed research work and identify new
research lines to be followed.
7. Write and publish papers with the partial results that are obtained during the dif-
ferent phases of the research.
1.4 Interest of the Research
In regard to publication and dissemination, the content of this thesis was developed as a re-
search line in several national R&D projects, called\Espa~na Virtual"1, CONSEQUENCE2,
EMRISCO (EMergency Response In Smart COmmunities) and INRISCO (INcident Mon-
itoRing In Smart COmmunities)3. The Espa~na Virtual and CONSEQUENCE projects
included specic working packages for \Security and Identity Management", whilst the
EMRISCO and INRISCO research projects incorporated the Work Package 3 for \Secu-
rity and Privacy"; where our ideas on security and privacy were contributed.
Moreover, dissemination was also accomplished through publication of scientic papers.
The main papers that support the interest of the research presented in this thesis are
detailed below. For each contribution, we briey explain the kind and date of publication
(i.e., whether conference or journal) and its contents, showing which part of the dissertation
they support. It is to note that all the journal papers correspond to journals indexed in
the JCR. We also reference other complementary works we have published that, though
1http://www.espanavirtual.org/
2http://consequence.it.uc3m.es/
3http://www.inrisco.org/
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they do not deal with core aspects of this thesis, are derived from the ideas presented here
(e.g., application scenarios, use-cases, etc.) and integrated in those works. The criterion
for ordering the results is their relevance to the dissertation, so more relevant papers are
listed rst.
Main Contributions to Journals:
1. Title: Enhancing Privacy and Dynamic Federation in IdM for Consumer Cloud
Computing.
Authors: R. Sanchez-Guerrero, F. Almenarez, P. Arias, D. Daz-Sanchez and A.
Marn.
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics ISSN: 0098-3063. Printed
version in Vol. 58, Iss. 1, pp. 95 - 103, February 2012. Impact Factor as of 2012:
1.087. Q2, category: Electrical and Electronic Engineering [4].
This work presents an identity management architecture based on privacy and repu-
tation extensions compliance with the SAMLv2 standard. The document, extended
from our conference paper in [5], analyzes the main identity management and pri-
vacy challenges to be tackled in consumer cloud computing. Likewise, the proposal
provides modules that enable users to access cloud services and share digital con-
tent without disclosing their real identity and to have enhanced awareness over their
identity through audit and monitoring services.
2. Title: An Event Driven Hybrid Identity Management Approach to Privacy Enhanced
e-Health.
Authors: R. Sanchez-Guerrero, F. Almenarez, D. Daz-Sanchez, A. Marn, P. Arias
and F. Sanvido.
Journal: Sensors, 12(5) pp. 6129-54, May 2012. Impact Factor as of 2012: 1.953.
Q1, category: Instruments & Instrumentation [6].
In this paper we analyze the main current identity models to preserve privacy in
identity management systems, when these are applied to sensitive scenarios such
as e-health, parental control, etc. We focused on the issue of eective consent re-
vocation, which is not supported by any of the models, presenting an event-based
mechanism enabling a new concept, the sleepyhead credentials, which enables to
achieve a more exible revocation consent model by activating and deactivating
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authorization rights according to events. The contributions of the paper include a
hybrid model supporting delegation compliance with the SAMLv2 standard, a math-
ematical model describing the event-based model, and an evaluation of the overhead
introduced by the system.
3. Title: Collaborative eHealth meets Security: Privacy-Enhancing Patient Prole Man-
agement.
Authors: Rosa Sanchez-Guerrero, Florina Almenarez, Daniel Daz-Sanchez, Patricia
Arias and Andres Marn.
Journal: Accepted for publication (January 2017) in the IEEE Journal of Biomedi-
cal and Health Informatics (J-BHI). Impact Factor as of 2016: 2.093. Q1, category:
Health Information Management.
In this article we propose a privacy-awareness prole management approach based
on a novel Adaptive Extended Merkle structure and compliant with EHR standards,
that promotes the user role to realize a selective disclosure of her information to
the dierent health stakeholders. Thus, the contribution empowers users to combine
several healthcare providers as well as user-generated claims into a single credential,
while avoiding the creation of bogus patient's EHR proles. To achieve this, the
work denes and evaluates a light structure that can be saved on handled devices, as
well as adapting eciently to changes over time and enriching compositions of the
patient's medical history, thanks to the designed algorithm.
Main Contributions to International Conferences:
1. Title: Improving Privacy in Identity Management Systems for Healthcare Scenarios.
Authors: Rosa Sanchez-Guerrero, Florina Almenarez, Daniel Daz-Sanchez, Andres
Marn and Patricia Arias Cabarcos.
Conference: International Symposium on Ubiquitous Computing and Ambient In-
telligence (UCAmI'11). Rivera Maya, Mexico, December 05-09, 2011 [7].
This paper analyzes the main current identity models, as well as the privacy support
presented by the identity management frameworks. After the main limitations are
identied, we propose a SAML-based delegation protocol with the aim to improve
the revocation consent within healthcare scenarios.
2. Title: A model for dimensioning a secure event-driven health care system.
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Authors: Rosa Sanchez-Guerrero, Florina Almenarez, Daniel Daz-Sanchez, Patricia
Arias Cabarcos and Andres Marn.
Conference: Wireless and Mobile Networking Conference (WMNC 2012). Bratislava,
Slovakia, September 19-21, 2012 [8].
This works builds on the exible event-based user consent revocation mechanism
dened in [6] for health care scenarios. It extends the network dimensioning for
the event-driven hybrid model estimating the SIP-Event Notify message overhead
generated during the system operation, that means, to calculate the introduced
overhead by the subscription and notication event messages exchanged between the
entity system in order to activate/deactivate the necessary attributes and privileges,
depending on the dierent health care events that arrive to the system. For this
purpose, we used a set of statistical data collected by the HES (Hospital Episode
Statistics) online service4 and considered two main simulation scenarios: a large
hospital and a small-medium hospital.
3. Title: An Identity Aware WiMax Personalization for Pervasive Computing Services.
Authors: Rosa Sanchez-Guerrero, Daniel Daz-Sanchez, Florina Almenarez, Andres
Marn, Patricia Arias Cabarcos and Davide Proserpio.
Conference: International Symposium on Ubiquitous Computing and Ambient In-
telligence (UCAmI'11). Rivera Maya, Mexico, December 05-09, 2011 [9].
This article proposes the introduction of identity management with privacy exten-
sions in WiMAX, as a previous step to the denition of identity aware WiMax per-
sonalization of pervasive computing services. Personalized content can be achieved
through a SAML-based IdP, which includes services for user prole management
and device prole selection. The user, device and subscription prole are associated
under a WiMAX session linked to a specic user identity.
4. Title: Introducing Infocards in NGN to enable user-centric identity management.
Authors: D. Proserpio, F. Sanvido, P. Arias, R. Sanchez, D. Daz-Sanchez, A. Marn
and F. Almenares.
Conference: IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM 2010). Mi-
ami, Florida, USA, December 06-10, 2010 [10]
4http://www.hscic.gov.uk/
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This work seeks to improve the navigation experience and security in multiservice
and multiprovider environments the user must be empowered to control how her
attributes are shared and disclosed between dierent domains. Thus, a manner
to combine the gains of a SAML federation between service and identity providers
with the easiness for the nal user of the Inforcard System using the well known
architectural schema of IP Multimedia Subsystem is explained.
Related Contributions to Journals and International Conferences:
In addition, the following publications complement the core ideas in the above mentioned
papers by the denition and the integration of application scenarios:
1. Title: Media Gateway: bringing privacy to Private Multimedia Clouds connections.
Authors: D. Daz-Sanchez, F. Almenarez, A. Marn, R. Sanchez-Guerrero and P.
Arias.
Journal: Telecommunication Systems, Vol. 55, Issue 2, pp 315-330, February 2014.
Impact Factor as of 2014: 0.705 [11].
This article describes a solution that enables limited devices to access contents lo-
cated in private clouds, with the cooperation of network providers. It includes a
comprehensive and ecient solution for managing content among federated home
environments. As part of the purpose of empowering the user role as well as to
improve user experience, we placed signicant eorts on interoperability and privacy
protection when it comes to accessing cloud resources from other networks.
2. Title: FamTV: An architecture for Presence-Aware Personalized Television.
Authors: P. Arias-Cabarcos, R. Sanchez, F. Almenares, D. Daz-Sanchez, A. Marn.
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics. ISSN: 0098-3063. Printed
version in Vol.57, no.1, pp.6-13, February 2011. Impact Factor as of 2011: 0.941.
Q2, category: Electrical and Electronic Engineering. [12].
In this article, extended from our conference paper in [13], presents a presence-
aware personalized architecture, which enables to combine the advantages of content-
ltering and presence-aware technologies for personalization. It provides a security
and privacy layer to establish privacy-enabled congurations and rules. These ele-
ments are desired, since TVs are usually located in a common place at home and
most of the time there are more than one viewer. In this way, whether a user is
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watching TV, her personal widgets, such as social network comments, are cong-
ured to become visible in the screen. When another user enters into the room, her
presence is recognized and the elements considered private are automatically hidden.
This work received the Chester W. Sall Award for the 2nd place best paper in
the IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 2011.
3. Title: A H.264 SVC Distributed Content Protection System with Flexible Key Stream
Generation.
Authors: Daniel Daz-Sanchez, Rosa Sanchez-Guerrero, Andres Marn Lopez, Flo-
rina Almenares and Patricia Arias.
Conference: IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE-Berlin
2012). Berlin, Germany, September 03-05, 2012 [14].
This article describes a distributed system for content encoding and protection that
generates a exible key stream that simplies the receiver. The proposed key man-
agement scheme is based on Merkle hash trees generalized by a Markov's state chain,
based on a directed acyclic graph, which allows to provide the key streams as a graph
in which every node represents a video quality and depends on the previous lower
qualities using a Markov's state chain. In such a way, a receiver does not need to
decode the entire graph, by inferring the probability of selecting one path or another.
4. Title: Family Personalization Service.
Authors: D. Daz-Sanchez, R. Sanchez-Guerrero, P. Arias-Cabarcos, I. Bernave and
F. Almenares.
Conference: IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE-Berlin
2011). Berlin, Germany, September 06-08, 2011 [15].
This paper, builds on the ideas in [12], and describes a personalization system which
empowers to automatically congure devices surrounding users. The system deals
with privacy-based ltering and group preference modeling.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
With the aim to achieve the goals outlined in the above sections, the organization of this
dissertation is as follows:
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Chapter 2 presents the state-of-the-art on technologies and latest research related to the
thesis. It objectively reviews the dierent existing identity management models; provides
an overview of techniques for privacy-awareness proles management, a background of
current specications for managing of personal information focused on e-health standards;
and summarizes related work being carried out by individual researchers, international
research projects and organizations involved in standardization.
Chapter 3 proposes a generic infrastructure to solve the privacy limitations of current
identity management models. Based on this high-level infrastructure description, Chap-
ters 4, 5, 6 and 7 go deeper into the main components and extensions of the architecture.
More specically, in Chapter 4, we give a comparative analysis of the privacy support
in identity management systems emphasizing the importance of the revocation consent
property. Besides, we propose an event-based mechanism enabling implicit revocation of
user's attributes and rights, and formalize a mathematical model to represent the event-
driven system behavior. Chapter 5 is dedicated to the validation of the ideas presented
in the previous chapter.
Next, Chapter 6 describes our approach for selective privacy-enhanced user prole man-
agement, which enables to construct enriched compositions of user's prole. An algorithm
to sort the proposed structure based on patterns of access compliance with standards for
personal information management is also described. Moreover, in Chapter 7 we explain
the evaluation carried out to validate the selective privacy-enhanced user prole manage-
ment proposal.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the results and discussions presented in this thesis. Fur-
thermore, since the need for further work and exploration is necessary in any useful re-
search, we also describe the future lines that can be followed from the ideas presented
here.
Apart from the the aforementioned chapters, we have included Appendix A, which con-
tains a glossary with all the acronyms used in the document.
14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter2
State of the Art
Contents
2.1 Identity Management Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 Federated Identity Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.2 User Centric Identity Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2 Privacy Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2.1 Basic Concepts and Denitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2.2 Principles and rules of privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2.3 Current Privacy-Preserving Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 Structures for privacy-awareness proles management . . . . . 50
2.3.1 Basic Concepts and Denitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.2 Hash trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3.3 Skip Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3.4 Identity and Attribute-Based Encryption Approaches . . . . . . 59
2.4 Current standards for personal information managing in sen-
sitive scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4.1 OpenEHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4.2 The ISO/EN 13606 Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4.3 HL7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.5.1 Previous Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.5.2 International Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
15
16 CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
2.5.3 Standards Developing Organizations and Related Bodies . . . . . 79
2.1 Identity Management Models
According to Jsang et al. [16] the fundamental privacy protection principle is that expo-
sure of personal information should be minimized. If we transfer this concept to identity
management approaches, this means that, the fewer parties involved in the management
of the identity information the better.
Nevertheless, achieving a good degree of privacy implies observing every of the main
privacy principles: anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, unobservability, selective dis-
closure and revoking consent. A detailed denition of the above privacy principles will be
provided in section 2.2.2. Furthermore, although the property of anonymity is one of the
main principles of privacy, it would be desirable that IdM systems support mechanisms
to break the anonymity of a user for the purpose of analysis or evidence under certain
circumstances (e.g., a malicious user, lawful interception).
For clarity, we introduce here the main actors in an identity management scenario. (i)
the Service Provider (SP)1, which provides services and takes decisions about a particular
subject based on the identity information provided by (ii) the Identity Provider2, that
authenticates users, manages identity information and shares identity information with
various SPs upon user request. (iii) The Principal, or the End User, who has a particular
digital identity and interacts (usually via an user agent) with both SPs and IdPs.
Identity models can be categorized into the following three styles: federated identity, user-
centric identity and hybrid identity models.
In the federated identity model, user or identity data are distributed across various identity
providers, which have a trust relationship among each other. Such trust relationships are
based on agreements between the SPs and IdPs belonging to the federation and they are
usually established on organizational level, whereas enforcement is carried out on technical
level.
1The term Relying Parties is also frequently used to refer to SPs
2The term Asserting Parties is also used to refer to IdPs
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Figure 2.1: Federated identity model: involved entities and interactions between them.
Thus, the federation identity model enables users of one domain to securely access resources
of another domain seamlessly, without the need for redundant user login processes. But
also it provides means for cross-domain user account provisioning, cross-domain entitle-
ment management and cross-domain user attribute exchange. However, the user does not
actively participate in the above processes, since all interactions between the applications
for authentication and attribute exchange, are carried out between SPs and IdPs, as can
be seen in Figure 2.1.
In its turn, as shown in Figure 2.2, the user-centric identity model situates the user in
the middle of a transaction. So, the user is no longer aside of the trust establishment,
authentication and attribute exchange processes. Nevertheless, user's attribute exchange
process cannot be completely user-centric, since in some scenarios the user is not always
online to grant her consent. On the other hand, federated identity models raise privacy
concerns because user's identity information may be available to every entity belonging to
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Figure 2.2: Interactions and involved entities for the user-centric identity model. Note
that, the user is placed in the middle of transactions between SPs and IdPs.
the federation.
Therefore, a combination of both models is necessary. In this thesis, we will use the term
hybrid identity model to refer to the blend of the federated and user-centric approaches.
2.1.1 Federated Identity Models
The identity federation model can be dened as a set of standards, technologies and
agreements, that enable SPs to recognize user identities and entitlements from other SPs
or IdPs. Federated models bring user attribute exchange, user account provisioning, enti-
tlement management and personalized service provisioning. The main existing federation
protocols and specications are detailed below.
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Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [17] is an standard developed by the Secu-
rity Services Technical Committee (SSTC) of the standards organization OASIS (the Or-
ganization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards). SAML v2.0 [18] is
announced as OASIS standard in March 2005 and it represents the convergence of Liberty
Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) [19] and other identity management initiatives, as
Internet2 Shibboleth [20] or Web Services Security (WSS) OASIS [21]. However, despite
SAML was standardized in 2005, corrections and new specications (rectication of Au-
gust 2007 \Approved Errata for SAML V2.0" draft technical review in March 2008, etc.)
have emerged.
SAML denes an XML-based framework to allow the exchange of security assertions
(about authentication, authorization decision, and attributes) between entities. The aim
is to establish open standards to easily conduct online transactions while protecting the
privacy and security of identity information. These standards enable identity federation
and management through features such as account linkage, and proles, especially for the
simple session management. The SAML standard denes four key elements:
 Assertions [22], which dene security claims of an entity within a system. These
statements can be of three types: authentication assertions, attribute and authoriza-
tion decisions. Authentication assertions indicate that the user has been authenti-
cated by an application, whereas attribute assertions are more specic and include
information about the user attributes (e.g., Alice belongs to a certain group with
more privileges). Finally, assertions authorization decision, dene something that
the subject is entitled to do (e.g., Alice has permission to buy certain product).
These assertions and other standard components are based in XML, which allows to
be used them in other contexts. In order to better illustrate the format of a SAML
Assertion, an XML fragment containing an example assertion with authentication
and attribute statements is provided in Figure 2.3:
 Protocols [22], which dene how assertions are requested.
 Bindings [23], which dene the lower-level communication or messaging protocols
(such as HTTP-GET, HTTP-POST, Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), Re-
verse SOAP (PAOS), etc.) that the SAML protocols can be transported over.
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Figure 2.3: Example of assertion with authentication and attribute statements.
 Proles [18], which are combinations of SAML protocols and bindings, together
with the structure of assertions to cover specic use-cases. For each combination of
use case and binding, some variations of the same prole can be obtained. Eight
dierent associations and specic transport protocols for a use case (Web SSO prole,
Attribute prole, etc.) are contemplated by the standard.
The combination of the aforementioned building-block components enables a set of use-
cases to be supported. The most relevant use case for which SAML is applied is multi-
domain web Single Sign-on (SSO), which allows a user to authenticate at a single site
and gain access to other sites without the need for re-authentication, i.e., reusing the
same identier, act of authentication, and login session across multiple sites. The Single
LogOut (SLO) use-case enables near-simultaneous logout of active sessions associated with
a principal through SOAP, HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST or HTTP Artifact bindings.
Moreover, the logout can be directly initiated by the user, or initiated by an IdP or SP
because of a session timeout, administrator command, etc.
Another important prole is the SAML Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) [24], which is a
single sign-on authentication prole that species a client application capable of directly
determining and contacting the user's IdP, without getting redirected by the SP. It is par-
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ticularly useful for client-side and server-side applications with a xed set of services. The
ECP prole focuses on applications with enhanced functionality, for instance, supporting
more sophisticated protocols and bindings (e.g., SOAP and PAOS). This prole also allows
to empower the user or principal role, as well as to improve user's privacy by minimizing
direct interactions between SPs and IdPs.
Apart from the aforementioned SSO use cases, SAML covers a huge range of use-cases,
namely:
 Federation via Persistent Pseudonym Identiers: In this use-case, an IdP
federates the user's local identity principal with the principal's identity at the SP by
means of a persistent SAML name identier.
 Federation via Transient Pseudonym Identiers: A temporary identier is
used to federate between the IdP and the SP for the life of the user's web SSO
session.
 Federation via Identity Attributes: In this use-case, attributes of the principal,
as dened by the IdP, are used to link to the account used at the SP.
 Federation via Out-of-Band Account Linking: The establishment of federated
identities for users and the association of those identities to local user identities can
be performed without the use of SAML protocols and assertions.
 Federation Termination: This use case consists of the termination of an existing
federation.
We describe below the rst two use cases, as they are the most relevant here.
In the Federation via Persistent Pseudonym Identiers scenario sketched out in Figure 2.4,
the processing is as follows:
1. John attempts to access a resource on the SP (cars.example.co.uk). John does not
have any security context on this site and is unknown to it. The resource that the
user attempted to access is saved as RelayState information.
2. The SP sends to the IdP (airline.example.com) a SAML <AuthnRequest> message
requesting that the IdP provide an assertion using a persistent name identier for
John. As the service provider desires the IdP have the exibility to generate a new
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Figure 2.4: Identity Federation with Persistent Pseudonym Identiers example (©[18]).
identier for the user should one not already exist, the SP sets the AllowCreate
attribute on the NameIDPolicy element to \true".
3. In Steps 3 and 4 the user authenticates as john and a local security context is created
for the user at the IdP.
4. In Step 5 the IdP looks up user john in its identity repository. Then it veries the
AllowCreate attribute and creates a persistent name identier (61611) to be used
for the session at the SP. Then the IdP builds a signed assertion where the subject
uses a transient name identier format. The name john is not contained anywhere
in the assertion.
5. The SP validates the digital signature and assertion on the SAML Response in Steps
6 and 7. Moreover, the supplied name identier is then used to determine if a previous
federation has been established. Whether a previous federation has been established
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then go to step 9. If no federation exists for the persistent identier in the assertion,
then the SP needs to determine the local identity to which it should be assigned.
The user will be challenged to provide local credentials at the SP. Optionally the
user might rst be asked whether he would like to federate the two accounts.
6. A local session is created for user jdoe and an access check is then made to establish
whether the user jdoe has the correct authorization to access the desired resource at
the SP.
7. Finally, if the access check is correct, the desired resource is returned to the user
agent (e.g., a web browser.).
Regarding, the Federation via Transient Pseudonym Identiers use-case, the dierence
from the previous scenario is that, the IdP creates a transient name identier (294723) for
John to be used for the session at the service provider (See Figure 2.5). Then, the IdP
builds a signed assertion where the subject uses a transient name identier format. Thus,
the Federation via Transient Pseudonym Identiers use-case avoids having to manage user
identiers and passwords at the SP and enables users partial anonymity, since the IdP
knows which user corresponds to each identity.
Summarizing, in regard to privacy, SAML supports partial anonymity in the sense that
the IdP itself is able to know which user corresponds to each identity. Indeed, SAML
does not provide a solution from preventing IdPs from tracking user's visits to SPs. Re-
garding privacy policies, this technology allows to obtain a principal's consent or describe
specic attributes to satisfy requirements to preserve privacy within a health care com-
munity, through the Cross-Enterprise Security and Privacy Authorization (XSPA)-SAML
prole [25]. Nevertheless, SAML standard states that privacy must be considered, but
concrete decisions are left to the implementors.
Liberty Alliance
The Liberty Alliance initiative began in September 2001, after the union of a consortium
of companies, suppliers and institutions with a common interest: to provide standards for
federated identity management. The federation model of Liberty, provides guarantees of
privacy and security as well as an open and standard single registration mechanism. The
development of the set of standards and recommendations has been divided into three
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Figure 2.5: Identity Federation with Transient Pseudonym Identiers example (©[18]).
phases:
 Phase 1- Liberty Identity Federation Framework: Proposes the use of fed-
erated network identity for troubleshooting network identity. Identity Federation
Framework was the rst specication of Liberty and denes the roles of the partici-
pating entities in a federated identity environment, as well as the required protocols
to perform tasks related to identity federation, single sign on, use of pseudonyms
global and single logout. The concept of \Circle of Trust" (CoT) is a key pillar,
which is dened by Liberty as a federation of SPs and IdPs that have business rela-
tionships based on Liberty architecture and operational agreements and with whom
users can transact business in a secure and apparently seamless environment.
The specications that make up the ID-FF module, reect the description archi-
tecture) [19], abstract protocols, XML Schema Denitions (XSDs) [26], the recom-
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mended deployment lines, specication of mandatory and optional requirements,
etc.
 Phase 2- Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF): It is based on ID-
FF to provide a framework for web services based on federated identity. It provides
the necessary mechanisms to share attributes based on permissions, discovery service
proles and user interaction. The specication includes support of SAML and allows
to implement web services in a standard environment ensuring end-to-end security.
 Phase 3- Identity Services Interface Specications (ID-SIS): ID-SIS, mean-
while, uses both ID-FF and ID-WSF to provide network services. ID-SIS specics
web services interfaces that support high-level particular use cases, such as proles,
geographical location, presence, etc.
Apart from the core frameworks dened above, during the last years of the project Liberty
Alliance also released Identity Governance Framework (IGF) [27] dealing with identity
governance and privacy issues. In February 2007, the Liberty Alliance started to work on
the IGF, releasing the rst version publicly in July 2007.
The Identity Governance Framework denes a set of standards to help enterprises easily
determine and control how identity related information is used, stored, and propagated in
appropriate and secure ways. IGF enables the creation of policies or contracts between
an Attribute Provider (AP) and a SP. Therefore, IGF includes two XML syntaxes: At-
tribute Requirement Markup Language (ARML) and Attribute Authority Policy Markup
Language (AAPML).
Moreover, IGF denes basic privacy constraints such as usage, storage, propagation and
display of identity data. Thus, an attribute provider creates statements to access and use
protected attributes. At the same time, a SP may specify whether the requested attributes
will be discarded after their usage. Furthermore, the SP could request to modify the data or
forward it to another SP. However, in [28], Liberty proposes a multi-level policy approach,
which does not consider any specication or rules for storing user preferences in a manner
that would facilitate the SPs to match the privacy policy levels in the attribute request
with the levels in user's preferences.
26 CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
WS-Federation
The Web Service Federation Language or WS-Federation [29] is an OASIS standard that
forms part of the larger Web Services Security framework (WS-*). More specically, WS-
Federation describes how to use WS-Trust [30], WS-Security [21] and WS-Policy [31] all
together in order to provide federation between security domains. This enables high value
scenarios where authorized access to resources managed in one realm can be provided to
security principals whose identities and attributes are managed in other realms.
Moreover, WS-Federation introduces mechanisms to manage and broker trust relation-
ships in a heterogeneous and federated environment. This includes support for federated
identities, attributes and pseudonyms. \Federation" refers to the concept that two or more
security domains agree to interact with each other, specically letting users of the other se-
curity domain accessing services in the own security domain. For instance, two companies
that have a collaboration agreement may decide that employees from the other company
may invoke specic web services. These scenarios with access across security boundaries
are called \federated environments" or \federations". Each security domain has its own
security token service, and each service inside these domains may have individual security
policies. WS-Federation uses the WS-Security, WS-SecurityPolicy and WS-Trust speci-
cations to specify scenarios to allow requesters from the one domain to obtain security
tokens in the other domain, thus subsequently getting access to the services in the other
domain. WS-Federation contemplates the following security services:
 Privacy services: Requests made to service providers for security tokens or au-
thorization decisions may include information that is subject to personal or orga-
nizational privacy requirements. WS-Federation denes extensions to the Request
Security Token and Response syntax dened in WS-Trust for a requestor to express
its privacy requirements and likewise for a Security Token Service (STS) to indicate
to the requestor the mechanisms actually used for issuing the token. This includes
extensions for indicating parameters that an STS must use if it issues a token, as
well as identifying individual sensitive claims in a security token for which the values
should be protected by encryption. WS-Federation also denes a model for how
privacy statements can be obtained using mechanisms dened in HTTP, HTTPS,
WS-Policy or WS-MetadataExchange [32].
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 Pseudonym service: may store tokens associated with a pseudonym to simplify
retrieving a pseudonym and associated tokens in a single security token request. It
may provide distinct pseudonyms for dierent scopes, that is, for access to dier-
ent resource providers. WS-Federation describes how a pseudonym service that is
combined with a STS may map pseudonyms to issued tokens. This includes describ-
ing how the mapping may be automatically performed based on the target service
for the token. It also denes extensions to the WS-Trust Request Security Token
and Response messages syntax for requestors to manually specify how pseudonyms
should be mapped.
 Authorization services: may be implemented as a special type of Security Token
Service which provides decision brokering services for participants in a federation.
While the internal processing of an authorization enforcement is implementation
specic, interoperability between services in a federation requires a common model
for interacting with authorization services. WS-Federation denes an authorization
model that meets these requirements. The protocol also denes two extensions for
rich authorization capabilities.
 Authentication types services: to facilitate interoperability, WS-Federation has
identied and dened a set of Universal Resource Identiers (URIs) for specifying
the common authentication types and assurance levels that can be used in Request
Security Token and Response messages.
 Attribute services: WS-Federation denes a model for either party to access at-
tribute services based upon the security token service concept and reliant on the
token issuance protocol dened in WS-Trust.
Figure 2.6 illustrates two realms with associated attribute/pseudonym services and some
of the possible interactions. It must be noted that, it is assumed that there is a trust
relationship between the realms. Hence a requestor has knowledge of the policies of a
resource (including its STS) and can obtain its identity token from its IP/STS (1a). It also
interacts with the resource's Identity Provider/Security Service Token (IP/STS) (Step 2)
in order to obtain an access token for the resource. In this example the resource IP/STS
has registered a pseudonym with the requestor's pseudonym service (Step 3) possibly
for service-driven mappings. In Step 4, the requestor accesses the resource using the
pseudonym token, which enables to the resource to gain additional information in Step 5
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Figure 2.6: General Model for Pseudonyms and Attributes services (©[29]).
from the requestor's attribute service if authorized based on its identity token (previously
in Step 1c). Note that trust relationships will require to exist in order for the resource
or its IP/STS to access the requestor's attribute or pseudonym service. In subsequent
interactions, the requestor's IP/STS may automatically obtain pseudonym credentials for
the resource (See Step 1b) whether they are available. In such cases, Steps 2 and 3
are omitted. It worth be mentioned that, in Step 1a a service-consumable identity is
returned when the mapping occurs at the IP/STS. In this way, pseudonym services could
be integrated with identity providers and security token services. Similarly, a pseudonym
service could be integrated with an attribute service as a specialized form of attribute.
Discussion
The federated approach is based on groups of SPs and IdPs that have a pre-existing
mutual trust relationship. Consequently, specications, such as SAML, recommend using
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [33] for establishing trust relationships. Regarding the
terminology of Liberty Alliance and WS-Federation, the above groups are called members
of the circle of trust and security realm, respectively (see Fig. 2.7).
Nevertheless, as far as usability and scalability are concerned, this model has several draw-
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backs. For instance, it adds further legal and technical complexity, since to be part of the
circle of trust, an entity would need to sign a legal agreement. In addition, federated model
presents scalability issues when deployed in dynamic open environments due to rigidity
and staticity of the agreements between federated organizations. A comparative analy-
sis of the underlying trust mechanisms of the current frameworks for federated identity
management can be found in [34].
Figure 2.7: Federated model scenario. A user, after a successful authentication, can access
services from any service provider within the circle of trust. For instance, booking a ight,
then renting a car, and nally buying tickets for a show. Note that the IdP stores identity
information on behalf of the user.
From a privacy perspective, the federated identity approach has both advantages and dis-
advantages. Regarding its advantages, it allows users to have multiple identities within a
given domain. Similarly, the federated model enables an entity to have dierent identities
or identiers in dierent domains. These features make possible, for a single identity to
have dierent identiers in dierent domains, e.g., as patient in a health care domain, as
employee or student in another domain, etc. Moreover, from the SP perspective, the iden-
tier mapping permits dierent SPs to refer to the same user through dierent identiers.
Whereas the IdP needs to know the \real world" identity of a user, this user identity can
be anonymous for a specic SP, which provides additional privacy protection. However, it
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must be noted that users never participate in the opaque process so they need to believe
that the IdP will behave honestly.
The main drawback of this kind of federated identity models is that the privacy protection
depends on the privacy policy and the adherence of the IdP or SP to the policy, which
can be a threat. For instance, dierent SPs could be able to match personal information
of the same user because of the mapping between identiers. In order to prevent this
problem, SAML, Liberty andWS-Federation, advise the use of pairwise, directional opaque
identiers.
2.1.2 User Centric Identity Models
The user-centric model places the user in the middle of a transaction. Thereby, this ap-
proach gives users total control over their identities, as well as control over authentication
and attribute exchange processes. In this way, the user is no longer aside of the trust
establishment process. However, this does not mean that users should approve every
transaction, but that data always ow through the user's identity agent. This approach
indeed empowers users and follows better than the federated model the philosophy of
minimal disclosure dened by Jsang. Moreover, from the usability perspective, the user-
centric identity model, solves scalability problems and provides similar services, as SSO,
whereas is compatible with the federated model. The main existing user-centric protocols
and specications are explained below.
OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect 1.0 [35] is the current version of OpenID. It is a simple (JSON3/REST4)-
based identity protocol built on top of the OAuth2.0 [36] protocol and JWT (JSON Web
Token) [37] family of protocols. OAuth is an open standard for authorization, which gives
users the ability to grant third-party access to their resources without sharing their pass-
words. It also provides a way to grant limited access (in scope, duration, etc.). OAuth
allows users to share their private resources (e.g., photos, videos, contact lists, bank ac-
counts) stored on one site with another site without having to hand out their credentials,
3JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
4Representational State Transfer (REST)
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typically username and password.
The concept of OAuth is based on the metaphor of a valet key of car, since it only gives
third parties a controlled (limited) access to the car [38]. OAuth mimics the valet key
metaphor by providing sites with just enough information to accomplish what the user
has requested, but not allowing third-party sites access to any other user information.
OAuth denes two dierent types of Tokens (Request and Access) and covers both online
and oine scenarios (i.e. the user is not present). Thus, it only allows users to hand
out to third parties tokens (instead of credentials) to their data hosted by a given service
provider. The tokens could be granting a printing service access to photos without sharing
username and password.
To achieve the aspects and scenarios above described, the framework provides and species
the following roles, concepts and denitions:
 The Service Provider or Resource Owner: It is the term used to describe
the website or web-service where the restricted resources are located. For instance,
it can be a photo sharing site where users keep albums, an online bank service, a
microblogging site, or any other service where user's private information is kept.
 The User: The users have personal data they do not want to make public on the
Service Provider, but they do want to share it with another site. In OAuth, the
protocol stops without manual interaction with the user at least once to receive
permission to grant access.
 The Consumer or Client: This can be a website, a desktop program, a mobile
device, a set-top box, or anything else connected to the web trying to access the
User's resources. The Consumer is the one getting permission to access resources
and the Consumer is where the useful part of OAuth happens.
 The Protected Resources: They are data controlled by the Service Provider
(e.g., photos, documents, contacts, activities or any URL with a need for access
restrictions.), which the Consumer can access through authentication.
 The Consumer Key: It is a value used by the Consumer to identify itself to the
Service Provider.
 The Consumer Secret: It is a secret used by the Consumer to establish ownership
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of the Consumer Key.
 The Request Token: It is a value used by the Consumer to obtain authorization
from the User, and exchanged for an Access Token.
 The Access Token: It is a value used by the Consumer to gain access to the Pro-
tected Resources on behalf of the User, instead of using the User's Service Provider
credentials.
 The Token Secret: It is a secret used by the Consumer to establish ownership of
a given Token.
So, the OAuth 2.0 framework enables a Relying Party (RP) to obtain prole information
about the end user, but does not provide any means for the RP to obtain information
about the authentication of the end user.
In OpenID Connect, in addition to obtaining prole information about the end-user, RPs
can obtain assurances about the end user's identity from an OpenID Provider (OP), which
itself authenticates the user. Thus, OpenID Connect enables clients to verify the identity
of the user based on the authentication performed by an authorization server. Moreover,
the specication suite is extensible, allowing participants to use optional features such
as encryption of identity data, discovery of OpenID Providers, and session management,
when it makes sense for them.
OpenID Connect involves interactions between four entities:
 The OpenID Provider: It provides methods to authenticate an end user and
generates assertions regarding the authentication process and the attributes of the
end user.
 The Relying Party: It oers protected on-line services and consumes the identity
assertion generated by the OP in order to decide whether or not to grant access to
the end user.
 The End User: She accesses on-line services of the RP.
 The User Agent: It is typically a web browser, that is employed by an end user
to transmit requests to, and receive responses from, web servers.
In order to allow a RP to verify the identity of an end user, OpenID Connect adds a new
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type of token to OAuth 2.0, namely the id token. This complements the access token and
code, which are already part of OAuth 2.0. These three types of token are all issued by
an OP with the following functions:
 Code : It is an opaque value, which is bound to an identier and a URL of the RP.
Its main purpose in OpenID Connect is to serve as a mechanism to RP to retrieve
other OP cards. With the aim to help minimize threats arising from its possible
exposure, this code has a limited validity period and is typically set to expire shortly
after issue to the RP [36].
 Access Token : It is a credential used to authorize access to protected resources
stored at a third party (e.g., the OP). Its value is an opaque string representing an
authorization issued to the RP. It encodes the right for the RP to access data held
by a specied third party with a specic scope and duration, granted by the end
user and enforced by the RP and the OP.
 Id Token : It contains claims about the authentication of an end user by an OP
together with any other claims requested by the RP. Claims that can be inserted
into such a token include: the identity of the OP that issued it, the user's unique
identier at this OP, the identity of the intended recipient, the time at which it was
issued, and its expiry time. It takes the form of a JSON Web Token [37] and is
digitally signed by the OP.
Both an access token [39] and id token [30] can be veried by invoking the web API of
the issuing OP.
In this way, the RP generates an authorization request on behalf of the end user and sends
it to the OP through a user agent. The OP provides ways to authenticate the end user
and asks the end user to enable the RP to access the user attributes. It also produces an
authorization response, which includes of two type tokens: access tokens and id tokens,
where the latter contain claims about user authentication. Thus, the RP can use a received
access token to access end user's attributes using the OP-provided API, and after receiving
an id token the RP learns about the user authentication, as shown in Figure 2.8.
Furthermore, OpenID Connect supports four authentication ows [41], i.e. ways in which
the system can operate, namely Authorization Code Flow, Hybrid Server-side Flow (or
Hybrid Flow), Client-side Flow (or Implicit Flow), and Pure Server- side Flow.
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Figure 2.8: OpenID Connect Protocol Overview (©[40]).
Summarizing, OpenID Connect is mainly an authentication protocol and allows attribute
exchange with the user's consent.
Information Cards
Information Cards (aka infoCard) are metaphors of real id cards whereas the identity selec-
tor mimics a wallet. We use them with a new kind of digital wallet called a selector, which
enables users to manage in an easy, visual way their dierent electronic identities. The
Information Cards technology is an open, neutral industry standard for safer digital iden-
tity supported by a non-prot organization - the Information Card Foundation (IFC) [42]-
composed by companies and individuals working together to evolve the internet identity
ecosystem. The foundation is currently organized in a series of active Working Groups
that deal with issues such as standardization, implementation, interoperability with de-
ployed identity technologies, and best practices, etc. Moreover, they published several
white papers and specications on Information Card technology and practice, being [43]
and [44] the core documents that dene the identity formats and protocol ows.
InfoCards are like business cards which let users decide what information will be disclosed
during an interaction, keeping personal data under control and they also let Relying Par-
ties to get the information they need directly from the users. Regarding identity selec-
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tors, in [43] two types of information cards are specied: Personal or Self-Issued (claims
about the user itself, e.g., phone number, e-mail address, web address); and also Managed
Information Cards, issued by IdPs. The latter can be auditing, non-auditing, or auditing-
optional to accommodate the needs of dierent business models. The identity cards are the
digital version of the cards we carry in our wallet today. Windows CardSpace [45], Higgins
project [46] or Open Source Identity Selector [47] are Identity Selector implementations
used nowadays. Furthermore, InfoCards support several data formats and authentication
methods such as XML, SAML, and OpenID. InfoCard -based identity management sys-
tems typically use Web Services Security protocols (WS-*) and SOAP. WS-Trust [30] is
the protocol used to obtain and exchange security tokens. Moreover, the integrity of the
tokens is preserved using an XML-Signature as part of the WS-Security [21] protocol.
U-Prove
U-Prove [48] [49] is an advanced cryptographic software designed for electronic transactions
and communications to overcome a long-standing dilemma between identity assurance and
privacy [1], [50]. The technology is part of Microsoft's drive to promote an open identity
and access model for individuals, businesses and governments, based upon the principles
of the identity metasystem [51]. The dilemma is addressed by enabling minimal disclosure
of identity information in electronic transactions and communications. To ensure min-
imum disclosure the U-Prove Agent software acts as an intermediary between websites.
Furthermore, U-Prove denes two classes of tokens: claim tokens, which can encode arbi-
trary claims, and ID tokens that specify globally unique, secure, and privacy-protecting
persistent identiers for users.
A U-Prove token (UPT) is a cryptographically protected container of claim information
that is issued for a Prover (the client) by an Issuer (the Claim Provider), and presented to
a Verier (the Relying Party). Each UPT corresponds to a private key needed to present
the token, and contains an Issuer's signature that vouches for its origin and integrity. A
UPT is conceptually similar to a X.509 certicate or SAML assertion, with two major
dierences:
 A UPT is generated jointly by the Prover and the Issuer in an interactive issuance
protocol. It contains no correlation handles identiable by the Issuer outside the
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certied claim values. In particular, its public key and Issuer's signature have been
randomized by the Prover in the issuance protocol; as such, these values are never
seen by the Issuer. Consequently, the Prover cannot be tracked on the basis of these
values when using the UPT, even if the Issuer and the Veriers collude (even if they
are the same entity).
 When presenting a UPT, the Prover can hide any subset of the encoded claims,
without invalidating the Issuer's signature generated on all the claims. In particular,
the Prover can hide all the claims or disclose all of them (like presenting a signed
SAML assertion or a X.509 certicate).
Figure 2.9 sketches out the protocol operation when a user congures her privacy options
to combine several claims. A Prover gets multiple UPTs certifying the same set of claims in
one instance of the issuance protocol (multiple UPTs are obtained to preserve unlinkability
between Veriers). To present any subset of the certied claims to a Verier (immediately
after issuance for on-demand tokens, or a later time for long-lived tokens), the Prover
creates a presentation proof for a selected UPT by applying the corresponding private key
to a cryptographic challenge. It should be noted that blending multiple claims only takes
place if user customizes her privacy options.
Figure 2.9: U-Prove token data ow (©[52]).
In summary, U-Prove aims to allow users to share data in a manner that protect their
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privacy, since they can now choose to share or otherwise. The specication includes a
mechanism that separates the retrieval of information from trusted third parties from
the release of this information to the destination site. This implies that the organization
issuing the information is prevented from tracking where or when information is used. The
destination site is similarly prevented from linking users to their activities.
Discussion
In regard to privacy, the user-centric model has both advantages and drawbacks. It intro-
duces the concept of meta-idp, which allows users to assert several kind of claims: user-
generated and provider-generated claims. These user electronic identities are typically
stored in user's equipment, such as her mobile phone. User-centric identity technologies,
such as InfoCards, allow users to select among their multiple identities through identity
selectors to identify herself to a service. However, it is worth mentioning here that, in the
case of provider-generated claims, the user must rely on the IdP honesty, as occurred in
the federated model (see Fig 2.10).
Figure 2.10: User centric model. A user can access services from any service provider
accepting his/her credentials. For instance, booking a ight, then renting a car and nally
buying tickets for a show. Note that the information is provided always by the user.
The main disadvantage of user-centric approach is that it requires a complex design in
order to avoid privacy and trust issues with authentication and attribute verication. In
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order to assist the reader in understanding this aspect, we provide the following example.
If we consider a real world example in which Bob may show his driver license to a bartender
to prove he is above the legal drinking age, we can see that Bob is able to use his Id card
without the Id card issuer's knowledge.
IdM
Framework
Main Purpose Format data and
types of tokens
Security and Privacy
considerations
Implementations
OpenID Connect Focuses on usabil-
ity and simplicity
aspects for iden-
tity management.
It is simple
enough to inte-
grate with client
and basic apps.
Access, Request and
id tokens for JSON
and REST.
The adoption of
JSON Web Token
and JSON Web
Signatures facilitates
attribute exchange
and processing on
mobile applications.
A huge proportion its se-
curity of is based on the
utilization of Transport
Layer Security (TLS).
It is built on the JWT
family of protocols.
Any credential man-
agement mechanisms
is dened. Use of the
Authorization Code
and Access Tokens in
a transient manner
recommended.
Google, Mi-
crosoft, Deutche
Telekom, PayPal,
etc. oers this
protocol.
InfoCards Focuses on maxi-
mizing the ease of
use and the in-
dividuals' control
over their identi-
ties.
Self-issued and man-
aged information
cards.
XML, SOAP, SAML,
OpenID and WS-*
are supported.
XML-Signature, WS-
Security.
Direct communication
between SPs and IdPs is
eliminated and identity
selectors are dened.
Windows Card
Space, Higgings,
Open Source
Identity Selectors.
U-Prove Focuses on secu-
rity and privacy
aspects of identity
management
Provides claim to-
kens and ID tokens,
which include persis-
tent identiers.
U-Prove tokens are
jointly created by the
user's computing de-
vice and a credential
authority.
Privacy by Design:
Minimal disclosure, user
control and selective
disclosure.
Claims are computed
as short zero-knowledge
proof for the device-
protection attribute.
Trusted terminal
required
U-Prove pro-
les have been
implemented
in a variety of
technologies; the
WS-Trust [52]
was used in
CardSpace.
Open-source
U-Prove C#
Crypto SDK and
JavaScript SDK
are provided.
Table 2.1: Outline of features of current user-centric IdM specications
However, if we transfer this example to a user-centric scenario, trust and privacy problems
emerge, because no SP is obliged to believe Bob when he asserts that he is old enough
to legal buy alcoholic beverages. In this sense, it is necessary that a trusted third party
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corroborates the above statement by using a provider-generated card.
In Table 2.1 we summarize the main features of the user-centric IdM specications re-
viewed in this section. With the aim to show the dierences between OpenID Connect,
Information Cards and U-Prove, aspects related to its main purpose, format data and
security tokens supported, security and privacy considerations, as well as available im-
plementations, are highlighted. A complete comparative analysis of the privacy aspects
that cover the federated and user-centric IdM technologies described in this section can
be found in Chapter 4.
2.2 Privacy Overview
2.2.1 Basic Concepts and Denitions
Privacy is dened by Windley [53] as the \protection of the attributes, preferences, and
traits associated with an identity from being disseminated beyond the subject's needs in
any particular transaction". However, privacy is a complex and subjective concept with
dierent meanings to dierent people, that depend on the context in which it is used.
In this thesis we focus on the privacy involving the capability to control what information
an individual discloses or withholds about herself, including determining who has access
to such information, and for what purposes the information may or may not be used.
With the advances in technology, users are increasingly subject to privacy threats. For
instance, users may become concerned if they discover that visited websites collect, store,
and possibly share personally identiable information about them.
According to the U.S. Oce of Management and Budget (OMB)5 [54], and also as adopted
by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [55], Personally Identiable
Information (PII) is dened as \any information about an individual maintained by an
agency, including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an indi-
vidual's identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's
maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable
to an individual, such as medical, educational, nancial, and employment information". In
5http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb
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a digital context, the term PII refers to the information that can be used to uniquely
identify a person.
In this sense, it is important to distinguish the three types of user's attributes that may
revealed: direct identiers, quasi-identiers (QIDs), and sensitive attributes. Direct iden-
tiers are attributes that can explicitly re-identify individuals, such as name, mailing ad-
dress, phone number, social security number, other national IDs, and email address. On
the other hand, quasi-identiers are attributes which in combination can lead to identity
disclosure (e.g., gender, date of birth, zip code, diagnosis codes, etc.) [56]. Last, sensi-
tive attributes are those that users are not willing to be associated with (e.g., psychiatric
diseases, human immunodeciency virus (HIV), cancer, etc.).
Based on the above types of attributes, the following classes of privacy threats can be
found:
 Identity disclosure or re-identication: It occurs when an attacker can associate
a user with her records in a published dataset [57].
 Membership disclosure: This threat occurs when an attacker can infer with high
probability that an individual's record is contained in the published data [58]. For
instance, consider a dataset which contains information on only HIV-positive pa-
tients. The fact that a patient's record is contained in the dataset allows inferring
that the patient is HIV-positive, and thus poses a threat to privacy. It should be
noted that membership disclosure may occur even when the data are protected from
identity disclosure. Some scenarios where protection against membership disclosure
is required are analyzed in [58] [59].
 Attribute disclosure or sensitive information disclosure: It occurs when an
individual is associated with information about their sensitive attributes [60]. This
information can be, for instance, the individual's value for the sensitive attribute.
Regarding a taxonomy of privacy from a perspective of law, Solove dened in [61] sixteen
dierent types of privacy violation. The author classies the identied privacy violations
in four categories, which are:
 Information Collection: surveillance and interrogation.
 Information Processing: aggregation, identication, insecurity, secondary use and
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exclusion.
 Information dissemination: breach of condentiality, disclosure, exposure, in-
creased accessibility, blackmail,appropriation and distortion.
 Invasion: intrusion and decisional interference.
Technological measures to protect against privacy violations focus mostly on preventing
the unintended leakage of information; while other types of violations fall out of the scope
of technological systems and legal measures are needed in order to prevent them. Technical
systems can better protect against the following particular privacy threats:
 Surveillance: considering adversary capable of monitoring electronic transactions,
privacy-enhancing technologies aim to reduce the risk of surveillance by concealing
information about the content and circumstances of electronic transactions from
adversary. When users are able to keep transaction contents condential and to act
anonymously, they protect themselves against surveillance threats.
 Interrogation: the technical property that protects a user from being forced to
disclose information is called plausible deniability. Systems that provide plausible
deniability make it impossible for adversary to prove that the user is concealing
information.
 Aggregation the property that prevents the aggregation of information as related
to each other or to a particular subject is unlinkability.
 Identication: Identication is connecting data to individuals. Anonymity, unlink-
ability and condentiality properties prevent this connection to be revealed.
2.2.2 Principles and rules of privacy
In the context of sensitive environments, like health care scenarios, user privacy is a funda-
mental right that is being challenged as user records are digitized. However, users should
not be required to sacrice their right to privacy with the aim to obtain services, such
as healthcare. In this sense, privacy principles and rules as anonymity, pseudonymity,
unobservability, unlinkability, selective disclosure and revoking consent have to be guar-
anteed. These concepts might have dierent denitions in the literature [62]. The works
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presented in [63] [64] [65] include additional privacy properties such as undetectability,
role interchability or undeniability/non-repudiability.
However, as it is shown in [62], not all the aforementioned privacy properties can be
achieved at the same time. For instance, complete anonymity is incompatible with non-
repudiability or accountability, which are desirable properties in healthcare scenarios.
Thus, in this section we will focus on the denition of properties from a privacy standpoint
that have been addressed to be analyzed later in Chapters 4 and 6.
 Anonymity can be dened as the state of being not identiable within a set of
subjects or entities. According to [66], this property ensures that a user may use
a resource or service without disclosing the user identity. The relevant threats are:
disclosure of identity or leakage of information leading to disclosure of identity, often
described as "usage proling". Encryption does not guarantee anonymity, since an
observer can still analyze trac, eavesdrop the sender and follow the message up to
the receiver, establishing certain relationships; therefore, IdM systems must provide
additional mechanisms, such as opaque identiers to prevent such inference. More-
over, it is necessary that IdM systems support partial anonymity or semi-anonymity
mechanisms (the IdP would know which user corresponds to each identity) for the
purpose of evidence or analysis under certain circumstances (e.g., lawful intercep-
tion).
 Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as identiers of subjects (or sets of subjects
when we generalize it a bit). The subject which the pseudonym refers to is the
holder of the pseudonym. An advantage of pseudonymity is that accountability for
misbehavior can be enforced. Thus, this enables service providers, that can link
identiers to real identities to make appropriate decisions when a user commits an
attack. In addition to the anonymity services, pseudonymity provides methods for
authorization without identication (at all or directly to the resource or service
provider).
 Unlinkability ensures that a user may consume multiple resources or services
without letting other entities to link these multiple resource or service accesses to-
gether [63]. In particular, this allows users to interact with multiple organizations,
each of them able to map a user to a given identity, using dierent identities. IdM
systems should provide mechanisms to prevent collaborating organizations from link-
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ing a given user prole at one organization with the same user prole at another.
 Unobservability permits a user to access resources or services avoiding other en-
tities, especially third parties, to observe that the resource or service is being used.
Moreover, this property is closely related to anonymity, since in terms of item of in-
terest (IOI), unobservability means anonymity of the subject(s) involved in the IOI
even against the other subject(s) involved in that IOI. As we had anonymity sets
of subjects with respect to anonymity, we have unobservability sets of subjects with
respect to unobservability. Sender unobservability then means that it is not notice-
able whether any sender within the unobservability set sends a message. Recipient
unobservability then means that it is not noticeable whether any recipient within
the unobservability set receives a message. Relationship unobservability then means
that it is not noticeable whether anything is sent out of a set of could-be senders
to a set of could-be recipients. In other words, it is not noticeable whether, within
the relationship unobservability set of all possible sender-recipient-pairs, a message
is exchanged in any relationship.
 Selective Disclosure is the act of disclosing personal information in one online
transaction setting and not disclosing it in another. Thus, users may create various
online personalities and share and receive specic information with SPs or IdPs
for each personality. For instance, users can have a private personality where they
disclose private data such as the number of their private mobile phone, and a work
personality where they disclose work-related data such as the oce location and
their meeting schedule.
 Revoking Consent enables users give or invalidate consent of specic actions over
data to certain individuals. So, user's consent revocation adjusts the privacy view as
control over the use and ow of one's personal information. IdM systems should pro-
vide this mechanism in order to enforce properly user's role in the task of preserving
her privacy.
2.2.3 Current Privacy-Preserving Models
In last years, privacy-preserving techniques has seen quick advancement due to rapid
increase in storing and maintaining personal data about individuals. The personal data
44 CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
can be misused, for a variety of purposes. Maintaining the privacy for high dimensional
database has become major aspect. With the aim to enhance these concerns, various
models based on anonymization mechanisms for preserving privacy of dierent types of
data like medical data, transportation system data, etc. have been proposed. In this
section, we review the main existing privacy-preservation techniques that deal with the
above privacy concerns.
k-Anonymity Model
Several algorithms with the aim to guarantee k -anonymity have been proposed in liter-
ature [57] [67] [68]. The anonymization problem is usually modeled as an optimization
problem, where a given information-loss cost metric has to be minimized. The solution
search space consists of all possible transformations of data (e.g., generalization, suppres-
sion) that lead to a k -anonymous dataset. Optimal solution is the one that achieves the
least information loss, and thus ensures maximum utility in the released data.
k -Anonymity model aims at hiding every individual in the released dataset among at
least k -1 others. The size of parameter k denes the level of the desired privacy.
Sweeney [57] [67] used generalization and suppression to transform quasi identiers in
a way that at least k records have identical QID values. Thus, any of them may corre-
spond to the same individual-target, for any target of the (at least) k -sized group. The
main concepts are detailed below:
Denition 2.1. An Equivalence Class is a set of records in an anonymized database that
have identical values in the QID attributes.
Denition 2.2.: A table T is considered k-anonymous with reference to a quasi iden-
tier set of attributes QID = fQ1; Q2; : : : ; Qdg, if the size of every Equivalence Class in
T is at least k.
The value of parameter k denes the level of privacy in this guarantee [69]. Satisfying
k -anonymity oers protection against identity disclosure, because it limits the probability
of linking an individual to their record, based on quasi-identier attributes, to 1/k. So,
a lager k results to larger Equivalence Classes and restricts the probability of a privacy
breach. However, this also restricts utility in the released data, as generalizations hide more
information that would be useful for instance, in data mining scenarios. Figure 2.11 shows
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a 2-anonymity example in which generalization and suppression techniques are applied for
quasi-identiers attributes (including age, gender and zip-code).
Figure 2.11: 2-Anonymity example for quasi-identiers attributes.
The work presented in [68] provides an approximate algorithm that minimizes the number
of suppressed values. The authors describes an approximation bound of O(k log k).
Regarding approaches that limit the search space by considering only global recoding,
several proposals can be found in the literature [70] [71] [58] [72]. In [70] an algorithm for
single-dimensional global recoding is proposed. The k -anonymization algorithm presented
in [71] explains a dynamic programming approach called Incognito. It tries to nd optimal
solutions for any metric by considering all possible generalizations, but only for global,
full-domain recoding. Full-domain means that all values in a dimension must be mapped
to the same level of hierarchy. For instance, in the country!continent!world hierarchy,
if France is mapped to Europe, then Canada must be mapped to America, even if the
generalization of Canada is not necessary to guarantee anonymity.
Nevertheless, the computational cost of Incognito grows exponentially, so it cannot be used
for more than 20 dimensions. A dierent approach is considered in [58], where the authors
aims at using natural domain generalization hierarchies to reduce information loss.
Finally, the approach presented in [72] proposes complete k-anonymity. However, complete
k -anonymity, may harm data utility unnecessarily because it is extremely dicult for
attackers to know for instance, all the diagnoses information in a patient record [56].
L-Diversity Model
k -Anonymity is proven vulnerable to dierent attacks, especially when the attacker has
access to background knowledge [60]. In 2006 Machanavajjhala et al. [60] proposed a new
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extended model for preserving privacy, called l -diversity. The authors classies the vul-
nerabilities of k -anonymity in two dierent attack models: background-knowledge attack
and homogeneity attack:
 Background Knowledge Attack: In this kind of attack, the adversary can use
an association between one or more quasi-identier attributes with the sensitive at-
tribute or public knowledge of the target to eliminate possible values of the sensitive
attribute. For instance, if a young individual's QID can be linked to an equiva-
lence class, where all values of the sensitive attribute \disease" are either arthritis,
Alzheimer syndrome or u, it can be inferred that the target's sensitive info is prob-
ably \u", since the rst values are highly unlikely to occur to a young person.
 Homogeneity Attack: In this attack, all the values for a sensitive attribute within
an equivalence class are the same. Therefore, even though the data is k -anonymous,
the value of the sensitive attribute for any record in that group of size k can be
predicted with 100% accuracy.
Consequently, while k -anonymity is eective in preventing identication of a record, it may
not always be eective in preventing inference of the sensitive values of the attributes of
that record. A k -anonymous table is safe from record linkage, but vulnerable to attribute
linkage. Therefore, l -diversity was proposed as an extension of k -anonymity which not
only maintains the minimum equivalence class size of k, but also focuses on maintaining
the diversity of the sensitive attributes in every class. The l -diversity model for privacy is
dened as follows:
Denition 2.3. A group of records that belong in the same Equivalence Class q* is
l-diverse, if it contains at least l \well-represented" values for the sensitive attribute S.
A table T is considered l-diverse if every Equivalence Class q* in T is l -diverse.
The l -diversity principle ensures the existence of l \well-represented" values in every
block of records (equivalence class), without further clarications on what exactly \well-
represented" means.
The simplest interpretation of \well represented" is distinct and leads to distinct l -
diversity [60], which requires each anonymized group to contain at least l distinct sensitive
attribute values. Another interpretation leads to recursive (c; l)-diversity, which requires
each group in T to contain a large number of distinct sensitive attribute values, none of
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which appears \too" often. Other principles that guard against value disclosure by limit-
ing the number of distinct sensitive attribute values in an anonymized group are (, k)-
anonymity [73] and p-sensitive-k -anonymity [74].
However, these privacy principles still allow attackers to infer that an individual is likely
to have a certain sensitive attribute value when that value appears much more frequently
than other values in the group [75].
t-Closeness Model
The main goal of the t-Closeness model [76] [77] is to limite the distance between the
probability distribution of the sensitive attribute values in an anonymized group and that
of sensitive attribute values in the entire dataset. Thus, this model requires the distribution
of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class to be close to the distribution of the
attribute in the overall table. The authors demonstrated in [76] two new types of attack
that l -diversity and similar models fail to prevent:
 Skewness Attack: Satisfying l -diversity (see Denition 2.3) does not prevent sen-
sitive attribute disclosure when the distribution of an attribute in the overall table
is skewed. For instance, authors consider a medical table with the results of HIV
examinations, where 98% of the total population were found negative. An equiva-
lence class with equal number of positive and negative results of the examination is
assumed. Moreover, it satises distinct 2-diversity and a recursive (c, 2)-diversity
can be imposed. However, individuals linked to this equivalence class face a severe
privacy risk, as they are found 50% possible of being positive to HIV, compared to
2% of the total population.
 Similarity Attack: In this attack, an adversary can learn important information
when the values of the sensitive attribute in an equivalence class are distinct but
semantically similar. Consider an l -diverse equivalence class and the sensitive at-
tribute values that appear in records of this class are bronchitis, pneumonia, u and
lung cancer. An adversary can infer that the target has some lung related disease.
In order to prevent skewness attack, Li et al. [76] proposed a privacy model, called t-
Closeness. The main concepts of this model are described below:
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Denition 2.4. The t-Closeness principle is satised when an equivalence class is said
to have t-closeness. In other words, the distance between the distribution of a sensitive
attribute in the equivalence class and the distribution of the attribute in the whole table
is no more than a threshold t. A table is said to satisfy t-closeness if all its equivalence
classes have t-closeness.
However, this model has several limitations and weaknesses. It is not suitable for prevent-
ing attribute linkage on numerical sensitive attributes. In addition, enforcing t-closeness
would severely aect the data utility as it requires the distribution of sensitive values to
be the same in all equivalence classes. This would signicantly damage the correlation
between the QID and sensitive attributes.
To reduce this information loss, another version of the t-Closeness model is presented
in [77].
Denition 2.5 The (n,t)-Closeness principle establishes that an equivalence class E1 is
said to satisfy (n,t)-closeness if there exists a set E2 of records that is a natural superset
of E1. Thus, the distance between the two distributions of the sensitive attribute in E1 and
E2 is no more than a threshold t. Furthermore, a table is said to satisfy (n,t)-closeness
if all of its equivalence classes satisfy (n,t)-closeness.
It should be noted that, this enhanced model achieves a better balance between privacy
and utility compared to the stricter t-closeness.
Other Privacy Models
Other techniques to preserve privacy proposed in the literature are -presence [58], (c,
k)-safety [78] and dierential privacy techniques [79] [80].
Firstly, the -presence model [58] intents to prevents an adversary from learning whether
an individual owns a record in the microdata. The authors proposed to bound the proba-
bility of inferring the presence of any potential target record within a specied range  =
(min;max) with the aim to prevent linkage. The main principle of this model is detailed
below.
Denition 2.6. Given an external public table E and a private table T, where T  E,
a generalized table T* satises (min;max)-presence, if min P(t 2 T jT)  max for all
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t 2 E.
Where P (t 2 T jT) is the probability that record t is included in original table T, given
its anonymous version T*.
-presence can indirectly prevent record and attribute linkages because if the attacker has
at most % of condence that the target victim's record is present in the released table,
then the probability of a successful linkage to her record and sensitive attribute is at most
%. Though -presence is a relatively \safe" privacy model, it assumes that the data
publisher has access to the same external table E as the attacker does. This may not be
a practical assumption.
Regarding the (c, k)-safety model proposed in [78], it guarantees that, whether an adver-
sary may have already known at most k pieces of implicational knowledge, they will not
be able to infer any user's sensitive information with condence higher than c. In this
work the authors study the adversary's worst-case background knowledge and provide a
polynomial-time algorithm that estimates the amount of disclosure of sensitive information
in the worst case scenario.
Other approaches as [81] introduce more realistic classes of attackers. These adversaries
may have some external knowledge and a new characteristic called stubbornness indicating
the strength of their prior knowledge.
Finally, in the last decade several models based on dierential privacy have been pro-
posed [79] [80]. Intuitively the notion of dierential-privacy says that any possible outcome
of an analysis should be almost equally likely, independent of whether any individual is
included or removed from the data set. In this way, the data of any specic individual can
never seriously aect the result of the analysis. A more detailed explanation of this model
is found in [79].
Techniques used to achieve dierential privacy include the addition of Laplacian
noise [79] [80] to each of the k outputs that is calibrated to the sensitivity of the analysis.
Nevertheless, the tolerance for the addition or removal of any one tuple in the dataset
is very restrictive for the production of a private release. Thus, the distortion of the
information due to the noise that must be added to ensure such a strict model is severe.
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Discussion
The privacy models reviewed in this section attempt to produce anonymous releases, while
maintaining the maximum possible data utility, by minimizing a given information loss
metric. Detailed denitions of dierent metrics of data utility can be found in [70] [82].
Consequently, they are prone to attacks can result to identity or attribute linkages. t-
Closeness approach has less information loss than l -diversity and k -anonymity models
but these techniques still leads to extensive information loss. Dierential privacy uses
Laplacian Noise addition and is less susceptible to minimality attacks. It provides strong
privacy guarantees, while leaving little room for data utility maintenance.
On the other hand, privacy approaches that apply to complex data sharing scenarios
while enabling selective information disclosure and eective revocation consent need to
be addressed. For instance, consider the case of multiple healthcare providers and sev-
eral identity medical records services that wish to obtain a richer view of patients' Elec-
tronic Health Records (EHRs). Healthcare providers and identity medical records services
may contribute dierent parts of patients' EHR, whereas each user or healthcare service
provider involved in the above scenario must have access only during the strictly required
time to the minimum necessary information. This scenario presents several interesting
challenges.
Firstly, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, more eective and time-independent
revocation mechanism are necessary to reach a balance between usability, privacy and
security. Secondly, as will be explained in Chapters 3 and 6, data contributed by dierent
providers need to be integrated in an ecient and privacy-preserving structure. In the
next section, we take a closer look at the existing structures for privacy-awareness user
proles management.
2.3 Structures for privacy-awareness proles management
The use of authenticated dictionary structures (ADTs) to construct user' credentials oers
desirable properties to preserve user's privacy in IdM systems, since ADTs enable to
prove the presence of an attribute without requiring to reveal any other attributes of
the structure. Furthermore, ADTs enable to combine and group user's attributes from
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dierent information sources while preserving user's privacy. ADTs are data structures
that support both update queries and tamper-evident membership queries. For instance,
a tamper-evident membership query is of the form \does element e belong to S?".
The answer to such a query consists in providing a tamper-evident proof showing that
element e participated to the construction of the root value of data set S. So, the problem
we address involves three parties: a trusted source, an untrusted directory, and a user.
The source denes a nite set S of elements that evolves over time through insertions and
deletions of elements. The directory maintains a copy of set S. It receives time-stamped
updates from the source together with update authentication information, such as signed
statements about the update and the current elements of the set.
The user performs membership queries on the set S, but instead of contacting the source
directly, it queries the directory. The directory provides the user with a yes/no answer
to the query together with query authentication information, which yields a proof of the
answer assembled by combining statements signed by the source. The user then veries the
proof by relying solely on its trust in the source and the availability of public information
about the source that allows to check the source's signature. The data structure used
by the directory to maintain set S, together with the protocol for queries and updates is
called an authenticated dictionary.
In order to better understand how ADT structures work, rstly we will review deni-
tions of hash functions and their main properties. Then, we will describe several existing
privacy-preserving techniques based on structures formed from hash functions or attribute
encryption.
2.3.1 Basic Concepts and Denitions
The term \hash function" is due to computer science, and refers to a function which
compresses an arbitrary length input bit string to an output bit string of xed nite
length [83]. These functions are primarily used to speed up the process of nding stored
data. However the term \hash function" has since been adopted by cryptographers, and
desirable properties of cryptographic hash functions, such as \collision resistance", have
been identied [84]. The main concepts are detailed below:
Denition 2.7. A function f : D ! R is preimage resistant if for a given y 2 R it is
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computationally infeasible to nd an x 2 D such that f(x) = y.
Denition 2.8. A function f : D ! R is second preimage resistant if for a given x 2 D
it is computationally infeasible to nd x0 2 D with x0 6= x such that f(x0) = f(x).
Denition 2.9. A function f : D ! R is collision resistant if it is computationally
infeasible to nd x; x0 2 D with x0 6= x such that f(x) = f(x0).
These properties imply that a malicious adversary cannot replace or modify the input
data without changing its digest. Thus, if two strings have the same digest, one can be
very condent that they are identical. There are some well known upper bounds on the
computation required to exhibit a preimage, second preimage or collision [85].
One of the rst authors to dene a hash function was Merkle [86], who dened a hash
function f to be any function with the following properties:
1. The function f can be applied to an input of any size.
2. The output of f is a bit string of xed length.
3. The output f(x) is computationally easy to calculate for any x.
4. The function f is preimage resistant (see Denition 2.7).
5. The function f is second preimage resistant (see Denition 2.8).
This denition is also sometimes known as a weak hash function [85]. Other authors
dene hash functions without preimage resistance or second preimage resistance [87], or
with additional properties such as collision resistance [88], or such that the input should
include a key [89]. Many more authors use the term hash function without specifying
the precise properties they require. We will refer to the output of a hash function as the
\output", the \hash value", or simply the \hash".
2.3.2 Hash trees
Balanced Trees
The balanced tree data structures were developed in the 1960s and 1970s and provide a
guaranteed worst-case running time that is proportional to log N for search, insert and
delete operations, where N is the number of nodes in the tree prior to the operation.
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These algorithms are based on modifying the elementary binary search tree data structure
to guarantee that the length of every path to an external node is proportional to log N.
Examples of such algorithms are 2-3 trees, 2-3-4 trees, AVL trees, red-black trees and B
trees.
A 2-3 tree is a tree data structure, where every node with children (namely internal node)
has either two children (2-nodes) or three children (3-nodes), whereas a 2-3-4 tree is a
self-balancing data structure, where every internal node has either two, three, or four (4-
nodes) child nodes. Regarding AVL trees, they are self-balancing binary search trees. In
an AVL tree, the heights of the two child subtrees of any node dier by at most one; if at
any time they dier by more than one, rebalancing is done to restore this property.
A red-black tree in its turn, it is a binary search tree with one extra attribute for each
node: the colour, which is either red or black. Finally, B trees are self-balancing tree data
structures and generalizations of binary search trees in that a node can have more than
two children.
In [90], Guibas and Sedgewick showed that all of these algorithms can be implemented
with red-black trees, which are binary search trees with one extra bit of storage per node:
its color, which can be either red or black. By constraining the way nodes can be colored
on any path from the root to a leaf, red-black trees ensure that no such path is more
than twice as long as any other, so that the tree is approximately balanced. In other
words, each link in a binary search tree is assigned a color (red or black) that can be used
to control the balance, and that this framework can simplify the implementation of the
various algorithms.
Furthermore, each node of the tree now contains the elds color, key, left, right, and p. If
a child or the parent of a node does not exist, the corresponding pointer eld of the node
contains the value NIL. We shall regard these NIL's as being pointers to external nodes
(leaves) of the binary search tree and the normal, key-bearing nodes as being internal
nodes of the tree.
[90] also describes a way to maintain a correspondence between red-black trees and 2-3-4
trees, by interpreting red links as internal links in 3-nodes and 4-nodes. Since red links can
lean either way in 3-nodes (and, for some implementations in 4-nodes), the correspondence
is not necessarily 1-1 (See Figure 2.12). The basic operations that balanced-tree algorithms
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Figure 2.12: Example of Red-black representation of a 2-3-4 tree.
use to maintain balance under insertion and deletion are known as rotations. In the context
of red-black trees, these operations are easily understood as the transformations needed
to transform a 3-node whose red link leans to the left to a 3-node whose red link leans to
the right and viceversa.
In red-black trees, also a simple operation known as a color ip is used. In terms of 2-3-4
trees, a color ip is the essential operation: it corresponds to splitting a 4-node and passing
the middle node up to the parent. A color ip obviously does not change the number of
black links on any path from the root to the bottom, but it may introduce two consecutive
red links higher in the tree, which must be corrected. Figure 2.13 illustrates a color ip
operation example to split a 4-node.
In regard to the security applications of these structures, multiple works that explore
certicate revocation and the publication of data collections on the Internet can be found
in the literature [91] [92] [93] [94]. [91] propose a binary red-black hash tree for certicate
revocation meanwhile [92] and [93] use the same kind of tree structure to guarantee secure
sharing of information and authorized access in collaborative cloud scenarios.
On the other hand, in [94] Naor and Nissim used techniques from incremental cryptography
in order to dynamize hash trees to support the insertion and deletion of elements. In their
scheme, the source and the directory maintain identically implemented 2-3 trees. Each
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Figure 2.13: Flipping color example to split a 4-node.
leaf of such a 2-3 tree T stores an element of set S, and each internal node stores a one-way
hash of its children's values. Hence, the source-to-directory communication is reduced to
O(1) items, since the source sends insert and remove instructions to the directory, together
with a signed message consisting of a timestamp and the hash value of the root of T. A
directory responds to a membership query for an element x as follows: if x is in S, then the
directory supplies the path of T from the leaf storing x to the root, together with all the
siblings of the nodes on this path; else (x is not in S ), the directory supplies the leaf-to-
root paths from two consecutive leaves storing y and z such that y < x < z, together with
all siblings of the nodes on these paths. By tracing these paths, the user can recompute
the hash values of their nodes by recalculating the hash value for the root, which is then
compared against the signed hash value of the root for authentication.
There are nevertheless some drawbacks of this approach. Dynamic 2-3 trees are not triv-
ial to program correctly, as it is. In addition, since nodes in a 2-3 tree can have two or
three children, one must take special care in the structuring of the query authentication
information sent by the directory to the user. Namely, all sibling nodes returned must be
classied as being left children, middle children (if they exist), or right children. Recom-
puting the hash value at the root requires that a user be able to match the computation
done at the source as regards a particular leaf-to-root path.
Eventually, as it will be shown in chapter 6, in the case of healthcare scenarios, patient's
medical history or records do not have to follow a strict binary, ternary or quaternary
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structure. Therefore, it is required to have a structure that allows to bring together user's
information in a more exible manner.
Merkle Trees
The well-known Merkle's tree [95] was the rst authenticated dictionary structure. A
Merkle tree is a binary tree, where leaf nodes are labeled by the hashed values of the
elements of a set, S, and internal nodes are labeled by the hashed values of concatenated
labels of their children. The root value is then the label of the root node, and the proof
that element e belongs to S consists of the labels of all sibling nodes on the path from the
leaf node representing e to the root node. In other words, a Merkle's tree is a hash tree T
for a set S stores the elements of S at the leaves of T and a hash value f(v) at each node
v, dened as follows:
 If v is a leaf, f(v) = h(x), where x is the element stored at x and h is a collision-
resistant cryptographic hash function.
 Else (v is an internal node), f(v) = h(f(u); f(w)), where u and w are the left and
right child of v, respectively.
The authenticated dictionary for S consists of the hash tree T plus the signature of a
statement consisting of a timestamp and the value f(r) stored at the root r of T. An
element x is proven to belong to S by reporting the sequence of values stored at the
siblings of the nodes on the path from the node storing x to the root. Each of these values
must be identied as being stored at a left or a right child node, so that the user can
correctly recompute the root's hash value and compare it to the current signed value.
It is important that all this order and connectivity information be presented to the user,
for without it the user would have great diculty recomputing the hash value for the root.
This hash tree scheme can be extended to validate that an item x is not in S by keeping
the leaves of T sorted and returning the leaf-to-root paths. Then, hash values associated,
for two elements y and z such that y and z are stored at consecutive leaves of T and
y < x < z, or y is undened and z is the left-most leaf or z is undened and y is the
right-most leaf.
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Figure 2.14 shows a perfect binary Merkle tree with height 2, because it is the extension
of a perfect binary hash tree to a Merkle tree. In addition, we will refer to the height of a
Merkle tree as the height of the underlying hash tree.
Figure 2.14: Example of a Merkle Tree.
The main goals of Merkle's trees are the following: 1) to make one-time signature schemes
feasible and 2) to provide an ecient key management, that reduces the amount of public
keys and their size.
Several enhancements to the original Merkle tree can be found in the literature. The im-
provements proposed in [96] and [97] basically consist of: 1) to use pseudo random number
generators with a seed value to generate the private keys of the one-time signatures and 2)
to use many smaller Merkle trees instead of one big tree. Furthermore, several approaches
that use Merkle tree-based structures to provide security or privacy mechanisms in dif-
ferent application scenarios, such as cloud computing, smart grid, wireless networks and
reputation systems can be found in the state of the art [98] [99] [100] [101] [102] [103].
In [98] the authors propose to integrate a Merkle tree with the homomorphic-authenticator-
based technique while in [99] the authors suggest authentication scheme that considers the
smart meters with computation-constrained resources. The work presented in [100] com-
bines a dynamic reputation mechanism based on subject logic with the multi-level security
technology in order to provide a privacy-aware secure hybrid wireless protocol. [101], in
its turn, considers a reputation system which relies on Merkle trees, blind signatures, non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs and signed blocks of data to achieve anonymity preserv-
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ing, minimize the workload on the trackers and to fairly distribute the record maintenance
tasks to the service providers.
Eventually, Merkle trees can be generalized by a structure called \hash DAG", based on a
Directed Acyclic Graph [104], thus allowing to extend the original Merkle tree (a binary
tree) to an m-ary Merkle tree. Hence, our thesis contribution is based on an extended
and unbalanced Merkle tree, because this structure enables richer clustering and to node
verication using a single signature. Thus, we oer potentially a large number of veriable
attribute combinations by means of a single verication tree that empowers the user to
realize a selective disclosure of her information to the dierent entities.
2.3.3 Skip Lists
Skip lists are another kind of ADT structure introduced by W. Pugh as an alternative
data structure to search trees [105]. The main idea is to add pointers to a simple linked
list in order to skip a large part of the list when searching for a particular element. While
each element in a simple linked list points only to its immediate successor, elements in a
skip list can point to several successors.
Thus, a skip list stores a set S of elements in a series of linked lists S0; S1; S2; : : : ; St .
The base list, S0, stores all the elements of S in order, as well as sentinels associated with
the special elements  1 and +1. Each successive list Si, for i  1, stores a sample of
the elements from Si 1. The method used to dene the sample from one level to the next
determines the kind of skip list being maintained. The default method is simply to choose
each element of Si 1 at random with probability 1/2 to be in the list Si. But one can also
dene a deterministic skip list [106], which uses simple rules to guarantee that between
any two elements in Si there are at least 1 and at most 3 elements of Si 1. In either case,
the sentinel elements  1 and +1 are always included in the next level up, and the top
level, t, is maintained to be O(log n), where n is the number of list elements.
In both the deterministic and the randomized versions, the top level is guaranteed to
contain only the sentinels. We therefore distinguish the node of the top list St storing
 1 as the start node S. A node of Si 1 storing an element that does not exist in Si is
said to be a plateau node. A node that is not a plateau node is said to be a tower node.
Thus, between any two tower nodes of the same list, there are some plateau nodes. In
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Figure 2.15: Example of a skip list.
deterministic skip lists, the number of plateau nodes between two tower nodes is at least
one and at most three. In randomized skip lists, the expected number of plateau nodes
between two tower nodes is one (See Figure 2.15).
Moreover, a skip list data structure supports the following operations: nd, which allows
to determine whether elements x is in S ; insert and remove, which enable to both insert
x into S and remove x from S, respectively.
2.3.4 Identity and Attribute-Based Encryption Approaches
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [107] enables for a sender to encrypt a message to an
identity without access to a public key certicate. The IBE systems view identities either
as a string of characters or a set of descriptive attributes [108].
Shamir [107] rst proposed the concept of Identity-Based Encryption. However, it was
not until much later that Boneh and Franklin [109] presented the rst Identity-Based
Encryption scheme that was both practical and secure. Their solution made novel use of
groups for which there was an eciently computable bilinear map. Canetti et al. [110]
proposed the rst construction for IBE that was probably secure outside the random oracle
model. To prove security they described a slightly weaker model of security known as the
Selective-ID model, in which the adversary declares which identity he will attack before
the global public parameters are generated. Boneh and Boyen [111] give two schemes with
improved eciency and prove security in the Selective-ID model without random oracles.
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Concerning attribute-based encryption (ABE) models, in these approaches each user has
a set of attributes and access policies that are dened to determine that the users with
certain attributes are authorized to access the shared data. ABE cryptosystems [108]
crowd in two categories: ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [112] systems and key-policy
ABE (KP-ABE)) [113] systems. In the rst, the users' secret keys are associated with
sets of attributes, and a sender generates a ciphertext with an access policy specifying the
attributes that the decryptors must have. Regarding KP-ABE solutions, the users' secret
keys are labeled with access policies and the sender stipulates a set of attributes; only the
users whose access policies match the attribute set can decrypt.
It is worth to be mentioned that, in an attribute-based encryption system ciphertexts are
not necessarily encrypted to one particular user as in traditional public key cryptography.
Instead both users' private keys and ciphertexts will be associated with a set of attributes
or a policy over attributes. A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if there is a \match"
between his private key and the ciphertext. In their original system Sahai and Waters [108]
presented a threshold ABE system in which ciphertexts were labeled with a set of attributes
S and a user's private key was associated with both a threshold parameter k and another
set of attributes S'. In order for a user to decrypt a ciphertext at least k attributes must
overlap between the ciphertext and his private keys.
The primary drawback of the Sahai-Waters [108] threshold ABE system is that the thresh-
old semantics are not very expressive and therefore are limiting for designing more general
systems. Goyal et al. [113] introduced the idea of a more general key-policy attribute-based
encryption system. In their construction a ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes
and a user's key can be associated with any monotonic tree access structure. The approach
of Goyal et al. can be viewed as an extension of the Sahai and Waters techniques where
instead of embedding a secret sharing scheme in the private key, the authority embeds a
more general secret sharing scheme for monotonic access trees.
This approach solves granularity problems of the approach presented in [108] and it works
well to manage more or less permanent user' prole attributes that do not vary over time.
But in those cases in which the attributes of the user's prole are very changing, it could
present scalability problems.
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2.4 Current standards for personal information managing
in sensitive scenarios
Sharing of Electronic Health Records among healthcare providers has experienced a note-
worthy growth in the last years, since it enables physicians to remotely monitor patients'
health and enables individuals to manage their own health data more easily. The EHR
is a longitudinal collection of electronic healthcare information about individual patients
as well as populations. A typical EHR system consists of several subsystems, such as ap-
pointments and scheduling; admission, discharge, and transfer (ADT); prescription order
entry; dietary planning; routine clinical notes; lab and radiology orders; picture archiving,
and smart card sign-on.
However, these scenarios face signicant challenges regarding security and privacy of the
extremely sensitive information contained in EHRs. Several government bodies, non-
government organizations, public hospitals and private clinics have joined forces to imple-
ment numerous security measures ranging from regulatory control to security process and
technologies. For instance, the HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act) [114] is a well-known federal law, which protects health information and ensures that
patients have access to their own medical records, while giving new responsibilities to those
in charge of protecting this information.
Nowadays, there are several EHR standards as Health Level Seven International
(HL7) [115], OpenEHR [116] and International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
EN 13606 [117] compliant with the HIPAA and that we have studied, in order to carry
out the validations of our thesis contributions. Particularly, we have selected health
care scenarios, since they are among the most sensitive environments.
Current e-health standards are based on a dual model architecture, which denes two
conceptual levels: reference model and archetype model. The reference model denes the
set of entities that form generic building blocks of the electronic healthcare record. The
archetypes dene clinical concepts in the form of structured and constrained combinations
of the entities contained in the reference model, so clinical knowledge is dened at this
level. Both OpenEHR and ISO EN 13606 use this modeling architecture, which has also
inuenced HL7 CDA.
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On the other hand, in order to facilitate the interoperability and provide integration ca-
pabilities in the exchange of such EHRs, initiatives as Integrating Healthcare Enterprise
(IHE) Proles [118] have emerged, but holistic implementations of IHE based e-Health
infrastructures to share EHRs are currently rare. IHE describes real world use cases. In
addition, it tries to solve security and privacy issues by a modular approach, which de-
nes Integration Proles and use cases to address several issues, such as communication
of claims about the identity of an authenticated users, exchange of medical or care data
or recording of the patient privacy consents.
Nevertheless, the current e-health standards do not deal with some aspects of privacy,
such as selective identity information disclosure or ne-grained control of sensitive data
that enable open sharing across dierent healthcare stakeholders in a secure way.
In chapter 6 will describe and detail our proposal to address the above privacy issues.
For that thesis contribution, we have selected OpenEHR, because it oers an open and
extensible framework, as well as archetypes for many clinical terms widely used in hospitals
and summary EHR systems in multiple countries. Here we summarize three well-known
EHR specications in order to provide a brief background that contextualizes the thesis.
2.4.1 OpenEHR
The OpenEHR Foundation [119] is a not-for-prot company, which was established in 2000
in the UK. Members of OpenEHR work closely with standardization bodies, including ISO
TC215, CEN TC/251, HL7 and national standards bodies. It publishes e-heath related
specications, open source software, domain models (archetypes) and educational material
around a platform architecture. Its specications include: the OpenEHR Reference Model
(RM), consisting of the primary information models (IMs), the archetype model (AM)
which includes the Archetype Denition Language (ADL) and Archetype Object Model
(AOM), and the OpenEHR service model (SM), which denes interfaces to major software
services in a health information environment. Release 1.0.2 [116] of its information models
are widely used in the industry. The Archetype Denition Language (ADL) v1.4 [120]
and its associated Archetype Object Model (AOM) specication [121] are ISO standards.
OpenEHR is a founding member of the Clinical Information Modelling Initiative (CIMI)6,
6http://informatics.mayo.edu/CIMI/index.php/Main Page
2.4 Current standards for personal information managing in sensitive
scenarios 63
and OpenEHR's ADL 2 draft standard7 is the language of CIMI models. Since 2012,
industry interest in OpenEHR's open platform health computing approach has grown
substantially. There are now around ten\Industry partner"(nancially supporting) vendor
companies (primarily from Europe). These are responsible for OpenEHR systems running
in a growing number of hospitals and health authorities worldwide. Furthermore, there are
active semantic health modeling programmes or projects based on OpenEHR archetypes in
Australia, Brazil MoH, Moscow City, Norway MoH, Slovenia MoH, and United Kingdom
NHS.
On the other hand, OpenEHR provides standards for: clinical (EHR) and demographic
data (the OpenEHR Information Models [116]); clinical (EHR) and demographic content
models, and connection points to terminology through the OpenEHR archetypes and tem-
plates; guidelines, portable queries and key services and APIs including REST services
generated from archetypes.
The OpenHER Architecture
Strategically, the OpenEHR approach enables a platform-based e-health software market,
in which vendors and developers solutions interface via standardized information models,
content models, terminologies and service interfaces. This gives procurement stakeholders
new choices, enabling them to avoid product and vendor lock-in; retain ownership of
the data for secondary use, as well as let their clinical experts be directly involved in
solution development, via archetype authoring. Thus, it also allows application developers
to concentrate on their applications, and simply plug in to a reliable back-end.
The OpenEHR technical approach is \multi-level modeling within a service-oriented soft-
ware architecture", in which models built by domain experts are in their own layer (See
Figure 2.16).
This allows domain experts to be directly involved in dening the semantics of clinical
information systems, and it also makes using terminology much easier. OpenEHR of-
fers an international repository of these models, known as \archetypes" and its archetype
specication is an ISO standard (ISO 13606-2). These are now being used by several na-
tional governments as described above. OpenEHR also denes specications for clinical
7http://www.openehr.org/releases/AM/latest/docs/ADL2/ADL2.html
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Figure 2.16: OpenEHR Technical Architecture: The OpenEHR technical approach is
multi-level modeling within a service-oriented software architecture, in which models built
by domain experts are in their own layer (©[122]).
information models, EHR Extracts, demographics, data types and various kinds of service
interfaces. These have been used in hospitals and summary EHR systems in various coun-
tries. It has also included a leading edge Guideline Denition Language (GDL), originally
developed by Cambio in Sweden, as a specication.
A second dimension via which the OpenEHR modeling approach can be viewed is single-
source modeling. Via this approach, archetypes and templates are denitive models of
semantics, without commitment to specic messaging or document standards. Instead,
these concrete expressions are now generated artifacts, i.e., document and message schemes
are no longer manually modeled. Once single-source modeling is established, other outputs
including user interface (UI) forms and software source code. This means that a model for
'microbiology result' only needs to be done once to enable reports, UI forms, documents
and other message formats to be generated.
Archetypes and Templates
The archetypes are key elements of the OpenEHR methodology. They are detailed and
domain-specic denitions of clinical concepts in the form of structured and constrained
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Figure 2.17: OpenEHR Technical Architecture: The OpenEHR single-source modeling
approach (©[122]).
combinations of the entities of the reference model. Archetypes refer to clinical concepts
and represent healthcare and application specic concepts such as blood pressure, exami-
nation of the chest, heart rate, etc. In other words, they are reusable, structured models of
clinical information concepts that appear in EHRs, such as \test result" , \physical exami-
nation" and \medication order", and are expressed in terms of constraints on the reference
model. All data in OpenEHR EHRs are instances of reference model entities, congured
by archetypes. Archetypes also act as mediators between data and terminology. They are
external to the software, and due to their adaptability, health information systems can be
computed at a semantic level and enable functions such as decision support and research
query.
Clinical concerns and the technical design of data storage can be separated through
archetypes and the two-level modeling. The rst level involves the technical concerns,
information structure and data types using the Reference Model, while the second level
handles clinical domains and semantics. Key attributes of health records are managed by
the reference model and do not need to be addressed by each archetype. The archetypes
represent discrete specications of clinical information, which are as inclusive as possible;
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they oer great advantages since data can be specied in an understandable manner to
health professionals and IT sta.
Regarding, the templates, they are locally dened models of screen forms, and ring together
a selection of archetypes, terminologies, language and other details relevant to the partic-
ular local use of archetypes. For example, concepts such as \referral" and \prescription"
are modeled as templates, which in turn use archetypes for more ne-grained concepts.
OpenEHR and the ISO EN 13606 [117] communities specify them using the ADL [120].
This language provides an abstract syntax, which can be used to express archetypes for any
reference model in a standard way. In addition, an archetype can include other archetypes
and can be used in combination to form templates. Moreover, archetypes are envisaged
as a clinical guide for clinicians.
Security and Privacy Considerations
The OpenEHR specications and core component implementations do not explicitly de-
ne many concrete security and privacy mechanisms. OpenEHR supports some of the
key requirements in a exible enough way that deployments with substantially dierent
requirements. These include EHR/demographic separation and an EHR-wide access con-
trol object. At the level of versioned objects, commit audits are mandatory and digital
signatures and hashes are available. The main security policy principles supported by
OpenEHR are detailed below:
 Non-repudiation: OpenEHR supports digital signing of communications in order
to guarantee non-repudiation of information exchanged between health care systems.
 Access control and access lists: An actor, named \gate-keeper", is responsible
for controlling access to the EHR access control congurations. The gate-keeper is
established at the EHR creation time as being one of the identities known in the
EHR (e.g., the patient, a parent, legal guardian or another responsible person.).
Moreover, it is in charge of determining who can change the access control list.
 Privacy: The content of the health record is separated from identifying demographic
information. Moreover, patients can label compositions in the EHR as having one
of a number of levels of privacy.
 Audit trailing: The EHR status, access control objects and other changes made to
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the EHR, including content objects are audit-trailed with user identity, time-stamp,
reason, optionally digital signature and relevant version information. If the updater
is the patient, a pseudo-identier can be used.
 Non removable: As health record information cannot be deleted, the logical dele-
tion implemented in version control is accomplished by labeling the data in such a
way as to make it appear deleted.
Summarizing, there are some key benets to OpenEHR's approach. Firstly, an EHR sys-
tem does not need to know a priori about any of the clinical data it will process, such as
vital signs, diagnoses or orders. Models for those things are developed separately. Mod-
els for data sets and forms are also developed separately, and UI form components are
now generated from these denitions. This enables a new generation of EHR systems
that routinely adapts to new requirements. Another benet is portable queries and deci-
sion support logic, since queries in OpenEHR are based on content models, not physical
database schemas. Coupled with EHR service interface APIs, these are enabling a new
class of decision support tools. Thus, with the Guideline Denition Language8, it is -
nally possible to express clinical logic that is truly agnostic to clinical domains, natural
languages and reference terminologies.
However, with respect to security and privacy, OpenEHR imposes only a minimal security
policy prole, which could be regarded as necessary, but generally not sucient for a
deployed system and other aspects would still need to be implemented in layers whose
semantics are not dened in OpenEHR. For instance, mechanisms that limit the time
during which given health professionals can see the patient record as well as privacy settings
to dene access control behaviour to patient's EHRs should be implemented. In this sense,
there are various eorts in progress, including the CEN EN13606 [117] part 4 work, the
ISO PMAC (Privilege Management and Access Control) [123] work being done in TC/2159
based on the generic security standard ISO/IEC 17799 [124]. Nevertheless, no large-scale
shared EHR deployments exist and security solutions to date are still developmental.
8http://www.openehr.org/releases/CDS/latest/GDL.html
9http://www.iso.org/iso/iso technical committee?commid=54960
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2.4.2 The ISO/EN 13606 Standard
The CEN/ISO EN 13606 [117] is a European norm from the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN) also approved as an international ISO standard. It is designed to
achieve semantic interoperability in the electronic health record communication. The main
objective of this standard is to dene the way that EHRs are exchanged, but it species
neither the internal architecture of an EHR system nor the way data are stored. Hence,
the ISO 13606 standard aims at dening a rigorous and stable information architecture
for communicating part or all of the EHR of a patient between EHR systems, or between
EHR systems and a centralized EHR data repository. It may also be used for EHR com-
munication between an EHR system or repository and clinical applications or middleware
components (such as decision support components) that need to access or provide EHR
data, or as the representation of EHR data within a distributed (federated) record system.
ISO 13606 follows a dual model architecture, which denes a clear separation between
information (Reference Model) and knowledge (Archetype Model) [125]. The former is
structured through a Reference Model that contains the basic entities for representing any
information of the EHR. The latter is based on archetypes, which are formal denitions of
clinical concepts (i.e., discharge report, glucose measurement, family history, etc.) in the
form of structured and constrained combinations of the entities of a Reference Model.
Furthermore, it provides a semantic meaning to a Reference Model structure and species
how health data should be aggregated and the context information that must accompany
every piece of data in order to meet ethical and legal requirements. The interaction of the
Reference Model to store data and the Archetype Model to semantically describe those
data structures; provides an unseen capability of evolution to the information systems.
Typically, a Reference Model contains sets of primitive types, classes that dene the build-
ing blocks of EHRs and set of auxiliary classes, that describe the context information to
be attached to an EHR annotation. It may contain classes to describe demographic data
and to communicate EHR fragments. Figure 2.18 (extracted from ISO/EN13606-1) shows
a simplied scheme of the basic generic components that support information and the
relationships between those components.
In regard to the archetypes, they are structured and constrained combinations of entities
of a Reference Model that represent a particular clinical concept, such as a blood pressure
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Figure 2.18: ISO/EN13606 Reference Model (simplied scheme from ISO/EN13606-
1©[117]).
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measurement or a laboratory analysis result. The archetypes can be also dened by further
constraining other archetype, called parent archetype, in order to obtain a more adequate
or ne grained representation of the clinical concept or to limit the value range of an
attribute (see Figure 2.19). Since this part of the ISO/EN13606 norm leverages appropriate
parts of the OpenEHR model for dening archetypes, OpenEHR and ISO/EN13606 share
the basis of the archetype model [126].
Figure 2.19: Relationship between information (instances of Reference Model) and knowl-
edge (instances of Archetype Model)(©[126]).
Although the main feature of ISO/EN 13606 is the dual model, it is also important to dene
other aspects in order to achieve interoperable exchange of EHR, such as nomenclature
issues, security issues and interfacing for querying:
 Reference Archetypes and Term lists: This part establishes a normative set
of coded terms, each one dening a controlled vocabulary for a Reference Model
attribute contained in ISO/EN 13606-1. It includes dierent groups of terms such
as terms related to the subject of an Entry (SUBJECT_CATEGORY), the category of
information of any ELEMENT or CLUSTER (ITEM_CATEGORY), the status of a particular
version of a record component (VERSION_STATUS), etc.
 Security : The ISO/EN 13606 specication describes a methodology for specifying
the privileges necessary to access EHR data and some other general security require-
ments that should apply to EHR communications. It also denes both general and
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specic access policies able to deny or grant access to medical records to identied
parties or specic functional roles.
 Interface Specication: This part describes a set of interfaces to request access
to the information and resolve the request. Three specic interfaces are dened to
request a specic EHR extract, one or more archetypes and to inquire a specic EHR
audit log extract.
Finally, another remarkable feature of ISO/EN 13606 is the alignment it presents to other
relevant standards such as HL7, OpenEHR, IHE [118], etc.
2.4.3 HL7
Health Level Seven International is a not-for-prot, ANSI-accredited standards developing
organization which was founded in 1987. It is dedicated to providing a comprehensive
framework and related standards for the exchange, integration, sharing, and retrieval of
electronic health information that supports clinical practice and the management, delivery
and evaluation of health services.
\Level Seven" refers to the highest level of the ISO communications model for Open Sys-
tems Interconnection (OSI) the application level. The application level addresses deni-
tion of the data to be exchanged, the timing of the interchange, and the communication
of certain errors to the application. The seventh level supports such functions as security
checks, participant identication, availability checks, exchange mechanism negotiations
and, most importantly, data exchange structuring [115].
The Reference Information Model (RIM) is the cornerstone of the HL7 Version 3 devel-
opment process. An object model created as part of the Version 3 methodology, the RIM
is a large pictorial representation of the clinical data (domains) and identies the life
cycle of events that a message or groups of related messages will carry. It is a shared
model between all the domains and as such is the model from which all domains create
their messages. Explicitly representing the connections that exist between the information
carried in the elds of HL7 messages, the RIM is essential to increasing precision and re-
ducing implementation costs [115]. The RIM consists of templates, vocabulary, and XML
standards.
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Concerning HL7 templates, they are data structures based on the HL7 RIM which express
the data content needed in a specic clinical or administrative context. They are prescribed
patterns by which multiple observation result segments may be combined to describe
selected, gross observations, etc. The observation result segment is primarily used to
carry key clinical observation/results reporting information within report messages, which
must be transmitted back to the requesting system. Some observations may be quite
simple, such as the blood pressure concept in healthcare, which involves a set of expected
observations (i.e., systolic, diastolic, patient position, method, etc.) Other more elaborate
diagnostic procedures may involve hundreds of related pieces of information, including
anatomy, orientation, sequences of measurements, etc.
Templates provide a means of coupling the multiple observation result segments needed
to send the observation with separately encapsulated rules for combining/validating them
for the particular observation. Based on user need and preference, the template oers the
user the advantage of dening the collection of observation result segments needed and the
corresponding set of validation rules once, and once, dened, the structure can be used
again and again. Since they are based on a specic user's needs/requirements, templates
can be \plug and play" at a given user site [115].
2.5 Related Work
Today, there are several approaches to identity management being the most popular the
federated and user-centric approaches. As will be shown in Chapter 4, both approaches
have benets and shortcomings, for instance, the federated model has scalability issues
which the user-centric model solves, but both of them can be used for a better privacy
management. Current IdM systems are not ready to deal with some aspects of privacy,
which are especially critical in sensitive environments, such as healthcare scenarios. Specif-
ically, user's consent revocation, is not covered by any of the aforementioned identity man-
agement approaches. This ts with the privacy view as control over the use and ow of
one's personal information [3]. Revoking consent allows users grant or withdraw consent
of specic actions over data to certain individuals. So this mechanism is useful to enforce
user's role in the task of preserving her privacy.
This property is part of the privacy rules described by the HIPAA for health, OECD (Or-
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ganization for Economic Cooperation and Developments) principles and GLBA (Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act) for nancial institutions. This is not in the European Union, where
a person's consent cannot be given prospectively and where consent must be fully in-
formed [127]. The E-Privacy Directive [128] addresses particular concerns in the use of
electronic communications to deal with personal data; however it alone does not provide
an adequate revocation solution, conferring as it does only limited rights on individuals to
prevent types of processing by withdrawing consent to such processing [129].
Furthermore, a exible, ecient and standard-based privacy-awareness prole manage-
ment solution to guarantee selective identity information disclosure and preserve user's pri-
vacy is indispensable. This section reviews both the related work carried out by researchers
(individually or in the framework of a research project), as well as the standardization ini-
tiatives that are related or may contribute in any aspect to provide privacy-enhancing
tools that empower the user role and permit secure information sharing across dierent
stakeholders, while data protection against unauthorized use and minimal disclosure are
provided.
2.5.1 Previous Work
Privacy and security are crucial issues are becoming important concerns for researchers
when managing personal information in very extremely sensitive environments, such as
e-health applications. So, this aspect must be taken into account when exchanging and
sharing data between dierent service providers and third parties, preventing personal or
sensitive data for being misused.
However, for instance, in the case of healthcare organizations, because of the complex
nature of data access for diverse purposes, often give broader access privileges and adopt
\Break the Glass" (BTG) policy to facilitate timely and eective care. Rostad and Eds-
burg [130], for example, report that 99% of doctors were given overriding privileges while
only 52% required overriding rights on regular basis, the security mechanisms of health
information systems were overridden to access 54% of patients' records. Another common
pitfall of BTG policy is that such broad-based privileges could be misused by employees.
Nevertheless, in this sense, there is still scarce work on eective revoking consent mecha-
nisms within sensitive environments.
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The approach presented in [131] is close to our work. The authors propose an activity-
oriented access control model to protect the condentiality of health information, which
consists of three levels: user level, activity level and privilege level. Thus, this proposal is
based on user activity to authorize access privileges and denes two revocation mechanisms
called single-step and multi-step revocations. However, possible activities in the hospital
and policies need to be dened in advance.
Bhatti and Grandison [132] proposed a privacy management architecture (PRIMA) model
that leverages artifacts such as audit logs arising from the actual clinical workow to infer
and construct new privacy protection rules. In particular, PRIMA implements a policy
renement module that periodically examines the access logs and identies new policy
rules using sophisticated data-mining techniques. These audit logs could, as well, be used
by privacy ocials to determine privacy violations, which in itself is a complex process and
often requires merging data from disparate sources [133]. Unfortunately such data merging
may cause potential disclosure of patients' sensitive information to the investigators against
the patients' consent.
In [134], a privacy-aware role-based access control (P-RBAC) is presented, in order to
express privacy policies. These policies are seamlessly integrated with access control. In
this same way, [135] presents the notion of consent and revocation policies to express user's
preferences, within the context of the EU FP7 EnCoRe project [136]. This work has been
extended in [137] and [138] by proposing a conceptual model for privacy policies that can
be integrated with XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Languages). They also
consider revocation of personal data as well as previously granted privileges. Nevertheless,
these works propose traditional revocation mechanisms such as temporal information being
used to predene policies. They do not take into account dynamic scenarios or information
systems designed for emergency situations.
On the other hand, as far as privacy-enhancing tools for user prole management and se-
lective disclosure of identity are concerned, we found several research initiatives in the
eld. Many authors have suggested security and privacy as key issues to address in
eHealth [139] [140] [141], but these issues as a whole have not yet been covered exten-
sively for application scenarios. The focus is normally on security related issues in general
wireless sensor networks.
Nowadays, several approaches to provide privacy-preserving techniques can be found in
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the literature [108] [113] [112] [142] [143] [144] [145] [146] [147]. Firstly, in attribute-
based (ABE) encryption models each user has a collection of attributes and access policies
are dened to determine that the users with certain attributes are authorized to access
the shared data. ABE cryptosystems [108] can be classied as ciphertext-policy ABE
(CP-ABE) [112] systems and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [113] systems. In the CP-ABE
systems, the users' secret keys are associated with sets of attributes, and a sender generates
a ciphertext with an access policy specifying the attributes that the decryptors must have.
In regard to KP-ABE approaches, the users' secret keys are labeled with access policies
and the sender species a set of attributes; only the users whose access policies match the
attribute set can decrypt. In [148] authors suggest a multi-authority CP-ABE scheme to
empower to the patient to associate an expressive access tree structure and on-demand
attribute revocation.
However, these ABE schemes require a priori access policies, which are not always available
in EHRs because the policies to access health records are sometimes determined after
key generation. [149] addresses this issue by considering a dynamic ABE paradigm, which
provides a delegation mechanism that allows users to redene the access policy and delegate
a secret key without making the redened access policy more restrictive. Nevertheless, how
to construct fully secure hierarchical identity-based encryption systems in prime-order
bilinear groups under simple assumptions remains as a challenging problem [150].
Secondly, cloud-based approaches as [142] and [143] propose privacy-aware schemes based
on query authentication to enable data condentiality, the query result integrity of sensi-
tive data, secure storage and secure computation auditing. The work presented in [144]
integrates a PRF-based key management for unlinkability, a search and access pattern
hiding scheme based on redundancy for privacy-preserving data storage. This approach
also combines ABE-controlled threshold signing with role-based encryption to provide ac-
cess control and auditability. A signature algorithm that allows for controlled changes to
the signed data is proposed in [151]. This work studies techniques that cryptographically
link the integrity of the original and modied datasets for practical types of modications
such as redaction, pseudonymization and data deidentication.
Thirdly, when it comes to information disclosure, spatio-temporal cloaking and ADT-based
approaches enable to preserve user's privacy. Spatial cloaking or perturbation allows
to hide the participant location inside a cloaked region using spatial transformations,
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generalization, or a set of dummy locations in order to achieve location privacy [152].
In [153] authors propose a privacy-preserving emergency call scheme called PEC, enabling
patients in life-threatening emergencies to fast and transmit emergency data to the nearby
helpers via mobile healthcare social networks. Once an emergency happens, the patient's
mobile device runs the PEC to collect the emergency data including emergency location,
patient health record and patient physiological condition. Then, the PEC generates an
emergency call with the emergency data inside and epidemically disseminates it to every
user in the patient's neighborhood. Moreover, the PEC has been designed to withstand
multiple types of attacks, such as identity theft attack, forgery attack, and collusion attack.
However, this kind of works do not address privacy issues related to management of user
proles.
Other approaches closer to our work are some identity frameworks like U-Prove [48] allow
selective disclosure of claims and pre-signed tokens that could be used when the entity
responsible for issuing medical records is oine. Furthermore, there are other proposals
such as identity agents [154], or veryIDX [155]. [154] proposes user-controlled identity
agents, which allow dening in advance disclosure policies, monitoring credential usage,
storing credentials based on a minimal disclosure scheme. The credentials are constructed
using Merkle trees, but the details about how patient's attributes are built or can be shared
by means of EHR standards are not provided. VeryIDX enables multi-factor identity
credential verication, by using a cryptographic commitment and an aggregated zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK).
Despite some current works [145],[156], [146] propose the use of authenticated dictionaries
or opportunistic computing mechanisms to provide selective information disclosure, none
of these works deals with neither building of the ADT structure based on EHR standards
nor combining subtrees that allows claims from dierent sources to be in a single creden-
tial in order to make easier the tasks of management of patient attributes, proles and
preferences. In this context, typical research directions are related to development of more
ecient and eective ADT-based structures and algorithms, in terms of storage overhead,
times of signature generation and verication or query and update times.
[145] proposes a signature scheme on the structure of the tree as dened by tree traver-
sals (pre-order, post-order, in-order), that improves protection against information leak-
ages. [156] describes a secure and privacy-preserving opportunistic computing framework,
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called SPOC, for m-Healthcare emergency. The authors introduce an attribute-based ac-
cess control and a privacy-preserving scalar product computation technique that allows
a medical user to decide who can participate in the opportunistic computing to assist in
processing his overwhelming personal health information data. Eventually, in [146], the
authors propose a multiway extension of the authenticated version of the skip-list data
structure and study the authentication cost that is associated with this model when au-
thentication is performed through hierarchical cryptographic hashing. However, due to
the heterogeneity of data types in healthcare scenarios, this kind of structure requires a
complex implementation.
2.5.2 International Projects
On the other hand, there are a number of key research projects primarily funded by the
European Commission - that are involved (or have been involved) in privacy and identity
management related topics. We gather here the most relevant ones. More specically,
within the Seventh Research Framework Programme of the European Union from 2010 to
2016, several new projects related to privacy and identity management started.
ABC4Trust [157] project has dened a common, unied architecture for privacy-attribute
based credentials systems to enable comparing their respective features and combining
them on common platforms. Its main contribution is the specication of the data artifacts
exchanged between the implicated entities (i.e. issuer, user, verier, revocation authority,
etc.), in such a way that the underlying dierences of concrete privacy-attribute based
credentials implementations are abstracted away through the denition of formats that
can convey information independently from the mechanism-specic cryptographic data.
It also denes all technology-agnostic components and corresponding APIs a system needs
to implement in order to perform the corresponding operations, perform the selection of
applicable credentials for a given policy or to trigger the mechanism-specic generation of
the cryptographic evidence.
STORK 2.0 (Secure idenTity acrOss boRders linKed) [158] and FutureID [159] projects
aim at building an identity management infrastructure for Europe in support of a single
market of online services. ENDORSE [160] is concerned with providing a Legal Technical
Framework for Privacy Preserving Data Management. The EnCoRe [136] project aims to
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oer the data subject consent and revocation controls through which an individual could
manage the ow of her personal data. The overall vision of this project is \make given
consent as reliable and easy as turning on a tap and revoking that consents reliable and
easy as turning it o again" [161].
PICOS (Privacy and Identity Management for Community Services) [162] investigates and
develops a state-of-the-art platform for providing trust, privacy and identity management
in mobile communities. PrimeLife [163], works on privacy-enhancing technologies that
can enable citizens to execute their legal rights to control personal information in on-line
transactions. Thus, the project is advancing the state-of-the-art in the areas of human
computer interfaces, congurable policy languages, web service federations, infrastructures
and privacy enhancing cryptography. For this purpose, PrimeLife works with the relevant
open source communities and standardization bodies.
The SWIFT [164] project (Secure Widespread Identities for Federated Telecommunica-
tions) leverages identity technology as a key to integrate service and transport infrastruc-
tures for the benet of users and the providers. It focuses on extending identity functions
and federation to the network while addressing usability and privacy concerns. The re-
search within SWIFT includes a gap analysis to identify challenges in existing identity
frameworks, a requirements list to address these gaps and a generic architecture based on
the requirements.
Summarizing, ABC4Trust, STORK 2.0, FutureID, PICOS and PrimeLife are more con-
cerned with privacy enhancing tools whilst ENDORSE and EnCoRe are concentrated on
providing privacy preserving and user's consent mechanisms. In regard to SWIFT, it
focuses on improving federation functions.
Finally, thought all the projects embrace security and privacy considerations to some
extent, none of them provides a comprehensive solution to the specic case of revoking
consent when the user is unconscious and cannot give her express consent, as we develop
in this thesis. In conclusion, current proposals do not provide a general solution that
address how to provide a hybrid and time-independent identity management model, which
includes delegation consent mechanisms. Finally, we aim to address more dimensions of
privacy, such as a richer patient prole management while enabling to bring together
several sources of EHRs to be part of a unique credential, that are not considered in the
presented approaches.
2.5 Related Work 79
2.5.3 Standards Developing Organizations and Related Bodies
Several standardization developing organizations and related bodies are working on iden-
tity management topics that conform fundamental pieces to provide enhancing privacy
tools for sensitive and dynamic environments, such as health care scenarios. In the follow-
ing, we name this organizations and explain their work and how it relates to the vision of
privacy preserving techniques in identity management platforms.
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OA-
SIS)
OASIS leads several eorts in the standardization of federation standards. As previ-
ously documented in this chapter, SAML, WS-Federation, and Identity Interoperability
Mestasystem for Information Cards, are federation frameworks standardized by OASIS.
In addition, apart form these mature identity standards, OASIS created other Technical
Comitees (TCs) that are also related to identity management. The most relevant groups
that are addressing issues of privacy are:
 OASIS Cross-Enterprise Security and Privacy Authorization TC.
This group, created in 2008, focuses on the development of healthcare proles of
existing OASIS standards, such as SAML and XACML, used to exchange interop-
erable security and privacy attributes within and between organizations. Moreover,
this TC concentrates on specifying healthcare proles of existing OASIS standards
to support reliable, auditable methods of conrming personal identity, ocial au-
thorization status, and role attributes. This work aligns with security specications
being developed within the U.S. Healthcare Information Technology Standards Panel
(HITSP). In their main document, \Cross-Enterprise Security and Privacy Autho-
rization (XSPA) Prole of SAML v2.0 for Healthcare Version 2.0", they dene a
set of attributes for using SAML assertions that can be used to capture requests for
exchange of healthcare information.
 OASIS Privacy Management Reference Model (PMRM) TC.
The PMRM group, formed in 2013, works to provide a standards-based framework
that help business process engineers, IT analysts, architects, and developers imple-
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ment privacy and security policies in their operations. The most relevant technical
work produced by the committee so far is \Privacy Management Reference Model
and Methodology (PMRM) Version 2.0". It provides a guideline for developing op-
erational solutions to privacy issues. It also serves as an analytical tool for assessing
the completeness of proposed solutions and as the basis for establishing categories
and groupings of privacy management controls.
Kantara Initiative
Kantara Initiative was announced on 2009, by leaders of several foundations and associ-
ations working on various aspects of digital identity. It is intended to be a robust and
well-funded focal point for collaboration between members of the identity community.
Kantara Initiative is bridging the enterprise, mobile, government and Web communities to
provide the industry with a clear path for moving interoperable identity systems forward,
advancing adoption and meeting marketplace. The organization is structured into working
groups that deal with dierent aspects of identity management. The groups that are more
related to privacy and focused on sensitive environments, such as healthcare scenarios, are
the following:
 Consumer Identity Work Group. The purpose of this group is to foster the devel-
opment of a consumer-friendly, privacy-protecting, high assurance \identity layer"
for the internet that enables consumers to fully exploit the potential of the internet
without fear of identity theft. They are working on proposing technical and policy
solutions that address current threats to privacy and identity, and socializes these
solutions with appropriate parties to help foster their implementation. Specically,
this group will describe how emerging identity technologies, protocols, frameworks,
laws and regulations, etc., can be leveraged to: (a) enable businesses to know, with
high condence, the identities of individual consumers with whom it engages in
high-value online transactions, without jeopardizing the privacy of the consumer'
Personally Identiable Information; and (b) enable individual consumers to prevent
others from impersonating them in high-value, online transactions.
 Healthcare Identity Assurance Work Group.
This group works on designing, implementing and testing reference applications for
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secure access to health information. Two use cases are proposed that would be
developed and supported as part of the work group. One is for consumers to be able
to access their health records with a standardized login system, and secondly, a way
for healthcare workers to access secure health information. The goal of this activity
is to engage the broadest community participation to facilitate the adoption of the
reference implementations and specications by the healthcare industry, worldwide.
 Privacy and Public Policy Work Group.
This group is intended to ensure that the Kantara Initiative contributes to better
privacy outcomes for users, data custodians and other stakeholders, by dening
privacy-related principles and good practice applicable to a broad range of prevalent
technology platforms.
 Consent and Information Sharing Work Group
The goal of this working group is to identify and document the use cases and scenarios
that illustrate the various sub-sets of user driven information, the benets therein,
and to specify the policy and technology enablers that should be put in place to
enable this information to ow.
Project VRM and other related parties wish to build a framework around which a
new type of personal information can be enabled to ow, and in doing so improve the
relationship between demand and supply. The contention is that when individuals
are forced to sign organization-centric privacy policies or terms of use then this places
limitations on the information that will be shared. If such constraints were removed,
and capabilities built on the side of the individual, then new, rich information will
ow.
More specically, the following initiatives are focused on improving security and privacy
measures in health care systems:
OpenID Foundation
The OpenID Foundation promotes and protects the OpenID community and technologies.
It is a non-prot international standardization organization of individuals and companies
committed to allowing and encouraging OpenID technologies. The foundation was formed
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in June 2007 and serves as a public trust organization representing the open community
of developers, vendors, and users. This entails managing intellectual property and brand
marks as well as fostering viral growth and global participation in the proliferation of
OpenID.
The most important group that is working on privacy for eHealth is the HEART Working
Group. It intends to harmonize and develop a set of privacy and security specications that
enable an individual to control the authorization of access to RESTful health-related data
sharing APIs, and to facilitate the development of interoperable implementations of these
specications by others. Recently, in February 2016, the OpenID Foundation members
have approved of the following specications as OpenID Implementer's Drafts: \Health
Relationship Trust Prole for OAuth 2.0" [165], \Health Relationship Trust Prole for
OpenID Connect 1.0" [166] and\Health Relationship Trust Prole for User Managed Access
1.0" [167]. The main goals of these specications are to increase baseline security, provide
greater interoperability, and structure deployments in a manner specically applicable to
(but not limited to) the healthcare domain.
International Organization for Standardization TC 215 Health Informatics
TC 215 works on the standardization in the eld of information for health and Health
Information and Communications Technology to achieve compatibility and interoperabil-
ity between independent systems. Besides, it aims at ensuring compatibility of data for
comparative statistical purposes and reducing duplication of eorts.
Today it has members from 31 countries and 162 ISO standards have been published under
the direct responsibility of ISO/TC 215. This technical committee is divided in eight work-
ing groups, being the most relevant in our topic area the ISO/TC 215/WG 4: Security,
Safety and Privacy. Its main goals are establishing guidelines for security management
in healthcare and dening standards for technical and management measures in order to:
1) enhance the condentiality, availability and integrity of health information; 2) prevent
health information systems from adversely aecting patient's security and privacy; and 3)
ensure the accountability of users of health information systems.
Chapter3
Architecture Proposal
Historically, privacy was almost implicit,
because it was hard to nd and gather
information. But in the digital world,
whether it's digital cameras or satellites
or just what you click on, we need to have
more explicit rules - not just for
governments but for private companies.
Bill Gates, 2013
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3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a global view of the architecture proposed to address the privacy
challenges presented in Chapter 1. The description starts in Section 3.2 with a brief intro-
duction to general architectural model that is common to federated identity management
infrastructures as references to introduce our extensions. Based on this basic model, a
requirement analysis is performed. Next, Section 3.3 introduces the contributions made
in this thesis to extend the functionality of the basic architecture satisfying the stated
requirements. The new components and the extended functionalities are explained and
accompanied by a owchart that illustrates how each architectural component interacts
with the rest. Finally, Section 3.4 ends with the main conclusions extracted from the
architecture proposal.
3.2 Design Principles
3.2.1 Requirements Analysis
With the aim to dene the IdM architecture, we rst analyze the current architecture of
Identity Management systems, since it will be the starting point to add the new func-
tionalities. In this respect, there is not a single IdM architecture denition. The only
thing that can be found in the literature are standards, specications, as well as guidelines
and best practices for implementation. But every organizations deploying IdM solutions
dene their own architectures. In the specic case of SAML, which is the most important
and complete framework, there are two big implementations: Shibboleth1 in education
environments and deployments in industrial/governmental environments. By extracting
the common features of them, we have elaborated a component diagram for a generic
identity federation architecture, depicted in Figure 3.1. Note that, we use generic names
for the components, however, these modules may be denominated dierently across im-
plementations despite their functionality is the same. As it can be seen in the picture, the
architectural components in the providers are:
1http://www.internet2.edu/products-services/trust-identity/shibboleth/
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Figure 3.1: Generic Architecture for Federated Identity Management. Common features
of current IdM implementations.
 Identity Services module: This module embraces services provided by the identity
framework for identication, authentication, authorization, Single-Sign On, Single
LogOut and session management. Both providers, the SP and IdP, implement this
module in order to enable the communication and exchange of user identity data
between them.
 Metadata Management module: This module is responsible for maintaining
a circle of trust, which contains information related to certicate lists, static list
of trusted entities, information about proles supported by an entity, etc. The
information contained in the metadata can be associated with either a single entity
or a group of entities and they are intended to facilitate the deployment of IdM
systems.
 IdM Library module: It provides the core functionality of the SP and IdP and
oers the necessary support for the main elements dened by current IdM speci-
cations (e.g., assertions, protocols, bindings, proles, etc.). For this purpose, it
interacts with the Metadata Management module to store the metadata of providers
with either the IdP or the SP has established a trust relationship ; and the Session
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Management module to handle users' identiers and session data. These data are
typically stored in local SP repositories. In the case of the IdP, it can be observed
that the IdM Library module also relies on Identication and Authentication Ser-
vices to authenticate users who access to the identity-based services through local
or external identity repositories.
 Cryptographic Library module: This module consists of a set of cryptographic
libraries, which oer several features: certicate generation for providers and commu-
nication with the IdM Library module for the tasks related to encryption/decryption,
signing/validation of messages exchanged between the IdP and the SPs. It also con-
tributes to the metadata generation for these entities.
 Logging Management module: This module is usually implemented by providers
with the aim to monitor user and service activities. The registries are used by
the identity services, but an interface may be also provided for auditors (external
parties).
 Data repositories: They contain information used by the rest of the components,
i.e., user's credentials, logs, session data, messages, metadata documents, security
policies, etc. These data can be stored either locally by providers or in external
repositories.
Finally, in Figure 3.1, can also be observed that the user interaction with the IdPs and
SPs is performed through a user agent, which is typically a web browser.
Functional Requirements
To complement the architecture described above, our main goal in this thesis is to de-
ne and validate (through proof-of-concepts and simulations results) some extensions to
provide a more robust privacy and identity management toolkit. As discussed in the in-
troductory Chapter in section 1.1, in the Chapter 2 in section 2.5 and it will be analyzed
in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6, the following aspects need to be tackled:
1. Current identity architectures lack of a suitable user revocation consent
mechanism, which encompasses scenarios in which the user cannot always
be aware to grant or revoke her consent expressly. IdM systems are the ideal
target to deploy the privacy mechanisms, since they handle and orchestrate every
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users' attribute exchange. However, current IdM specications are not ready to cope
with some aspects of privacy. Particularly, the user consent revocation has not yet
been adequately addressed.
It is required that IdM systems protect user's privacy and allow authorized entities
(including humans) to access users's information conveniently in order to avoid at-
tacks, frauds or identity misuse. Furthermore, there are very sensitive environments,
such as health care scenarios, where the user is not always be aware to give her con-
sent (e.g., the user suers an accident and loses consciousness.), so it is necessary an
identity management model which includes consent delegation mechanisms taking
into account the dierent events that happen in the system.
The proposed mechanism will oer users adequate interfaces and components to
congure and modify her security and privacy policies according to her privacy pref-
erences, levels of criticality of the event, etc.
2. Need for a time-independent revocation mechanism. A traditional way to
mitigate revocation challenges is to limit the lifetime of security tokens by reducing
the time-to-live to a magnitude of seconds or to minimize minutes of the vulnerability
window in cases of compromising the token. The downside to this is that the systems'
usability probably will be reduced since the user will have to re-authenticate to
obtain a new valid security token. On the opposite side, users will obtain a better
experience when token expiration is set to hours, days or months, while the risk
of compromising information and identity theft increases. In order to address this
problem, the proposed architecture will incorporate components to provide a exible
event-based user consent-revocation mechanism, which enables to substitute time
constraints and explicit revocation by managing authorization rights in accordance
with events.
3. Inclusion of new roles. As explained above, in those environments that handle
sensitive data, it is required to contemplate scenarios in which user is not online
to grant her consent. For instance, a user could delegate another user to make a
payment to buy an object when she was oine, could not be located and the price
of the object was below a certain threshold.
Besides the roles dened in the current IdM specications, it is necessary to consider
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new roles in order to oer revocation services based on events and support such
interactions. Thus, we identify the following roles, which can be adopted by dierent
entities (user, SP or IdP):
 Delegator : It is the role adopted by an entity when it gives its permissions to
access to the attributes or services provided by others.
 Delegatee : It is role played by an entity when it receives permissions to access
to the attributes or services from others by a Delegator.
In this way, we achieve that the dierent actors of IdM scenario have access to the
user's attributes that are allowed the time strictly necessary, since the revocation of
attributes and privileges will take place implicitly. It is worth noting that entities
can act as both roles of Delegator or Delegatee in each time.
4. Current IdM specications do not suciently support users regulation
the release and use of their own identity information. Nowadays, users are
expected to deal responsibly with the privacy agreements exposed by the participants
in a digital transaction, but the complexity of some agreements and the increasing
number of participants overwhelm users. In most cases, users accept Service Level
Agreements (SLAs) without reading service conditions or being aware of how they
their data will be shared, distributed or used.
So, it is necessary to include a component which allows to oer a richer management
and vision of user's proles. It also will empower the user's role enabling her to com-
bine multiple sources of identity in a single credential to present to the providers and
to disclose her personal information selectively, while minimizing direct interactions
between SPs and IdPs. Furthermore, we will address the four fundamental pri-
vacy principles reviewed in section 2.2: anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability,
unobservability, selective disclosure and revoking consent.
5. Need for an enhanced awareness over users' online identity use. The pro-
posed IdM architecture with privacy extensions should minimize privacy risks and
oer users greater awareness of the use of their digital identities by introducing
monitoring mechanisms that enable users to balance security, privacy and usability
according to their needs. In addition, the architecture proposal should allow user
interaction in the system to support auditing. To accomplish this, the solution will
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contemplate a module, which will introduce monitoring tools and an audit service
focused on data sharing.
To cover the above requirements, we present a solution for federated IdM infrastructures
based on the inclusion of a Privacy Engine, which includes several modules and sub-
modules and has distinct characteristics depending on the dierent roles of the entity
where it is located. The detailed explanation of the proposed architecture is developed in
the section 3.3.
Architectural Strategies
This section describes the design decisions and strategies that aect the overall organiza-
tion of the architecture and its higher-level structures.
 A Layered Approach. The proposed architecture is dened by following a layered
approach, where all Privacy Engine and identity management related functionalities
are grouped together in an IdM Layer. It provides simple interfaces towards the
application and services layer, thereby abstracting the internal design and structure.
So, the focus of our privacy-awareness IdM architecture is to dene the IdM Layer,
paying special attention to the Privacy Engine, and its interfaces to the upper layers
(e.g., Application). With this respect, it does not analyze the internals of the other
layers, but it only concentrates on dening the logic and interfaces necessary for
those layers to use the functionality of the Privacy Engine.
Equally important in the architecture is the specication of the data artifacts ex-
changed between the implicated entities, in such a way that the underlying dierences
of concrete Privacy Engine components will be abstracted away through the de-
nition of formats that can convey information independently from the mechanism-
specic cryptographic data.
Therefore, we will dene all technology-agnostic components of the Privacy Engine.
That is, the issuance and presentation, disclosure or revocation of user's attributes
and credentials are interactive processes, potentially involving multiple exchanges of
messages. Chapters 4 and 6 dene the models, ow operations, etc. and specify the
data exchanged during the issuance, presentation, revocation of user's credential and
attributes; and the generation and disclosure of enhanced user's proles. There are
several existing protocols, in which these privacy-awareness credentials, attributes
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and proles can be embedded, such as SAML, or new ones could be dened in the
future.
 Building Privacy-enabled applications. The implementation and deployment
of proposed architecture will be embedded into example applications showing how
to integrate the proposed extensions and components into dierent use cases for
health care, social networks, cloud computing or consumer electronics scenarios. In
this way, application developers could integrate the Privacy Engine modules in their
applications, without having to know how its layers are internally structured.
Finally, it is important to note that we contribute on a specic part of the architecture2,
but without losing the global perspective.
3.3 Architecture Description
The proposed IdM infrastructure incorporates the functionality to allow Identity Providers,
Service Providers, and enhanced clients to share common knowledge. The enhanced client
is a software element for non-HTTP uses cases, which enables to minimize direct interac-
tions between SPs and IdPs, and provides full control to users over their identities, thereby
improving mainly privacy. The proposed architecture for the elements of the IdM system
is represented in Figure 3.2. Such image shows the logic blocks, in a layered model, as
well as the relationship between them.
At the top of the architecture, we have the Application and Services Layer. It contains
applications and services oered by providers (SPs or IdPs). Note that, this layer is also
located on the the enhanced clients, containing client applications. Next, in the underlying
level we can see the IdM Layer, which oers the basic functionality of each role dened
in the IdM specications. In addition, such basic functionality is extended by adding the
Privacy Engine component.
Finally, the Data Layer accommodates the information required for the upper layers to
operate, that is: security and privacy policies, privacy preferences, history logs, user's data
2For reasons of simplicity, we do not include the architectural components that cover layers for estab-
lishment of dynamic trust relationships or location, since these topics are out of the scope of the research
presented in this thesis. Moreover, the existence of an Event Engine, which follows a notication model
including well know workows triggered by well known trusted entities is assumed and the Privacy Engine
relies on it.
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and personal information (e.g., structure data, documents, etc.).
Figure 3.2: Enhanced-Privacy IdM architecture. This shows the building blocks in the
dierent roles in an identity management system, such as providers (SP, IdP), users and
enhanced-clients.
3.3.1 Architecture Overview for Enhanced-Privacy IdM
Application and Services Layer
As will be detailed in the Use Case 2 in section 3.3.3, in very complex or heterogeneous
scenarios, applications typically rely on mechanisms for event management and workow
management tools, in order to handle and carry out eciently the dierent requests that
arrive at the system and involve the interaction of multiple individuals and resources
(e.g., Alice has an accident and as a result, she loses consciousness, a citizen noties the
emergency services that a person has suered an accident, the emergency service sends an
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ambulance, etc.).
So, with the aim to manage internal and external events that happen in the system, the
dierent tasks that are triggered involving access or exchange of sensitive information; the
Privacy Engine will rely on the following components to implement the logic for revocation
consent event-driven:
 Event Engine: This component is in charge of handling and collecting relevant
events received and sent to theWorkow Manager. Essentially, it communicates with
the sub-modules Event Broker to orchestrates the communications and operations
required by Workow Manager, to broadcast the event sent by producers to the
consumers that are interested in those types of events; and the Event Processing to
analyze the events associated with each transaction. The Event Engine supports a
producer/consumer model: components need to register as producers or notiers,
to share events with the Event Engine by declaring who they are and the types of
events that they are going to produce. Likewise, event consumers or subscribers
need to register with the Event Engine by declaring who they are and which types
of events they wish to receive. In the proposed architecture, the Privacy Engine
components called Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler is a notier; Audit Service
and the Action Monitoring components are consumers (See section 3.3.2). It should
be noted that SPs and IdPs can play the role of notiers and subscribers, in some
circumstances, either notifying dierent events or consuming them. Furthermore,
each entity can be subscribed to multiple types of events and each event type can
be attended by several notiers.
 Workow Manager is responsible for the execution of workows. It instantiates
workows from workow denitions, and decides which activities of the workow
have to be executed next. To control and monitor workow execution and to handle
failure situations, the Workow Manager maintains so-called workow control data.
For instance, these workow control data describe the actual execution stage of a
workow and its activities, or record the execution chronology. In particular, work-
ow control data cannot be manipulated by applications or users. During workow
execution, this module invokes applications if they have been assigned to the activity
to be executed next. For activities which have to be executed by users, a worklist
handler maintains the worklists stating which activities are to be executed by which
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sta members, and propagates this information to the respective user interfaces.
IdM Layer
The logic modules that make up the IdM Layer contribute to manage sessions, issue and
processing of requests and responses of authentication and authorization, etc. In this sense,
the proposed architecture supports a exible privacy-aware user prole management and
an event-driven revocation mechanism, which enable user to have more control over her
identities and her disclosed information in dierent transactions. On the other hand, this
layer has cryptographic modules based on an underlying PKI for secure communications
and exchange of needed metadata in the dialogue between the SP and the IdP about the
user. Also note that, we can think of metadata lists being equivalent to trust lists, since
a provider considers trustworthy the entities whose metadata is stored in its repository.
The core modules of the IdM layer, which are common both to providers and enhanced
clients, are detailed as follow:
 Metadata Management Both SPs and IdPs implement a conguration compo-
nent, over which the services rely. This component is in charge of accessing local data
stores to determine if a provider involved in a current identity-related transaction is
trusted. This decision is made basically by consulting the local data stores to check
if the entity is contained in a list of trusted entities.
 Authentication and Authorization Service functionality depends on its loca-
tion. So, it receives and processes the authentication request messages from either
the SP or the enhanced client, regarding to the enhanced client or IdP, respectively.
In the SP, it issues such authentication and authorization request. The modules in
each entity interact to verify the user requesting a service is really who he claims.
For this purpose, it supports multiple authentication mechanisms including PKI,
username/password, etc. In regard to the authorization process, the security as-
sertions and the attributes exchanged convey authentication decisions, proles and
attributes to services providers allowing them to decide what services or resources
the user can access. For that, this module issues (IdP) or veries (SP), and manages
authentication assertions and attribute statements. The aim is to facilitate authen-
tication and user management to users and services improving user experience while
reducing complexity and management costs.
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 Privacy Engine is responsible for managing user identiers (e.g., pseudonymous),
handling the revelation and revoking of enriched user's proles and attributes; and
auditing how user data is being accessed without compromising user's identity. To ac-
complish this, the Privacy Engine includes an audit component for events, attribute
activation, and access control decisions. The elds that are logged by monitoring
tools and veried by audit tools show the auditor what information about the user
is being accessed without divulging the actual information. In this way, this module
provides multiple and partial identities, which allows users to access services and
share digital content without necessarily revealing their name and true identity to
everyone. The use of dierent pseudonyms and privacy-awareness proles enables to
support diering ranges of identication and authentication strengths. Finally, note
that, the audit component itself will not physically prevent privacy breaches from
occurring but it can act as a deterrent and allow individuals and regulatory bodies
to monitor how data is being shared, in order to prevent from linking and trac
analysis attacks.
These modules are supported by basic libraries such as IdM and cryptographic, which
implement IdM functionalities and cryptographic algorithms and protocols, respectively.
In the user's side, these libraries implement the minimal functionality, taking into account
limited devices. Thus, the enhanced clients incorporate \lite" library versions.
Regarding the provider's side, we can also nd other two additional modules whose func-
tionality is specic to service provision:
 Session Management is responsible for managing user identiers, as well as the
session data of those users accessing SPs or IdPs services. The SP together with
IdP determine when user's session is active. The SP creates session identiers for
every user once user has already been authenticated and registered in the service.
Such session identiers are linked to users' prole. The Session Management module
also may check several user proles and select the most appropriate content for a
specic service (e.g., video on demand). Thus, the Session Management module
communicates with other modules handling authentication and attribute exchange,
and with the User Management and the Privacy Engine modules to request the
user's prole, related to the dierent services, and matches it with the user's prole
policy, the device prole and any other enforced IdP policies.
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 User Management is in charge of dealing with credential storage, management
users' proles according to their preferences and policy enforcement. Regarding
credential management, the user can store her credentials (e.g., username/passwords,
digital certicates, etc.) that are required by applications that can be accessed
for instance from TV services, social networks, payment or health care services,
user-centric private clouds, which oer a unied perspective on the user's activities,
etc. Moreover, this module also communicates with the Privacy Engine to build
and search selective privacy-enhanced user's proles and attributes. On the other
hand, the User Management module interacts with the enhanced client in order to
determinate which IdP is appropriate according to the service requested and user's
preferences. This last aspect, allows to the proposed architecture to act on behalf
of the user and perform authentication in the dierent applications providing a
seamless, personalized and improved user experience.
Besides, the enhanced client incorporates other two additional modules whose functional-
ities are:
 IdP Management is responsible for determining the most adequate identity
provider depending on the requested service, the user's preferences related to privacy
and security (e.g., type of credential) and the context. For instance, in some contexts
the user may not want to reveal any personal information, whereas in other contexts
she may wish for partial or full disclosure of identity. To achieve these tasks, this
module collaborates with the Request-Response Manager, theMetadata Management
(to congure trust relationships with the IdPs) and the Privacy Engine (See the Use
Case 1 explained in section 3.3.3).
 Request-Response Manager receives authentication, authorization or attribute
requests from the applications. It is the interface between Authentication and Autho-
rization Service and applications. These requests can be originated by authentication
request statements from the SP. After carrying out the processing and verication
of requests, this module issues or redirects responses to the applications for being
resent to the SP. Note that, the Request-Response Manager is able to use a reverse
SOAP (PAOS) binding [23] to manage the requests and responses of authentication
such as is specied.
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3.3.2 Privacy Engine: Components and Relationships
Once an overview of the proposed architecture and its layers has been provided, this
section goes into the details of each individual modules that constitute the Privacy Engine
as well as their contribution to meet the requirements identied in section 3.2.1 and the
relationship between them.
Privacy is preserved thanks to the enhanced clients and the Privacy Engine, which has
been incorporated in each entity. As explained at the beginning of section 3.3.1 and it will
be shown through the use cases described in section 3.3.3, the enhanced client allows to
give users more control over their personal information, identities, as well as control over
authentication and attribute exchange processes eliminating the direct communication
between the SP and the IdP.
Figure 3.3: Detailed view of the Privacy Engine components.
The Privacy Engine component carries out an appropriate management of user identiers,
proles, revocation of attributes/permissions according to user's preferences and events
sent by the Event Engine, as well as to monitor how user data is being accessed by
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SPs or IdPs without compromising user's identity. Figure 3.3 sketches out the dierent
Privacy Engine components, whereas Figure 3.4 illustrates the dierent functionalities of
the Privacy Engine depending on the entity in which it is located.
The IdP and the enhanced client have in common the following modules, which improve
the active role of the user and also consider scenarios in which the user may be oine:
Figure 3.4: Detailed view of the Privacy Engine components from the perspective of the
entities. The Privacy Engine has dierent functionalities depending on the dierent roles
of the entity where it is placed; for instance, management of user identiers, proles and
privacy preferences or audit and monitoring functions.
 Consent/Revocation Manager is responsible for handling and revoking at-
tributes and privileges (following the principle of minimal disclosure) depending on
the dierent event lters and the dened privacy policies. This component interacts
with various Privacy Engine components in order to cover the requirements (1), (2)
and (3) identied in section 3.2.1, including: the Privacy Preferences Service, the
Privacy-Aware Prole Handler and the Audit Service (See the use cases illustrated
in section 3.3.3). To this end, this component has been divided into two sub-modules
to separate the responsibilities of the following main functions:
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(a) Attributes and Privileges Management. The Attribute/Privileges Pro-
visioning sub-module enables to the user (Delegator) to establish dierent
terms or conditions for access to her personal information (e.g., dierent parts
of her medical history) when specic events happen. Likewise, this compo-
nent is responsible for provisioning and publishing the required credentials,
attributes/permissions in order to the consumers subscribed to those events
can receive relevant updates.
(b) Access revoking. The Attribute/Privileges Activation Decisor sub-module
analyzes the dierent elements which compose each event sent by the Event
Engine (i.e. issuer, situation, degree of severity), as well as their purposes
(i.e health care treatment, operation, emergency treatment) and applies the
corresponding privacy policy to decide whether the Delegatee can access to
the requested attributes. The policy includes the set of consent directives and
other privacy conditions (i.e. object ltering, user, role, purpose) that constrain
enforcement. In addition, this component updates the corresponding privileges
and actives new ones, if necessary, depending on the information forwarded by
the Event Engine.
 Privacy-Aware Prole Handler is in charge of managing and storing user proles
to fulll the requirement (4) specied in section 3.2.1. As it will be detailed in the Use
Case 3 in section 3.3.3, this module facilitates that users can instruct the applications
on how dierent identity attributes should be coalesced when a given SP requires
information. Thus, in some scenarios where the user interacts with several service
providers that need to access to user data stored in dierent identity repositories,
those proles would be eventually merged for each SP with other proles from SPs,
user devices or IdPs by either a client tool or a trusted identity provider (if the user
is oine). Then, the user's prole, including only the strictly required information,
would be sent to each service provider. To accomplish this, this component employs a
exible data model by allowing the combination of certied and self issued attributes
from dierent sources with dierent pseudonyms.
On the other hand, the module incorporated in the enhanced client has the following
components, that contribute to achieve the requisites related to enhanced awareness over
users' identity use and disclosure (See section 3.2.1). To facilitate the understanding of the
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interactions between the Privacy Engine components in the client site with the rest of the
architecture elements, it is recommended to look at the use cases described in section 3.3.3:
 Privacy Preferences Service provides an interface which communicates with the
Consent/Revocation Manager for conguring user's preferences about the handling
of personal data and specifying options for the use and release of sensitive informa-
tion. The set of variables that dene the customizing privacy preferences include for
instance, the user identier, information type, the requestor, the requested operation
(i.e. query, create, modify), as well as a set of pre-dened policies by the IdP.
On the other hand, this module also includes the tracking preference expression
(DNT) feature that allows user to express their personal preferences regarding cross-
site tracking to each service or application. Whereas the Do-Not-Track approaches
that recently have been incorporated in some commercial browsers, only enable or
disable tracking characteristic and this is applied to all services accessed by user
without including any preference set for conguration. Even if we use anonymous
proles and private browsing options we are tracked [168]. So, we believe that, it is
necessary to maintain a trade-o between degree of tracking and user's privacy to
obtain an adequate personalization degree in the dierent services.
Nowadays, we can nd a lot of services, for example, personalized catch up TV
services or location prediction applications, which require access to certain attributes
related to habits, preferences and user needs to properly adapt to user behavior,
to predict future patterns in his preferences and to oer a really customized user
experience. Therefore, the improvement of our proposal over current solutions comes
from oering the user the option of selecting and detailing which attributes may be
traced depending on the user's trust placed in the service, the sensitivity of a specic
attribute, desired personalization degree, etc.
 Personal Data Access Manager allows user to check the accuracy of her personal
information and visualize how his data is being used by both the SP and the IdP. For
the latter purpose, this module receives notications from the Audit Service located
in the IdP; thereby allowing the user to obtain automatically updated information
in a seamless and dynamic manner.
 Personal Identier Manager is responsible for managing dierent kind of identi-
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ers such as pseudonyms (transient or permanent identiers), social networks iden-
tiers, etc., in a exible and personalized manner in order to enable user to choose
between multiple identities when interacting with services. For this, the module in-
teracts with the IdP Management component to obtain and associate user identier
in each IdP and conveys this information to the Privacy-Aware Prole Handler. Note
that this module uses dierent pseudonyms for each SP in order to avoid dierent
SPs belonging to the same federation to infer user behavior.
In regard to other tasks of the Privacy Engine in SPs and IdPs, as it will be shown in
the use cases 2 and 3 in section 3.3.3, they are related to the functions of auditing (i.e.
IdP Audit Service) and monitoring (i.e. SP Action Monitoring) of how each SP accesses
user data without compromising user's identity. So auditing and fraud detection at SPs
could be tackled. The IdP Privacy Engine module includes an Audit Service that focuses
on data sharing, which captures any transaction or event where user data is requested,
shared, created or modied from a service provider, including information such as the
sender, receiver, target identity, as well as identifying the user attributes accessed and
the purpose for which they were accessed. It must be noted that, the actual values of the
attributes involved in each event are not logged in order to ensure that events are recorded
in a consistent manner amongst all the SPs using the Action Monitoring module. The
Action Monitoring module uses an XML-based event structure dened by us to log events
to the Audit Service, which includes the following elements:
 UserID species an opaque identier or pseudonym. It refers to the principal whose
personal information is accessed.
 SPName species the entity name, which is accessing to user data. It identies
the service provider and is a unique identier of each SP (EntityID) contained in its
metadata.
 AttributeName is a compound eld that contains the attribute names accessed by
the SP. In this case, attribute names must be consistent across the federation.
 Scope indicates the scope in which user data are being used, as well as how many
SPs are sharing or exchanging a specic user's attribute.
 Purpose species the purpose usage for attribute requested by a SP.
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 AccessTime indicates the instant time in which an attribute was accessed by a
provider. It is a timestamp of the event.
 UserDelegateeID species an opaque identier or pseudonym. This eld is op-
tional, because it is only logged in delegation cases and refers to principal in whose
behalf on user data is being accessed.
Summarizing, since the Consent/Revocation Manager and the Privacy-Aware User Prole
Handler components include the functionality that constitutes the main contribution of the
thesis, a separate chapter is dedicated to dene each of these components. Thus, Chapter 4
and Chapter 5, develop and show validation results of an event driven hybrid IdM approach
to be implemented as part of the architecture by providing a more exible revocation
model. Then, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 explain the mathematical model to represent
selective privacy-enhanced user proles and the validation carried out, respectively.
Finally, in order to complete the general picture of the architecture, next section explains
the general behavior of the architectural components through several use cases and oper-
ation owcharts.
3.3.3 Use Cases and High-Level Interactions
In order to show the behavioral part of the architecture, this section illustrates how the
dierent components interact with each other through several use cases, referencing which
parts of the proposed architecture take part in the process. The aim is to provide just a
conceptual understanding so low level details are not yet given, but they will be addressed
in subsequent chapters.
 Use Case 1: Privacy-enabled conguration: This use case is about a user that
congures her security and privacy preferences for access to her medical records. The
Privacy Engine module in the user's site congures various internal components to
ensure the fulllment of these preferences.
Figure 3.5 shows the involved steps and the aected Privacy Engine components.
The following steps and components are involved:
1. Alice provides her specication of related privacy preferences, via the interface
oered by the Privacy Preferences Service component. This specication in-
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cludes that a high critical level-based policy that would enable access to the
participant entities in particular event to full patient's medical history (e.g., if
Alice is unconscious). A low level-based policy would grant access to the parts
of medical history that Alice species according her privacy preferences is also
dened. Moreover, she selects as trusted IdP her city hospital and species the
credentials to access to a social network where she will share her daily activity
and food intake progress.
Figure 3.5: Privacy-enabled conguration use case: involved components and high-level
interactions.
2. The Privacy Preferences Service sends the information provided by Alice in
Step 1 to the Personal Data Access Manager in order to verify its accuracy.
3. If the verication result is successful, the Personal Data Access Manager for-
wards the information related to the chosen credentials and IdP to the Personal
Identier Manager (Step 3a). Otherwise, it returns an error response to the
Privacy Preferences Service in the Step 3b.
4. In the Steps 4 and 5 the Personal Identier Manager interacts with the IdP
Management and the Privacy-Aware Prole Handler components, respectively,
to request the storage of the associated privacy preferences, along with the
additional metadata (references to personal data, selected providers etc.).
5. The Privacy Preferences Service also communicates with the Con-
sent/Revocation Manager in Step 6 to manage the corresponding attributes
and privileges according to privacy preferences established in Step 1.
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6. The Consent/Revocation Manager asks for storing the information associated
to the user's credential and attributes, as well as user's consent and privacy
preferences to the Privacy-Aware Prole Handler in Step 7.
7. Finally, the Privacy-Aware Prole Handler calculates an enriched user prole
and stores this information through the Data Layer in the Step 8.
 Use Case 2: A user delegates access to others to certain parts of her
personal data when she is not able to give her express consent:
This use case is about a user, Alice, who suers an accident, that triggers several
events. The emergency service (SP1) requests access to Alice's medical records in
order to send them to an ambulance company (SP2), that needs access to her medical
records (managed by IdP1) to provide Alice the appropriate treatment.
The enhanced-privacy IdM architecture, deployed within SP1, SP2 and IdP1, han-
dles the overall process of disclosing data and grant/revocation access to user's
attributes, consistent with the Alice's privacy preferences and the credentials and
attributes congured in the Use Case 1.
Figure 3.6: Flow of interactions, involved entities and Privacy Engine components for a
use case in which the user is unconscious.
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Figure 3.6 illustrates the involved steps and the aected Privacy Engine components
along with the participant entities and their roles.
The following interactions and components are involved:
1. The emergency service (SP1) receives a call which informs that Alice has suf-
fered an accident. An employee of emergency service, Susan, completes a task
form introducing the required information (e.g., the address where the ambu-
lance company must go, etc.) by means of the worklist handler oered by the
Workow Manager.
2. In Step 2, the Workow Manager conveys the task data as an event type to
the Event Engine in order to it can be analyzed and sent it to the consumers
subscribed to that event.
3. The Event Engine deployed within the SP1 processes the received event and
broadcasts it to the ambulance company (SP2) in Step 3.
4. When the SP2 arrives at the scene of the accident (in Step 4), it identies the
patient and noties her identity to the SP1 (See the interaction between the
Event Engines of SP1 and SP2). At the same time, the SP2 requests access to
Alice's medical history in order to give her a calming to stabilize her.
5. To disclose the strictly parts of Alice's medical records, in Step 5 the SP1 inter-
acts with the medical record service (IdP1) to check the credential containing
attributes and permissions congured by Alice in the Use Case 1.
6. The occurred events are sent by the Event Engine deployed within IdP1 to the
Consent Revocation Manager in Step 6.
7. In Step 7, the Consent Revocation Manager examines the event received and
requests to the Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler rigorously necessary at-
tributes to be sent them to the SP2.
8. The Consent Revocation Manager also communicates with the Audit Service,
in Step 8, to record the request for access to parts of Alice's medical history re-
quested by the SP1 (e.g., Alice's UserID, Bob's UserDelegateeID, the attribute
names to represent the part of Alice's medical history related to therapeutic
precautions that includes allergies, the scope and purpose to indicate that these
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data will be used by SP1 and SP2, etc.).
9. The Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler and the Audit Service interact with
the Data Layer to obtain the requested data without revealing information
related to non requested attributes, and to record the audit logs, respectively
in Step 9.
10. In Step 10, the Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler sends back to the Consent
Revocation Manager the user's attributes recovered in the previous step.
11. The IdP1 forward a response to the SP2, which includes the information about
Alice's medical history in Step 11 and it is returned to Bob in Step 12.
12. The Event Engine of SP2 noties to the SP1 that Alice is being taken to hospital
A (SP3, not represented in Figure 3.6) in Step 13.
When Alice arrives at the hospital A (not depited in Figure 3.6), SP3 sends an event
to the emergency service indicating that Alice has come to the hospital. Next, hos-
pital sta requests access to her medical records and the SP1 performs the following
tasks. It communicates with the IdP1 to request revoking access to Bob to Alice's
medical records. If the response of IdP1 is successful, SP1 grants access to Alice's
medical history to hospital A sta. In this case, similar iterations between the SP3,
the IdP1 and their involved Privacy Engine modules to those reected in steps 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 will be repeated.
 Use Case 3: Personal data disclosed to a third party:
This use case is about a user, Alice, who wants to watch a video her friends have
shared with her through a social network (SP1) she is member of. This video content
is hosted and served through a by a third party (SP2).
Figure 3.7 displays the involved steps and the aected Privacy Engine components
within the providers and the enhanced client. Note the active user role through the
privacy-aware enhanced client, which allows to minimize direct interactions between
IdPs and SPs.
When Alice accesses the application through the social network she is warned the
SP2 requires the following attributes from her prole: feeds, friends, adultness and
email (See Step 1). Alice, who does not want to share with the SP2 more than the
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necessary attributes, let the SP1 to send the feeds and friends to the SP2. However,
Alice wants to keep her preferred email account (used in the social network) unknown
to the SP2, so she instructs the social network to get it from her mobile device
(hereinafter IdP1). In regard to adultness, SP2 would need to get that attribute
from an authority that vouches for it. For that reason, Alice instruct the SP1 to get
it from IdP2. As it has been shown in the Use Case 1, the proposed IdM architecture
empowers Alice to congure personalized privacy policies specifying where are those
attributes taken from. The interactions between the involved components of the
Privacy Engine, are represented in gray in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: Flow of interactions, involved entities and Privacy Engine components for a
personal data disclosed to a third party.
The following steps to disclose Alice's personal data to SP2 are:
1. Hence, upon SP2 request, in Step 2 the SP1 demands from IdP1 and IdP2 the
corresponding attributes (e.g., adultness, email, etc.) by means of the enhanced
client.
2. The enhanced client forwards this request to IdP1 and IdP2 in order to let SP2
to verify the aforementioned attributes in Step 3.
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3. In steps 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 the construction of the user's prole from various
sources of information (IdP1 and IdP2) when the user is aware is outlined. The
interactions carried out between the Event Engine, the Privacy-Aware User
Prole Handler, the Consent-Revocation Manager components and the Data
Layer, are analogous to those described in the Use Case 2.
Thus, IdP1 and IdP2 give back a sub-tree to the enhanced client in Step 9,
which includes a verication path and a root node signed by either IdP1 or
IdP2, respectively. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that, the returned
sub-tree may be either simple (enabling to verify a single attribute) or complex
(allowing to check multiple user's attributes simultaneously).
4. The enhanced client comprises a single tree that contains the user's prole from
the information received from the identity providers and sends it to the social
network in Step 10.
5. The social network transmits the enriched user's prole to the SP2 in Step 11.
Although it not is shown in Figure 3.7, other sensitive attributes, such as user's
location, have to be directly requested to user devices by the SP1.
Finally, after presenting this general view of the architecture, we will develop the func-
tionality and low level details of the main Privacy Engine modules in the next chapters.
3.4 Conclusions
It is clear that current IdM architectures are limited to provide appropriate tools for
eective user revocation consent, which encompass situations where the user is aware to
grant or revoke her consent expressly without compromising her privacy. Furthermore,
issues related to how users can regulate the use and disclosure of own identity information
are not enough addressed by existing IdM specications.
In this chapter we proposed an extended architecture to ll these gaps. The architecture
is composed of a set of logical modules that separate and encapsulate the functionalities
required to achieve on the one hand a exible event-based revocation mechanism and
on the other hand, an ecient privacy-enhanced user prole management approach, that
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guarantees selective identity information disclosure. The pillars of the architecture are
the Consent/Revocation Manager and the Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler modules
of the Privacy Engine component, which constitute the main contribution of the thesis.
The mathematical models implemented by each part are thus developed in the following
chapters.
In conclusion, the extension of the architecture satises the intended goals, since it makes
possible to cope with both online and oine scenarios, while preserving user's privacy and
allowing her to better control over her online identities.
Chapter4
Revocation Consent Proposal: An Event
Driven Hybrid IdM Approach
Here in your mind you have complete
privacy. Here there's no dierence
between what is and what could be.
Chuck Palahniuk, 2009
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CHAPTER 4. REVOCATION CONSENT PROPOSAL: AN EVENT
DRIVEN HYBRID IDM APPROACH
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the proposed event-based mechanism empowering a new concept,
the sleepyhead credentials, which allows to substitute time constraints and explicit revoca-
tion by activating and deactivating authorization rights according to events. Our approach
is to integrate this concept in IdM systems in a blend of the federated and user-centric
model supporting delegation, which can be an interesting alternative for scenarios where
revocation of consent and user privacy are critical. Moreover, in the case of federated
models, they bring up privacy concerns because medical records may be available to every
entity within the circle of trust, even whether there is no emergency. Section 4.2 highlights
the importance of revoking consent and provides a comparative analysis of the privacy
support in identity management systems. Section 4.3 explains contributions made in this
thesis to enhance privacy in health care scenarios. A mathematical model, which describes
the event-driven system behavior, is also illustrated. Finally, section 4.4 summarizes the
presented work and presents the main conclusions.
4.2 Understanding the Problem of Revocation Consent
Credential-based authorization oers interesting advantages for ubiquitous scenarios in-
volving limited devices such as sensors, or personal mobile equipment: it oers a compu-
tational cost more reduced than its competitors for issuing, storing, and verication; and
it naturally supports rights delegation. The main drawback is the revocation of rights.
Revocation requires handling potentially large revocation lists, or using protocols to check
the revocation status. Moreover, current identity management technologies are not ready
to cope with user consent revocation properly.
This is a relevant issue in regard to privacy-enhancing mechanisms, especially in sensitive
scenarios when sensitive data and proles are shared. In a health care scenario, the
system must protect user's privacy and allow authorized entities (including humans) to
access medical records conveniently. Furthermore, in these scenarios the user is not always
be aware to give her consent, so it is necessary a hybrid identity management model which
includes consent delegation mechanisms. Besides, privileges permitting access to user
attributes should be revoked in an eective way.
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To achieve these goals, we will have to provide solutions that allow to perform some
required tasks as discussed in the remainder of this section.
4.2.1 The need for an appropriate revocation in current IdM frame-
works
Nowadays, there are several federated and user-centric identity management frameworks,
(already detailed in Chapter 2), but they have not addressed this privacy rule. The privacy
support of the current federated and user-centric identity management technologies is
analyzed below. SAML is a federated specication, which supports two types of identiers
to refer to users: transient or one-time identiers and persistent identiers. On the
one hand, transient identiers ensure that a user anonymously accesses a service during
SSO process, since these identiers are created for use during a session and they are
destroyed at the end. Thus, correlation between identiers is avoided. On the other hand,
the persistent identiers provide a persistent federation and remain active until they are
explicitly deleted. The permanent federation implies an account linkage process, which
relates two accounts associated to a user in dierent SPs. Note that it is recommended
to use dierent pseudonyms for each SP, in order to avoid dierent SPs belonging to the
same federation to infer user behavior.
Regarding Liberty, as SAML, it oers long-term and one-time pseudonyms. Correspond-
ingly, it must be noted that this specication only allows a user to have one long-term
pseudonym per SP to prevent user tracking across dierent transactions. This is a big lim-
itation. In addition, it does not protect against SPs cooperating to share user pseudonyms
in order to track users behavior. In order to overcome these problems, a set of rules and
recommendations are proposed in [169]. WS-Federation, in its turn, contemplates privacy
and pseudonym services by dening extensions to the WS-Trust Request Security Token
and Response messages in order to specify how privacy statements can be obtained using
mechanisms dened in HTTP, HTTPS, WS-Policy, etc., as well as how pseudonyms should
be mapped.
In the case of the user-centric technologies, U-Prove and InfoCards handle privacy through
pseudonyms and privacy languages to express privacy policies. In addition, U-Prove and
InfoCards deal with unlikability and unobservability issues by dening a message ow that
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eliminates direct communication between the IdP and the SP. U-Prove enables selective
disclosure of user's claims through a pre-signed token that can be used even if the IdP
is oine. InfoCards, in its turn, allows the identity selector to encrypt the SP identity
to prevent the IdP from learning the SP identity when it receives a request for a token.
Note that, this identity selector applies user-centric principles in collecting user consent.
Both features together are necessary to ensure that an IdP cannot learn which SPs visit a
given principal. The SAML Enhanced Client Proxy prole is similar, but currently it only
has unlikability. However, some IdPs may require knowledge of the RPs identity before
issuing a requested token, or even if the IdP cannot learn the visited SPs, user proling is
possible by colluding parties.
On the other hand, U-Prove enables the use of services with minimum disclosure of personal
information. OpenID Connect identies a set of personal attributes that can be exchanged
between identity providers and the applications that use them, and includes an approval
step so that users can consent (or deny) the sharing of this information.
Furthermore, this specication provides an extension called PAPE (Provider Authentica-
tion Policy Extension) [170], provides the means for a RP to request previously agreed
upon authentication policies being applied by the OpenID Provider and for an OpenID
Provider to inform an RP what policies will be used. Therefore, the decision to trust can
be based in the knowledge of the authentication mechanism employed. Hence, with this
user-centric framework, RPs must decide for themselves which providers are trustworthy,
being able to enforce policies to the OpenID Provider's response.
Table 4.1 summarizes the main privacy features grouped by IdM models. The technologies
that have been analyzed handle privacy by means of pseudonyms which can be transient
or permanent. Moreover, it must be noted that, InfoCards, U-Prove and SAML ECP
prole address better the principle of minimal disclosure. Current identity frameworks
support partial anonymity, since authorities, as the IdP, provides obfuscated identiers.
We want to stress the importance of privacy policies, since they are the basic means that
allow users to understand privacy implications in terms of attribute exchange or delegation
between dierent security domains. Though privacy policies are critical for users to give
their consent, they are often poorly dened, complex to implement, or simply out of scope
of the specications.
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4.2.2 The need for a time independent revocation system
The problem of revoking consent is not covered by the aforementioned IdM technologies.
In this sense, OpenID Connect is the only specication that addresses partially this issue
through time-based and not exible enough revocation mechanisms, which require an
express request from user. Thus, if personal data have been already shared, the eective
revocation of consent implies an important challenge to address. For instance, it requires
dynamic updates to sticky policies. Consider that Bob, a doctor, has been assigned to Alice
for pre-diagnose. He should be authorized to access Alice's medical records (i.e. blood
test) but after that evaluation, Bob privileges should be revoked. If the revocation is based
on time, as PKI-based solutions, Alice should wait some time until Bob privileges expire to
be sure he is no longer able to access her records. In this case, the time window after Bob
nishes the pre-diagnosis until the privileges are revoked is a window of opportunity Bob
has to access Alice records without explicit permission. This fact dicults the accounting,
since after the rst legal access, further (illegal) accesses to records will be related to the
initial authorization.
To overcome this problem in time based revocation, the validity time of a given privilege
set can be set to a very short period of time, so the opportunity window is reduced. On
the contrary, if the token duration is longer than necessary, user's sensitive information
may be exposed to entities which should not have access to that information during that
time.
As a result of this previous discussion, our motivation is to provide a exible event-based
user consent-revocation mechanism. So, in the previous scenario, after Bob nishes the pre-
diagnosis, a new event is issued (i.e. needs surgery) and Bob privileges are automatically
revoked.
4.3 Towards a Hybrid IdM Event-Driven Consent Revoca-
tion Approach
Attribute exchange and delegation process cannot be completely user-centric, since in
cases of critical accidents the user cannot be able to give her consent. On the other hand,
federated models raise privacy concerns since medical records may be available to every
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entity within the circle of trust, even if there is no emergency. Moreover, to meet the need
of a time-independent revocation mechanism, we envision an event-based approach. Here
we aim to ll these gaps by designing a hybrid model, which allows users to congure and
track access to their medical records while the identity providers are the entities in charge
of storing and managing users' sleepyhead credential. For the design and validation of the
hybrid IdM event-aware model, will follow these steps:
1. Establishing a set of assumptions during the design of the hybrid IdM
event-aware: It includes the way in which the delegation protocol, along with the
event engine, allows to revoke user consent.
2. Dening a time-independent revoking consent mechanism: The delegation
protocol will include the issuing of a sleepyhead credential containing user's attribute
identiers (i.e. her medical history), as well as access privileges, that have been
granted beforehand but that are kept latent. To use these attributes, an activa-
tion process will be necessary. Moreover, in order to prevent unauthorized access,
we require some entities to use a Consent/Revocation Manager component of
the Privacy Engine module (see Chapter 3), responsible for analyzing events and
activating the needed attributes and privileges for each event.
3. Formalization of a mathematical model for the event-based proposal:
Within health care scenarios, patients life cycle can be modeled as event-
driven [171] [172]. The proposed model, based on Markov chains with priorities,
will enable to trusted entities to re events when specic circumstances are met, and
routed to required entities. These events will enable to awake the dormant privileges
of the sleepyhead credential or part of them.
4. Validation of the feasibility of the contribution ideas related to sleepyhead-
credential delegation protocol and the involved Privacy Engine compo-
nents by developing a proof-of-concept: Such proof-of-concept will allow to face
some important challenges posed by the proposal, namely integration with identity
and SIP-based event frameworks, as well as modication of the SAML standard.
5. Evaluation through simulation scenarios: We will estimate the overhead of
activating/deactivating attributes and privileges, as subscription and notication
event messages exchanged, depending on the dierent health care events, since it is
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the main extra part that has been added to the system. For this purpose, we will
consider and studied two main simulation scenarios: 1) A general case; and 2) a
real case, which includes a large hospital and a small-medium hospital.
4.3.1 Hypotheses
This section describes the assumptions on which our Sleepyhead Credential -based delega-
tion protocol has been built. The Sleepyhead Credential is a credential with attributes and
privileges granted beforehand, which remain latent until certain circumstances happen.
We assume the existence of an event engine, which follows a notication model based on
the SIP-Specic Event Notify [173] specication to send events to entities (by means of
broadcast or unicast to registered entities). We assume that the entities persisting the
medical records act as IdPs and those requesting access to medical records acts as SPs.
SPs, as hospitals, emergency services and even individuals, as doctors, can issue events that
will be routed to appropriate medical record holders (IdPs) in order to unblock medical
records.
We assume that events follow well know workows usually triggered by well known trusted
entities as emergency services. Moreover, events are achieved allowing rogue entities to
be traced if they interfere in the process. It should be noted that SPs and IdPs can take
the role of subscribers and notiers, in some circumstances, either subscribing to dierent
events or notifying them. In order to clarify this last aspect, consider that some parts of the
patient's medical history reside in dierent IdPs and depending on the required treatment,
it is necessary to consult several parts of the medical record, thereby an IdP can act as
both client (subscriber) and server (notier). Besides, each entity can be subscribed to
multiple types of events, as well as each event type can be attended by several notiers.
Patients life cycle modeled as event-driven, as well as Poisson distributed arrival rate of
health care events and service rate (i.e. patient arrivals at an emergency service) are widely
adopted and well-known by existing research work in the literature, such as [174] [175] [176].
Therefore, we suppose that the arrival process of the events to our system conforms to
Poisson distribution with parameter  and the processing time of these events conforms
to exponential distribution, then from the queueing networks result [177], the outgoing
process of NOTIFY messages is also Poisson distribution (see Figure 4.7).
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Concerning security, communication condentiality should be granted specially for sensi-
tive environments like health care. For that reason we assume the use of HTTPS with
mutual authentication to handle message exchange. We assume as well that HTTPS cer-
ticates have been correctly issued and distributed. Furthermore, note that it is necessary
to take into account security considerations regarding SIP SUBSCRIBE and NOTIFY mes-
sages, given the high sensitivity of health care data considered in the proposal. Therefore,
both subscription and notication messages must be authenticated and authorized, for in-
stance to prevent the participating entities from subscribing multiple times or redirecting
the subscription of their neighbor either intentionally or accidentally.
In this sense, SIP can use dierent security mechanisms such as HTTP Digest or TLS. We
recommend TLS for secure and encrypted SIP communications. Besides, all users utilize
transient identiers in order to preserve their anonymity while enabling IdPs accountability
enforcement in case of user's misbehavior, according to the main principles of privacy
specied in Chapter 2. A Public Key Infrastructure can be easily used to support secure
communication channels. Finally, we assume an underlying trust relationship based on
PKI for entities belonging to dierent domains.
4.3.2 Implicit Event-based Revocation through Delegation
The main novelty of the event-based user consent revocation model proposed here is the
inclusion of a unique credential, named sleepyhead credential, which is an event-driven
delegation mechanism in which a user delegates to one or more participants the use or
access to certain personal information when certain conditions are met. Therefore, the
permissions are pre-granted but they are dormant and will not be activated unless es-
tablished circumstances happen. In this way, we achieve that the dierent actors of IdM
scenario have access to the user's attributes that are allowed the time strictly necessary.
With the introduction of a delegation solution based on events, the revocation of attributes
and privileges will take place implicitly. Here we aim to adapt the existing knowledge on
delegation protocols to adapt and dene a solution that is applicable to provide a more
exible revocation mechanism in IdM environments.
Delegation is a process of an identied entity, called a delegator, giving some of the del-
egator's privileges to another identied entity, called a delegatee. The delegatee receives
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the privileges to act on behalf of the delegator at a service provider [178]. The notion of
delegation is widely used as an eective access control method. For instance, many grid
systems adopt delegation frameworks to enhance eciency and scalability [179]. Digital
rights management systems provide another example delegation services are oered to
consumers, so that they can delegate their access rights to a protected piece of media to
a number of devices.
Delegation Models and Sleepyhead Credential Denition
As a previous knowledge base for dening the delegation protocol in the IdM context, we
rst reviewed the most notable delegation models.
Currently, there are two main models for delegation: the direct delegation model and the
indirect delegation approach. In the rst case, a delegator directly delegates a set of her
privileges or attributes to a delegatee, which uses the delegated identity information to
carry out specic tasks or retrieve information. In the second model, a delegator indirectly
delegates set of her attributes or privileges to a delegatee through one or more entities. In
this latter model there will be more than one delegation step before the delegatee can use
the delegated data. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 sketch out these two delegation models.
In an IdM context, service providers trust the identity provider to manage user identities
and authenticate users. In such an IdM environment, IdP can, in addition, act as the
delegation authority that manages delegations. The delegator assigns delegations at IdP.
The delegatee is to perform the delegated tasks at the specied service provider. The SP
can obtain delegation assertions from the IdP. Why do we need a delegation authority? In
the considered sensitive health care scenario, the user is not always conscious to provide
her consent expressly, so the IdPs are the entities responsible for handling, tracking and
storing users' sleepyhead credentials. The alternative of using the identity providers as
trusted delegation authorities has been also proposed in other works, such as [178] [180],
but our proposal avoids IdPs to implement and update complex revocation lists, since the
revocation of the user's attributes and privileges is being produced based on a series of
events that disable them through a single credential, that we have called that credential,
the Sleepyhead Credential.
Moreover, our approach supports both delegation models: direct and indirect delegation.
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Figure 4.1: Direct delegation model.
Figure 4.2: Indirect delegation model.
It is worth be mentioned here that the delegation assertion must prove specically the
delegator's consent to the delegation. The delegator may also want to impose certain
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conditions on the delegation (e.g., whether or not the delegation assertion is delegatable
to another entity depending on some circumstances or events are met, the type of infor-
mation that can be retrieved, etc.); these conditions must be established in the delegation
assertion.
The Sleepyhead Credential (SC) is created with the following tuple:
SC = fAttP1; AttP2; : : : ; AttPng (4.1)
Where each component AttPi represents attributes and access privileges, which have been
granted to any entity beforehand but that remain latent until activated. A sleepyhead
credential is composed of elds, including the following elements for delegation restric-
tion: EventFilter, denes lters that will be used by the Consent/Revocation Man-
ager to analyze the received events and decide whether any attribute(s) may be acti-
vated; TrustedEventSources, contains entity names whose events activate the credential;
EntityMedicalRepository, species the location and distribution of attributes and med-
ical records.
Protocol Overview
In order to work with the sleepyhead credential, rst it is necessary to create, registry and
publish it within the IdM system. In Figure 4.3, we show a sample of this process:
1. The user (Delegator) requests the generation and registration of her sleepyhead cre-
dential (SC) to IdP1 through an enhanced client (ECP1) install on her mobile in
Steps 1 and 2.
2. The user authenticates against the IdP1 to registry the SC in Steps 3, 4 and 5
1.
3. Whether the authentication process is successful, the ECP1 provides user the Privacy
Preferences Service in Step 6.
4. In step 7 the Delegator establishes her privacy preferences (e.g., dierent terms or
conditions for access to the dierent parts of her medical history, whether or not an
1The specic authentication mechanisms used are out of the scope of the research presented in this
thesis.
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attribute or privilege is re-delegatable to another entity, the type of information that
can be retrieved, etc.) by means of the ECP1.
Figure 4.3: Sample sleepyhead credential generation sequence diagram.
5. Next, the ECP1 forwards the above user conguration privacy information to the
IdP1 in order to create the SC in Step 8.
6. In Step 9, the IdP1 creates, supplies and publishes the sleepyhead credential with
dormant attributes and privileges; and noties its creation to the participant entities
(SP1, ECP2, Delegatee1, etc.) in Steps 10 an 11 in order to physicians and emergency
personnel can use the SC.
The protocol messages involved to operate with the sleepyhead credential in the hybrid
IdM approach proposed, conceptually depicted in Figure 4.4, are:
 DelegationRequest. This message is used to ask for delegation, it contains the
following elds:
{ Message_ID: Message identication number.
{ Issuer_ID: The entity (SP or IdP) asking for user's data contained in the
sleepyhead credential.
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{ Subject_ID: The subject of the delegation or Delegatee, i.e., the entity (user,
SP or IdP) whose authorization to access to certain attributes/privileges of the
sleepyhead credential is being evaluated.
{ Delegation Restrictions: Restriction conditions for the delegation.
{ EventFilter: The set of lters which allow to determinate which attributes or
privileges must be activated/deactivated.
{ TrustedEventSources: The list of entities (SPs or IdPs) whose events enable
to activate the sleepyhead credential.
{ EntityMedicalRepository: The location of attributes and medical records
that make up the sleepyhead credential.
Figure 4.4: Sleepyhead Credential-based Delegation Protocol Messages.
 DelegationResponse. This message is used to convey sleepyhead credential data in
reply to a DelegationRequest, it contains the following elds:
{ Message_ID: Message identication number (the same as in the request).
{ Issuer_ID: : The entity (IdP) sending a delegator's sleepyhead credential data.
{ Timestamp: Time when the delgation message was issued.
{ Delegation data: Associated to the entity identied by Subject_ID, in regard
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to a set of delegations restrictions comprised of the event lters, trusted event
sources and entity medical repositories. The Delegation data contains active
attributes of the sleepyhead credential of a specic Delegator.
Accordingly, the above messages are used to access to user's data through the sleepyhead
credential. Figure 4.5 illustrates a sample of the protocol sequence diagram for a particular
transaction example:
1. If an entity requests access to a service or resource which requires some attributes
or privileges (e.g., AttP1), then a DelegationRequest message is constructed and
sent to the trusted delegation authority (IdP1) in Steps 1.
2. In Steps 2, 3 and 4 whether the user (Delegatee1) does not have an authentication
context established, the IdP1 challenges her for authentication. A valid security
context is created when the user provides valid credentials.
3. When IdP1 receives a message asking about attributes or privileges of a specic
subject (i.e., a DelegationRequest message), the IdP1 must check the delegation
restriction conditions (the event lters and entity names whose events activate the
credential like SP1) to determine if the Delegatee can access to the requested infor-
mation (See Steps 4 and 11). Then, it must construct and send a response with the
delegation data back to the requester (i.e., a DelegationResponse message).
4. As can be seen in Figure 4.5, the event denoted by Event1 allows to awake AttP1,
while Event2 deactivates these attributes and privileges when the Delegatee1 interacts
with SP1. So, the SP1 provides access to the requested resources or services during
the Event1 and it refuses access to AttP1 when this event ends in Steps 9 and 15,
respectively.
SAML-compliant Sleepyhead Credential
Since SAML is the best known identity management framework, we detail how to im-
plement the implicit event-based revocation through delegation protocol over it. For this
purpose, SAML oers extension mechanisms that can be used. Including the sleepyhead
credential-based delegation support to SAML implies modications to assertions. So, the
sleepyhead credential has been dened as a new SAML assertion according to the SAML
proposal for delegation information dened in [181]. The SAML assertion is dened as
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Figure 4.5: Sample use of the sleepyhead credential sequence diagram.
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follows:
<complexType name="DelegationRestrictionType">
<complexContent>
<extension base="saml:ConditionAbstractType">
<sequence>
<element ref="del:EventFilter" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<element ref="del:TrustedEventSource" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<element ref="del:EntityMedicalRepository" maxOccurs="unbounded">
</sequence>
</extension>
</complexContent>
</complexType>
Besides, the structure of the Sleepyhead Credential Assertion has an initial part or
header, whose content is the same that is dened in the standard assertions. This common
section includes the assertion identier, the names of the issuer and the subject, and
information about the instant in which the assertion was issued. The XML tags are
<Assertion ID>, <Issuer> , <Subject> and <IssueInstant>, respectively. And the
content for this tags will be the value of Message_ID, Issuer, Subject_ID and TimeStamp
dened in the DelegationResponse primitive.
This Sleepyhead Credential Assertion is exchanged using the SAML \Authentication
Request Protocol". Therefore, the SAML requests and responses are exchanged using the
bindings dened in the specication and they are compliant with the rules dened for
extending the schema.
Eventually, as it has been explained before, the IdPs will be the entities responsible for
storing and managing the sleepyhead credentials, since as we have mentioned previously,
in cases of serious accident, the user may not be able to provide his credentials.
We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype, which is explained in the Chapter 5
and provides further technical details on the implementation issues.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the choice of implementing the sleepyhead credential
as SAML assertions is an advantage in the sense that most of the IdM protocols are able
to convey SAML tokens. Therefore, messages can be used in other applications. When
no SAML bearing mechanism is available, a translation service, to extract the assertion
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contents and translate into another token format can be used.
4.3.3 Health Care Application Scenario
In order to show the benets of our approach, in this section, we describe a potential healh
care application scenario. Let us start with some naming conventions for our health care
scenario. We will use the term IdP for entities archiving medical records, and with the
term SP we refer to consumers of the medical records: hospitals, ambulances and even
individuals (doctors). Concerning event management, we assume that events follow well
know workows usually triggered by well known trusted entities as emergency services.
Furthermore, events are accomplished enabling rogue entities to be traced if they interfere
in the process. It must be noted that SPs and IdPs can act as both subscribers and
notiers, in some circumstances, either subscribing to dierent events or notifying them.
Alice can authenticate by means of a credential to the hospital that persists her medical
history (i.e. IdP1). In case of an accident, IdPs will provide access to SPs to Alice's
medical record (or part of it), according to the events. SPs should demonstrate to IdPs,
by means of any sort of authentication, that they are elegible (trusted entity as a hospital)
to access medical records.
In our scenario, Alice suers an accident, that triggers several events. The emergency
service or 911 (SP1) requests access to Alice's medical records in order to send them
to an ambulance company (SP2), in another trusted domain, which needs access to her
medical records to provide Alice the appropriate treatment. Thus, as events happen, they
are notied to the involved parties, such as the medical record service (IdP1) and the
ambulance (SP2) which treats Alice. So the IdP1 may know which ambulance should be
allowed to access to medical histories.
Furthermore, every medical record access request should be related to an event and bound
to a purpose, which enables the IdP to lter the access to certain parts of medical history
according to a policy. Thus, in this scenario the following events could be distinguished:
 Event 1 : There is an accident. SP1 noties this event and calls all ambulance services
close to the area.
 Event 2 : SP2, that is subscribed to SP1 events, arrives on the scene and requests
access to Alice's medical history. It must give a description of the severity of the
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Figure 4.6: Health care event-based scenario across dierent domains.
problem (event) to allow IdP1 to give access to certain parts of Alice's medical records
or her full history to treat her (purpose). To illustrate this, consider that Alice has
broken her femur, has lost her consciousness and needs surgery. In this case, access
to the whole medical record could be provided. However, if the problem is minor, as
a sprained ankle, SP2 is allowed to access only to trauma and drug allergies sections
of the history.
 Event 3 : Although not depicted in the Figure 4.6, another possible event would be
red if Alice is taken to hospital (SP3). The hospital diagnoses her with trauma
during the triage and determines that Alice requires an operation. Therefore, a
doctor belonging to the hospital (SP3), could read Alice's records.
It must be noted that, events may be red by authorized entities, like the emergency service
or a hospital urgency service. Likewise, events happen asynchronously and the duration
of each event lasts from the beginning of the event itself (T1) until another event arrives
(T2) whose circumstances and context have changed; and it may contain new requested
attributes or privileges. Thus, certain attributes or privileges previously granted will be
deactivated and new components of the sleepyhead credential will be activated.
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4.3.4 Mathematical Formalization of the Event-based Model
The purpose of this section is to mathematically describe how our event-driven system
operates. In this sense, Markov's chains provide support for problems involving decision
on uncertainties through a continuous period of time. Specically, Markov models consider
the patients in a discrete state of health, and the events may represent the transition from
one state to another. Moreover, these approaches enable to model repetitive events and
time dependence of probabilities [182].
So, we assume that events arrive to the system according to a homogeneous Poisson
process with rate  and to be consistent with an exponential distribution. A summary of
the denitions and parameters that are used in this section is shown in Table 4.2. Equation
4.2 denes the set of entities of the system (SPs or IdPs), equations 4.3 and 4.4 denote
the notiers and subscribers of the system, respectively. Finally, equation 4.5 describes
the set of events that can be triggered by the system:
ES = fes1; es2; : : : ; esNES jESjg (4.2)
N = fn1; n2; : : : nNN jN jg (4.3)
S = fs1; s2; : : : sNS jSjg (4.4)
E = fe1; e2; : : : eNE jEjg (4.5)
Where,
NN ; NS  NES
NN +NS  2NES
N tN = p
t
NNN  NN
N tS = p
t
SNS  NS
(4.6)
Furthermore, being fN1,. . . , N t, Nu, Nv, . . . , NNEg a subset of N , i.e, notier subsets
of events e1, et, eu, ev, etc., then
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Parameter Denition
NES Total number of entities in the system
NE Number of possible event types (matches the Markov's chain states)
NN Number of notier entities in the system
NS Number of subscriber entities in the system,
N tN Number of notiers in the system delivering events of type et
N tS Number of entities subscribed to events of type et
ptN Percentage of notiers in the system delivering events of type et
ptS Percentage of entities subscribed to events of type et
M t Message size to be transferred, considering the overhead introduced by the protocol,
when an et event is delivered
t Rate of et event arrival
t;k Rate of et event notication rate for notier nk
tj Rate of arriving events of type et to entity ej
t;kj Rate of notied events of type et by the nk notier that arrives to the entity ej
P ten;j Percentage of notied events of type et by the nk notier that arrives to the entity ej
 Service time for notication of events of type et
c Number of servers or notiers attending notication of et
 = =(c) Congestion of the system with parameters ,  and c
K Maximum number of notication messages that can be buered by the queue
PN Probability of having n notication messages in the system
P0 Probability of having 0 notication messages in the system
Lq Notication message queue size
L Average notication messages in the system
Wq Average waiting time of notication messages in the queue
Table 4.2: Denition of the parameters for the event model
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NEX
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 (4.8)
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Similarly with subscribers, it can be established that, if fS1,. . . ,SNEg are subsets of S,
then
NS =
NEX
t=1
St  NEX
t=1
[St (4.9)
Also, we dene M t as the message size to be transferred (considering the overhead intro-
duced by the protocol) when a event of type et is delivered. Moreover, 
t and t;k are the
et event arrival rate and et event notication rate for notier nk, respectively. 
t
j , 
t;k
j and
P ten;j are the rate of events of type et that arrives to entity ej ; and the rate and percentage
of events of type et notied by the nk notier that arrive to the entity ej , respectively.
Thus, we dene the rates as:
t;kj = P
t
en;j
t;k (4.10)
tj =
NNtX
k=1
t;kj (4.11)
t =
NNtX
k=1
t;k (4.12)
 =
NNEX
t=1
t (4.13)
Hence, an entity can be subscribed to several notiers. Once an et event happens, the
corresponding NOTIFY messages are scheduled to be sent to all the entities which are
subscribed to this type of event. Figure 4.7 illustrates the process when an et event is
received, N tS NOTIFY messages are generated. Thus, 
tN tS is the arrival rate for messages
notifying et events and there are N
t
N notiers or servers. In addition, as explained before,
the service time for an et event NOTIFY message is assumed to be exponentially distributed
with mean 1/. Therefore, if we consider a queueing system, that has c servers (being c =
N tN ) withK nite capacity, Poisson distributed incoming rates and exponential distributed
service rates, this queueing system can be denoted by M=M=c=K [183].
It worth be noted that, when arriving health care events are placed in dierent queues,
each of which has a dierent service priority. We propose a priority discipline for dierent
categories of events and then a rst-in-rst-out discipline for each category. For instance,
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urgent events will have a higher priority than non-urgent events, since an emergency
department should treat patients with life-threatening injuries before others. Moreover,
knowing the average frequency of events per period it is possible to derive the probability
of a certain number of events to arrive to the system for a given period. This is derived
using Poisson's probability distribution:
Figure 4.7: Event queueing system.
Pn =
8<: 
n
n!nP0 if l  n < c
n
cn cc!n
P0 if c  n < K
(4.14)
P0 =
8>>><>>>:

c=1P
n=0
rn
n! +
rc
c!
1 K c+1
1 
 1
if  6= 1
c=1P
n=0
rn
n! +
rc
c! (K   c+ 1)
 1
if  = 1
(4.15)
Besides, we have to calculate the average length of each Notify queue in order to estimate
the overhead SIP-Event-Notify messages:
Lq =
P0r
c
c!(1  )2 [1  
k c+1   (1  )(K   c+ 1)K c] (4.16)
L = Lq + r(1  PK), W = L(1 Pk) , Wq =
L
(1 Pk)  
1

(4.17)
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For 4.14, 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 we dene  = tN tS and c = N
t
N . Eventually, according
to [184] and using 4.17, the average SIP-Event-Notify messages to subscribe tom resources
and receive the corresponding notications (irrespectively of the number of resources that
the entity subscribes to) can be dened as:
Average SIP-Event-Notify messages = 6 + 2L (4.18)
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have reviewed and analyzed the main identity models and current frame-
works to preserve privacy in identity management systems, identifying its main lacks and
drawbacks. Specically, in this contribution we have addressed the relevant issue of eec-
tive consent revocation, since it is not covered by none of the analyzed IdM technologies
and it is a must requirement in sensitive environments, such as health care scenarios.
Current approaches are focused on temporal information-based revocation mechanisms
being used to predene policies. Thus, we have proposed a hybrid IdM event-driven
model, which includes a sleepyhead credential -based delegation protocol compliant with
the SAMLv2 standard to provide a more exible user consent-revocation mechanism within
health care scenarios. The main advantages are that this credential is issued only once
and would be used any time. Time-based credentials have to be periodically re-issued, for
short windows of time to minimize unauthorized accesses, as required.
Our solution proposes using events to awake dormant privileges or part of them and it
incorporates new features that allow better scalability, since the emergency services are
the entities which manage indirectly trust. Moreover, in this chapter we have presented a
mathematical model based on Markov's chains and theory queues to determine and study
dierent health care event arrivals to the system and how they are handled and notied
to the corresponding subscribed entities. Finally, implementation issues are presented in
Chapter 5 together with the validation tests concerning the event engine.
Chapter5
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5.1 Chapter Overview
With the aim to evaluate our proposal, on the one hand we have carried out a proof-
of-concept focused on validating the delivery process (over SAML) of security data and
information related to the dierent events that are happening in the system. The sleepy-
head -based delegation protocol operation, the Privacy Engine and the interactions among
dierent entities of our system have been examined, as well, for correctness. In this way, we
can prove the feasibility of our proposal and make easier the determination of deployment
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requirements. On the other hand, we considered necessary to perform some simulations to
estimate the SIP-Event-Notify message overhead generated during the system operation.
This is very important in our approach, because it is the main extra part that has been
added to the system. The performance of credential issuing is not relevant with regard to
time-based credential issuing systems.
As we do not have, so far, a suciently rich ecosystem or a large number of entities to
conduct a real experiment, we have simulated an event engine through Matlab/Simulink
tool [185], including various event sequences with dierent arrival rates and service times
in a random way.
5.2 Event Driven Hybrid IdM Proposal Validation
5.2.1 Implementation Details
We have deployed our own identity management infrastructure using Lasso [186], a C
library which implements the full SAML 2.0/ID-FF stack. The IdPs of the systems, are
based on Authentic [187], a software that has been developed from Lasso. This library
uses OpenSSL as the underlying cryptographic library and Apache2 as the web server.
Regarding SPs, we have used ZXID [188]. Furthermore, with the aim to simulate the
system of medical events through the SIP-Notify-Event specication, we have deployed
a Sailn Application Server [189] and implemented a set of modules that handle the
associated logic to subscribe or register events, as well as send appropriate notications
to each of the participating entities. Moreover, we have deployed a Registrar Server, to
ensure participants are authenticated and registered before exchanging any subscription
or notication messages. Once registered, entities might exchange messages containing
an Event header that indicates the event type to which the entity is subscribed. As for
the Expire header, it species subscription duration. Finally, event descriptions are sent
through XML messages embedded in SIP requests.
The identity management architecture used for the experiments is depicted in Figure 5.1.
We used that architecture to introduce the modications proposed in section 4.3. It can
be seen the dierent interactions between the entities (an IdP and two SPs) through
the exchange of SIP and SAML messages. Firstly, the SIP clients are registered in the
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Figure 5.1: Test architecture for the hybrid IdM event-driven proposal.
Registrar Server by sending REGISTER messages. Then, the SIP clients subscribe to
dierent events by means of SUBSCRIBE Requests. The SIP Server noties events to
the subscribed entities through NOTIFY Responses. Once events are received, they are
analyzed by the Consent/Revocation Manager component of the Privacy Engine module
and the sleepyhead credentials are exchanged through SAML requests and responses.
For this purpose, we developed a preliminary version of the Consent/Revocation Manager
component, that we are currently rening and integrating with the rest of Privacy Engine
components (See section 5.2.2), able to receive a data structure, which represents the event
lter, and a hash table, which contains the event sources. This building block is in charge
of checking that event notiers are in its Dynamic Trust List (DTL) [34]; and accomplishes
the decision making process that would determinate under which conditions or restrictions
can be the attributes of the medical record disclosed, or the privileges activated. Since
the IdP is the entity handling the medical records as well as the credentials, the Privacy
Engine operation is closely related to the IdP. Thus, the Privacy Engine in our solution
is an addition to the original IdP.
Besides, we have extended the Lasso library dening a new structure that represents
136
CHAPTER 5. EVENT DRIVEN HYBRID IDM APPROACH
VALIDATION
the sleepyhead credential SAML assertion, as well as its dierent elds and associated
attributes. Such assertion is exchanged through SAML messages. To do this, we have
modied the metadata exchanged by the IdP and the SPs in order to include the URL
or the endpoints to which the sleepyhead credential messages would be sent or from they
would be received, i.e. the location of the Sleepyhead Credential Consumer Service.
In addition, it must be noted that the SP and IdP have been extended by implementing
the SAML-based delegation protocol. Thus, we are currently working in order to integrate
the new software components with the SIP-based event system to oer a really enhanced
privacy experience and to apply audit services for events.
5.2.2 Proposal Adoption and Lessons Learned
The proof-of-concept prototype and the architectural design on which the prototype is
based, were contributed to the national R&D project \Espa~na Virtual".
Espa~na Virtual is a CENIT9 project funded by CDTI (Center for the Development of
Industrial Technology), Spanish Government. The main goal of the project, that lasted
between 2008 and 2012, was to establish a bridge between geography and the Internet
through the denition of an architecture, protocols and standards of Internet geography,
with a special focus on processing data, 3D visualization, virtual worlds and interaction
between users. An specic working package for \Security and Identity Management",
where our ideas were developed [190] was included to give a exible and secure support to
the envisioned rich ecosystem of services.
Once we tested the architecture depicted in 5.1, we dened and developed new use-cases to
be integrated in the scenarios of the project. More specically, besides the SPs and IdPs
located in the domain of University Carlos III and in one of the participant companies,
we oered the possibility of introducing external third parties (e.g., Facebook, Twitter) as
IdPs. We successfully tested the introduced privacy extensions with a dynamic federation
with these 3rd parties, and the subsequent delegation of user authentication to them.
Note that, some interoperability issues have been addressed; therefore, we have modied
the source code of the Authentic to make the IdP-compliant with SAMLv2/ID-FF. The
ECP has been deployed in mobile and embedded devices. This has also been integrated
with deployed providers. Both providers and ECP are being extended by implementing
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the SAML-based Privacy Engine. In the ECP, the interfaces to congure user's privacy
preferences and check personal data have been developed as an integrated application in
Java for limited devices. We are also testing the interaction of these modules with the
audit and monitoring services. On the other hand, we have tested guarantee of user's
privacy by providing explicit user consent to allow third parties access to certain parts of
user prole.
More details on the code, structures used, modication points, interfaces, conguration,
threat analysis and so on can be found in the project deliverables [190] [191]. On the other
hand, apart from the validation in the context of the above mentioned project, another
type of validation was made through the design, implementation and publication of derived
use-cases and architectures based on the ideas presented here. Initially, the architecture,
main related concepts and implementation issues were outlined in [7] and [6]. [6] and [8]
also describe dierent use cases and simulation scenarios to evaluate our thesis contribution
and show the main evaluation results.
Furthermore, the new applications and proposals that reuse the privacy-preserving mech-
anisms presented in this thesis are the following:
 In the context of Cloud Computing, we combined privacy improvements with a
dynamic federation architecture layers-based [4] to enable the global scalability and
usability that are required for the successful implantation of Cloud technologies,
while preserving user's privacy. Thus, our approach empowers users to access cloud
services and share digital content without necessarily revealing their true identity
to everyone, thanks to the use of multiple identities, for instance depending on the
context. Besides, it provides a framework that enables to keep to a trace-o between
user's privacy and degree of tracking to obtain an adequate personalization degree
in the dierent services. Moreover, the solution includes a module enables users to
have enhanced awareness over their online identity use by introducing monitoring
tools and an audit service focused on data sharing through the Personal Cloud.
This proposal build on the privacy and security model for identity management
architectures presented in this thesis.
 In the context of smart and mobile television, we proposed FamTV1 [12].
1This work received the Chester W. Sall Award for the 2nd place best paper in the IEEE Transactions
2011 (http://www.icce.org/index.php/awards2013)
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FamTV is an architecture focused on oering presence-aware personalized TV by
using the benets of content-ltering and presence detection technologies. But it
includes a security and privacy layer where privacy-enabled congurations and rules
will be established. This is essential having into account that TVs are usually lo-
cated in a common place at home and most of the time there are more than one
viewer. Thus, if a viewer is watching TV and her personal widgets, such as social
network comments, are congured to also appear in the screen. When another user
comes into the room, her presence is detected and the elements considered private
are automatically hidden.
 In the context of mobile Internet access and next generation networks, we
use the IdM architecture proposed in this thesis to complement existing WiMAX
security solutions [192] [9], while enabling secure personalization of services, as well
as improvement of QoS management and user experience and privacy.
The main lessons learned through this phase, as well as the remarkable conclusions and
limitations found can be summarized in:
The proof-of-concept has served to face some important challenges posed by the proposal,
namely integration with identity and SIP-based event frameworks, as well as modication
of the SAML standard. The integration between SP and IdP implementations, even if
supporting the same set of IdM specications, is not a straightforward task. This fact
conrms that the introduction of automation features is important. The designed privacy
extensions is easy to integrate with current open source identity management toolkits.
In our tests, rstly we modied directly the source code of the used toolkits (Authentic
and Zxid) to include the new functionality. Next, the key parts of the proposed modules
were programmed as external APIs to be used from other SP/IdP implementation. The
implemented prototype proves that the core principles of the architecture are workable.
Thus, the sleepyhead -credential delegation protocol and the Consent/Revocation Manager
are realizable and can be included in SAML-based frameworks. In the implementation,
tests were focused on delivery process (over SAML) of event information and security data.
Further validation is carried out by means of simulation, as it is described in the next
section.
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5.3 Validation through the Event Engine Simulations
To carry out an adequate dimensioning of the designed system and provide a robust and
scalable solution, it is necessary to estimate the SIP-Notify-Event messages overhead
introduced in order to determinate the required number of notier entities to attend and
notify the event messages according to the subscribed entities and the rate of event arrival
without congesting the system. For this purpose, we used the MATLAB mathematical
tool [185]. An event engine has been simulated by generating generic health care events
that arrive to anM=M=c=K notication queueing system and they are served as described
in section 4.3.4.
For the experiments, we used a set of statistical data collected by the HES (Hospital
Episode Statistics) online service, which contains data related to 18,51 million accident and
emergency attendances from April 2013 to March 2014 [193] at major A&E departments,
single specialty A&E departments, walk-in centres and minor injury units in England.
Furthermore, these data set reect detailed information provided by 205 English hospitals
about emergency attendances and average times depending on the hour of arrival, day,
month, etc. Note that, these data are oered at health care provider level. We will
dierentiate between several scenarios according to the frequency of event arrival, that
means, the number of events related to emergency attendances per minute.
Firstly, we will distinguish a general case in which the required number of notiers and
subscribers will be analyzed depending on the mean frequency of health care events con-
forming to hour and day of event arrival. It must be noted that, the aforementioned
average frequency event was calculated in a weighted manner for all health providers (SPs
or IdPs) listed in the data set. Afterwards, we will characterize the analysis of the in-
troduced overhead contemplating two specic cases: 1) a small-medium hospital and 2)
a large hospital. After examining the data set, with the term of small-medium hospital
we will refer to a health provider that received an average of 8.391 emergencies p.a (the
Herefordshire Community NHS Trust hospital) and we will use the term of large hospital
for a hospital with 237.701 emergencies p.a (the Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust
hospital).
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5.3.1 Simulation of A General Case
We rst analyze the proposed event model supposing a general case. For this analysis we
use the parameters 1/ = 1:25 events per minute, K = 100; 200 and observe the behavior
of the event engine in terms of overhead with varying number of notiers (c) from 15
to 200 and subscribers (10 and 20). In Figures 5.2 and 5.3 we present several plots of
Equation 4.18 depending on rates and time of event arrivals.
(a) Overhead messages according to notication arrival rates, variable number of
notiers, K=100 and subscribers=10.
(b) Overhead messages according to notication arrival rates per day and hour,
variable number of notiers, K=100 and subscribers=10.
Figure 5.2: Overhead SIP-Event Notify messages by varying the notication arrival rates and the
number of notiers for a general case. Parameter values: K=100 and subscribers=10.
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Subgures 5.2(a) and 5.3(a) show that the SIP-based event engine introduces an assumable
message overhead, which grows linearly with the arrival frequency of events and the number
of subscribed entities to the system. As it can be observed, increasing the K value does
not have a signicant impact on the overhead, but it must be carefully selected to avoid
loss of messages without congesting the system. Moreover, we study the system behavior
according the hour and day of event arrival (see Subgures 5.2(b) and 5.3(b)).
(a) Overhead messages according to notication arrival rates, variable number of
notiers, K=200 and subscribers=20.
(b) Overhead messages according to notication arrival rates per day and hour,
variable number of notiers, K=200 and subscribers=20.
Figure 5.3: Overhead SIP-Event Notify messages by varying the notication arrival rates and the
number of notiers for a general case. Parameter values: K=200 and subscribers=20.
In these cases, as we can see, the overhead introduced by the event engine is quite similar
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for every day of the week, showing a slight increase on Monday from 9:00 a.m to 12 p.m.
It is due to the increment of emergency cases. Besides, we can appreciate that generally
the highest and lowest rates of arrival of events coincide with the slots from 9:00 a.m. to
12:00 noon and from 12:00 midnight to 6:00 a.m, corresponding to the periods of highest
and lowest message overhead respectively.
5.3.2 Simulation of A Real Case
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(a) Overhead messages according to notication arrival rates, variable number of
notiers, K=100 and subscribers=10.
(b) Overhead messages according to notication arrival rates per hour, variable
number of notiers, K=100 and subscribers=10.
Figure 5.4: Overhead SIP-Event Notify messages by varying the notication arrival rates and the
number of notiers for a small-medium hospital case.
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Similarly, whether we particularize the study for the cases of small-medium and large
hospital, we can observe that in the same way as in the results shown in Figures 5.2
and 5.3, the introduced overhead depending on the rate of arrival of events varies linearly
(See Subgures 5.4(a) and 5.5(a)).
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(a) Overhead messages according to notication arrival rates, variable number of
notiers, K=200 and subscribers=15.
(b) Overhead messages according to notication arrival rates per hour, variable
number of notiers, K=200 and subscribers=15.
Figure 5.5: Overhead SIP-Event Notify messages by varying the notication arrival rates and the
number of notiers for a large hospital case.
For the simulation results presented in Figure 5.4 we use the parameters 1/ = 0:8 events
per minute, K = 100, number of subscribers = 10 and distinct number of notiers (from
25 to 55). It should be noted that, periods of highest and lowest overhead are similar to
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the obtained for the general case, except for the decrease occurred at 12 noon, which cor-
responds to a low health care event rate. In the case of the large hospital (See Figure 5.5),
we analyze an scenario composed by 15 subscribed entities, a variable number of notiers
(from 34 to 100), with 1/ = 3:5 events per minute and K = 200.
5.4 Conclusions
We have covered the validation of the architecture proposed through the implementation
of a proof-of-concept and testing prototypes showing that the main ideas of the revocation
consent proposal are feasible.
On the other hand, we have observed in the performed simulations, that the message over-
head starts to grow exponentially when the event arrival rate doubles the notiers. This
is seen for 34 notiers (see Figure 5.5); so the parameter that represents congestion of the
system is approaching to its saturation value (  1). Therefore, it is necessary to achieve a
trade-o between the number of entities subscribed to dierent type of events, the number
of notiers that serve them and the maximum size of the queue for each event type, in or-
der to avoid loss of messages. Note that, a quantitative validation showing the advantages
achieved by our revocation consent event-based proposal in compare to time-dependent
solutions has not been provided, due to the scarce deployment of consent management
infrastructure that avoids to obtain mean values to perform a fair comparative.
To conclude, simulations results show that the event engine introduces an assumable mes-
sage overhead, since if we consider the the large amount of information exchanged in health
care systems, the size of the messages to manage events for implicit revocation is small.
However, important parameters such as the number of notiers and the maximum size
of the notication queue, must be controlled in order to avoid loss of messages without
saturating the system. In addition, it must be noted that, the usage of the system also
aects privacy and should be present in users consents. The auditing processes should
verify that the design and assumptions regarding future usage match its actual usage.
Finally, as a future step, it would be interesting to test the architecture in a real world
health care environment to validate not only if the architecture is feasible, well-designed
and meets the specied requirements, but also if it is useful in real life scenarios.
Chapter6
Selective Privacy-Enhanced User Prole
Management Proposal
The closing of a door can bring blessed
privacy and comfort - the opening, terror.
Conversely, the closing of a door can be a
sad and nal thing - the opening a
wonderfully joyous moment.
Andy Rooney, 2011
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6.1 Chapter Overview
In dierent situations of our real life we are who decide with whom we share our secrets
and reveal our personal information. For instance, in distinct areas of our either work or
personal lives, we just share sensitive information with people from our closest circles of
trust and we want to be informed of the third parties involved. It is necessary to transfer
these situations to the digital world, by allowing the concept of \man-in the loop" [194]
in order to enable users to have complete control over their digital identities and their
disclosure.
The purpose of this contribution is to provide precisely a user's prole management mech-
anism that reveals identity information as selectively as a human would do. This aspect is
specially critical in sensitive scenarios, such as health care. For this reason, we will focus
on validating and evaluating our proposal in these environments.
Current standards and specications to share electronic health records [115] [119] [118] are
not ready to cope with some aspects of privacy. Specically, it is necessary to develop tech-
niques for the storage, maintenance, and ne-grained control of sensitive data that permit
controlled sharing across dierent healthcare stakeholders, following minimal disclosure
whereas data protection against unauthorized use and minimal disclosure according to
patient's consent preferences is provided.
With these premises as foundation, this chapter focuses on studying and dening a ex-
ible privacy-awareness approach for the management of patient's EHR proles, which is
implemented by the Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler component of the architecture
for privacy provisioning. It is based on a generalized, adaptive and unbalanced Merkle
structure. As discussed in Chapter 2 and it will be discussed in greater depth in this
chapter, these kind of structures enable to combine user's identity information in a richer
and more exible manner, since user's proles do not need to follow strict binary, ternary
or quaternary structures.
The contribution enables to bring together various patient identity sources to be part of
a single credential, while avoiding the creation of bogus patient's EHR proles. In this
sense, solutions based on basic structures need healthcare providers must either see all of
the claims or trust the providers of all information, which it is not ideal from a security
and privacy point of view. Thus, with our proposal a healthcare service would be able to
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accesses the specic personal information without being able to inspect any other details
and keeping user control of her data by controlling who can access.
To accomplish this, our contribution relies on the EHR Information Model established by
openEHR [119], because it oers an open and extensible framework, as well as archetypes
for many clinical terms widely used in hospitals and summary EHR systems in multi-
ple countries. In addition, these structures are publicly available, which facilitates the
implementation and adoption of our proposal.
This contribution pursues to bring a data structure that can be saved on constrained de-
vices, as well as adapting eciently to changes over time thanks to the proposed algorithm.
This privacy-aware user prole management contribution re-uses some of the technological
mechanisms explained in Chapter 4, such as a hybrid identity management architecture
to provide interoperability, a consistent user experience and to control the information
exchange in both online and oine scenarios.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 illustrates a use-case motivating
the work and highlights the advantages of our solution. Section 6.3 explains a mathemati-
cal model to describe the selective privacy-enhanced patient prole management behavior
and how the oered privacy mechanisms that can be integrated some use cases are also
provided. Next, section 6.4 remarks some security and privacy considerations. Finally,
section 6.5 gives the principal conclusions.
6.2 Motivation
6.2.1 Use case for management of EHR proles
In order to show the benets of our approach, in this section, we describe a potential use-
case that can be realized by applying our proposal. Alice is a diabetic patient who also has
hypertension and kidney problems. She nds dicult to manage her condition eectively.
Let us assume within a given domain, such as the State of California, we have several
healthcare communities in San Francisco and Los Angeles. As Alice travels frequently,
has received healthcare in each of these communities. She is undergoing kidney surgery
in the hospital in LA (hospital A) next month. The attending physician, Bob, will need
to use her hospital information system to query across multiple domains for healthcare
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information about this patient (e.g., chronic conditions, critical diseases, past surgical,
family history, laboratory results, blood glucose, blood pressure, etc.).
On the other hand, in one of her visits to San Francisco, Alice was admitted to hospital
B. Her doctor, Robert, advised Alice to subscribe to a diabetes management program
oered by hospital B. As a part of the program, Alice wears a hospital-provided device
that continuously monitors her activity level and calories burned, and installs software on
her mobile phone. The software processes data it receives from the monitor along with
contextual information such as Alice's location. Alice decides to join a social network for
diabetics, whose privacy settings enable her to share information with the group (e.g.,
her daily activity and food intake progress) and to allow complete access to her personal
health information to her family members. Once a week, Alice records her weight, blood
glucose and blood pressure, using devices that send the measurements wirelessly to her
mobile phone. Due to her participation in the management program, Alice's insurance
company oers to reduce her premium if she shows signicant improvement in controlling
her diabetes. In this dynamic scenario, dierent parts of Alice's medical history can be
distinguished and merged as EHR proles to construct an M -ary Merkle tree according
to the openEHR Information Model specication [116] (see Fig. 6.1):
 Basic Information : Patient ID, social security number (SSN), weight, blood glu-
cose, blood preassure and blood group.
 Patient Preferences: Alice has the choice to remain anonymous in the group for
diabetics.
 Patient Consents: Alice's husband can access to her complete personal health
information (PHR). To demonstrate progress, Alice must provide the insurance com-
pany access to certain parts of her health data. She instructs her PHR to provide
aggregate information of her activity, diet and physiological parameters.
 Therapeutic Precautions: it considers allergies (e.g., penicillin) and alerts.
 Lifestyle : it includes exercise and food intake progress.
 Care Plan : combinations of goals, targets, monitoring, education concerning the
diabetes management plan.
 Laboratory Results: for instance, blood tests.
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Figure 6.1: This gure shows a XML fragment of a patient's EHRs, which can be repre-
sented with a tree structure
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 Prescriptions: medication orders related to Alice's chronic conditions.
 Family History : Alice's father died of myocardial infarction at 62.
 Physical Examinations: observations appointment, admission and discharge at
hospitals A and B.
Due to the signicant variation of Alice's diurnal blood-glucose levels, activities related to
diabetes management plan, her data and location will be accessed more often.
6.2.2 Advantages of the proposed Adaptive Extended Merkle (AEM)
tree-based management
The aim of this section is to justify the choice of the proposed structure, an AEM tree,
rather than others, such as binary Merkle or red-black trees or skip lists reviewed in Chap-
ter 2. To select the adequate structure, our work has taken into account on the one hand,
the indispensable properties in the context of privacy in healthcare and identity manage-
ment environments, given the extremely sensitive nature of the information handled and
on the other hand, performance needs of these scenarios. Regarding privacy features, the
proposed AEM tree provides the following advantages:
 A richer view of the EHRs by assembling dierent parts of medical records
as prole groups and user's preferences. Patient's medical history or records
do not have to follow a strict binary, ternary or quaternary structure. It is necessary
to have a structure that enables to group information in a more exible manner.
Concerning skip lists, their construction needs to order elements and form the rst
list using the ordered elements. Subsequent lists are built on top of the list by
selecting randomly some of the elements from the list immediately below. This will
be repeated until there is only one element. However, EHRs may contain attributes
and data types of dierent nature, making it dicult to nd a valid sorting criteria
for all elements that will become part of the list. Let us consider a patient's EHR
example, in which the user has several contacts and critical diseases. To address
the treatment of a specic disease, the intervention from 1 to N departments of
dierent hospitals (e.g., surgery, chemotherapy) may be necessary. Each department
may implement from 0 to N treatments and each treatment, has a date and may
have from 1 to N participants (e.g., doctor, nurse, surgeon, etc.). To achieve a
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more exible structure storage, we study and dene a prole management based
on a M -ary, adaptive and unbalanced Merkle tree. The tree is distributed suitably
according to the frequency user's attributes are accessed. The set of attributes with
similar access frequency may have semantic relationships, which will allow to build
dierent proles to be part of a patient's medical history. To this end, our proposal
provides an algorithm for sorting the tree based on patterns of access according to
the EHR Information Model [116]. Thus, the attributes frequently required will be
placed closer to the root, whilst clinical data whose relevancy to the clinical care
of the patient fades in time (e.g., most measurements made on the patients or in
pathology) will be located in the lower levels.
 Combining several sources of EHRs to be part of a single credential. We
use the use case described above to illustrate the potential benets of combining mul-
tiple sources of identity and selective information revelation in collaborative health
care environments. In the scenario, solutions based on basic structures would re-
quire the healthcare provider must either see all of the claims or trust the providers
of all information. This solution is not ideal from a security and privacy point of
view. Hence, our approach includes an optional branch to some internal nodes of
the full tree and it enables that healthcare providers (hospitals A and B) do not
have access to all information about Alice. Healthcare providers are only responsi-
ble for claims related to their subject area. Furthermore, the used hash minimizes
the need of individual verication of elements along a path and, instead, it would
suce with a root's hash check and the user only has to keep track of one credential.
This also enables multiple attributes verication through a single verication tree
without revealing information related to non requested attributes.
 Adaptive performance. Considering the large information handled and the vari-
ability of data is much smaller than in the case of social networks and cloud comput-
ing scenarios, it is desirable to have an agile storage structure on read operations.
In healthcare environments, response times of insertion or modication operations
can be penalized in favor of applying more robust security and privacy mechanisms
to protect sensitive information in accordance with the regulatory and legislative
frameworks. Although the use of the Merkle Trees makes more dicult to add or
update attributes without recomputing parts of the tree as well as changing the root
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itself, our work provides an algorithm to improve this aspect, by sorting the tree as
we envision frequently accessed attributes to be closer to the root.
6.3 Improving Privacy in e-Health: An Adaptive Extended
Merkle Tree-based Management
Before explaining the mathematical model, it is necessary to briey review the important
concepts of the architecture proposed in Chapter 3 in order to identify stakeholders that
manage EHRs.
6.3.1 Architecture
We considered our IdM architecture with the following actors: 1) Service Providers,
which provide services and consume the identity data coalesced by the healthcare providers
from several sources. For instance, this role is played by the insurance company in the use
case presented in section 6.2.1; 2) Identity Providers, which are entities issuing medical
records (e.g., hospital A and hospital B); and 3) Users (e.g., Alice) with a particular
digital identity who interact with SPs and IdPs (see Fig. 6.2).
The information sent to the healthcare providers may contain pieces of data stored in
several identity providers and user devices. User's devices would act as an Identity Meta-
system , meta-IdP[195], in order to provide interoperability, a consistent user experience
and control of the information exchange. In this way, the role of the patient (Alice) is
empowered letting her to participate in the process. So, the trust and attribute disclose
processes are no longer opaque as in other identity models. The patient is given the
ability to congure interactions with healthcare providers and third parties (e.g., the in-
surance company and the social network), by detailing which attributes may the healthcare
providers take from her prole and which ones can be taken from an identity provider.
It worth be noted that, the meta-IdP can be also instantiated in the health care provider
to cope with scenarios in which the patient is not online to accept the transaction. More
technical details about the IdM architecture has been discussed in Chapter 3.
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Figure 6.2: This gure illustrates the IdM Architecture. Note the meta-IdP may be
instantiated in either the user device or the healthcare provider
6.3.2 Mathematical Formalization and Denition
The purpose of this section is to describe how to handle patient's EHR proles through a
novel AEM tree to convey patient claims to other entities.
An AEM tree is essentially an M-ary and unbalanced tree, i.e., each node may have up to
M maximum children. Thus, each node holds the hash of the concatenated values of its
children nodes. Leaf nodes hold the identity attributes as well as other information as (e.g.,
node tag, semantic annotation, attribute value, attribute nature and type as self-issued -
non veriable - or provider issued - veriable). Node's children inuence the node hash
and so does the node with its parent until the root node, so a large number of separate
data can be tied to a single hash value (root node). In this way, given an attribute and its
hash tree, if hashes related to the attribute are consistent until the root and the signature
of the root node is valid, it is possible to verify that any of the leaf nodes of the tree are
authentic without revealing any further data. Thus, selective patient's attribute disclosure
and verication is achieved. To help the consumer to distinguish among dierent sources,
the meta-IdP labels nodes by appending a bit to the end of the hash, true if the attribute
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is provider-issued (i.e., age, nationality), or false if the node attribute is self-issued.
AEM trees are constructed according to the following. A template node, named N , con-
tains several attributes Attn (of any nature) and children N1; : : : ; Nn. Some node types
may contain a Hash value HN from a summary obtained from its attributes and related
to its children. Moreover, they contain a node identier NId:
N  ([HN ]; NId; Att1; : : : ; Attv) ; [fN1; : : : ; Nng] (6.1)
There are several node types: leaf nodes, named LN , contain attributes but no children;
LN  (NId; Att1; : : : ; Attu) ; fg (6.2)
prole nodes, named PN , contain attributes and descendants that should be kept together
since they constitute a prole or set of interrelated claims;
PN  (HN ; NId; Att1; : : : ; Attv) ; fNp1; : : : ; Npng (6.3)
inner nodes, named IN , are structural nodes containing no identity attributes but the
necessary hash values to build a verication path from any leaf node to the root (that will
be signed by the provider);
IN  (HN ; NId; Att1; : : : ; Attn) ; fNi1; : : : ; Ning (6.4)
the root node, named RN , contains several attributes including an identier, a time stamp
TS (generated during signature) and a signature Sig over the hash value related to its
children. Its children contain, as well, a hash value related to their children, until a leaf
node. In this way, a provider can certify all the data placing one signature in the root node
over the hash value allowing the tree to be lopped by the meta-IdP removing branches
without aecting the hash whenever hash values until the claim to be proven are known.
Moreover, the root node has a set of special children nodes that contain pseudo identiers
(Pid1; : : : ; Pidn) that are randomly generated when the data structure is signed. Thus
a signed tree can be used several times enabling unlinkability. Besides, due to selective
disclosure properties of the AEM tree, a degree of unobservability is oered, since the meta-
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IdP allows the patient to handle health resources while keeping clear of other entities (e.g.,
the social network) have access to more information than it is necessary.
RN  (Sig; TS;HN ; NId; Att1; : : : ; Attn) ; fN1; : : : ; Nng; fPid1; : : : ; Pidng (6.5)
Figure 6.3: Privacy Framework based on extended Merkle trees for EHR prole manage-
ment.
Figure 6.3 illustrates Alice's medical history according to the use case described in sec-
tion 6.2.1. We also summarize the information contained in the prole nodes in Table 6.1.
Node Type of prole node
pr1 Physical examinations
pr2 Allergies
pr3 Patient's basic data
pr4 Patient's basic data
pr5 Self-issued lifestyle attributes
pr6 Physiological parameters
pr7 Patient Preferences
pr8 Events or conditions in Alice's family members
pr9 Laboratory measurements
pr10 Information related to patient consent
Table 6.1: Summary of Prole Nodes
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It must be noted that, nodes n8 and n9 store PHR data based on compliance with Alice's
activity and diet. Leaf nodes n8 and n9 contain Alice's location information and her blood
group, respectively. Finally, the rest of LN are children of the aforementioned PN.
Furthermore, our AEM tree annotates the query frequencies of its attributes, as a criteria
for subsequent optimizations. In this way, the most frequent attributes (e.g., PHR data
related to diabetes, Alice's basic information and her location) are placed in the upper
levels of the AEM tree, making more ecient and faster the verication process. Hence,
the AEM tree can be dynamically optimized according to node frequencies given some
structural constraints (tree depth and node children from 0 to M). So, we denote by m
the maximum degree of a node, i.e, the maximum number of branches that emanate from
each node, the parameter h represents the AEM tree height. In addition, we use the term
L% to represent the contribution percentage variance of the access frequency of the nodes
remaining to be placed in the tree. Equations 6.6 dene the set of possible AEM tree
nodes (including leaf, prole and inner nodes), equation 6.7 their query frequencies, and
equation 6.8 denotes the maximum number of AEM tree nodes and the maximum number
of leaves, respectively:
NAEMTree = fN1; N2; : : : Nkg (6.6)
F = ff1; f2; : : : ; fkg (6.7)
k =
hP
i=1
mi, M = mh (6.8)
Where,
f1 < f2 : : : fk 1 < fk, k M (6.9)
As mentioned before, a sorting algorithm can be triggered to improve searches. The
algorithm works as follows. Step 1: we order the set of AEM tree nodes containing data
(LN and PN) by query frequencies in ascending order. Step 2: we take the p nodes, named
P , that contribute (Cvari) to the L% of the frequency variance (var) of the remaining
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nodes (see Equations 6.10, 6.11 and 6.12).
P = fp1; p2; : : : ppg (6.10)
var =
RMP
i=1
(fi   f)2=RM , std =
p
var (6.11)
where RM are the nodes pending to be placed.
Cvari = (fi   f)2=RM (6.12)
Step 3: the algorithm iterates over the nodes in P . Until P is empty, we take the rst
node in P , pi and check:
mh   (m  1) > k   1 (6.13)
The equation 6.13 evaluates if pi can be placed in this level (since it reduces the maximum
number of leafs) leaving room for the rest of the nodes (k   1). If so, we place the node
pi, remove pi from P and go back to step 3. Otherwise, m new internal nodes are added
to the tree and go the next level. Finally, once nodes in P have been placed we move to
step 1 where the variance and dispersity for the remaining nodes are recalculated and the
following p nodes contributing the L% of the variance are chosen. This process is repeated
until the number of nodes to place in the AEM tree is equal to zero.
It must be noted that, the sorting algorithm is also applied each time a node is inserted or
updated in the AEM tree. As the new node does not have historical of access frequency,
it will be placed at the \most disadvantaged" positions of the AEM tree, as happens in
the real life situations when someone starts at the bottom and works her way up. If
this new node is frequently consulted, it will prove itself and its position will improve.
As regards the update attributes, whether a node is very frequently accessed when the
proposed algorithm is applied, it will be in a good position. Otherwise, it will be located
at the lower levels.
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Figure 6.3 illustrates an example of how our distribution algorithm works for an AEM tree
with parameters m = 3 and h = 3. Nodes with the highest frequencies are shown in red
color. Medium frequencies are have been drawn in yellow, while the rest of the nodes are
represented in white. The search algorithm looks for nodes upside-down and left to right,
so after running the distribution algorithm, pr3 and its children (n3, n4 and n5) are put
in a higher level and further to the left. The node called pr4 is also relocated in a position
that favors its search and verication when these attributes are shared with hospital A, B
and the social network. It must be noted that, the PN pr10 and pr7 will be checked before
disclosing attributes held by pr3 and pr4. The rest of the nodes are placed according the
same criteria position respecting the parameters m and h.
6.4 Security and Privacy Considerations
The unlinkability and \partial anonymity" of the proposal stems from the corresponding
IdPs services. Users claims, asserted by the IdPs, are only exposed according to the
privacy rules and informed consents. When a restricted view is required, opaque parts
of the EHR are incorporated and veriable thanks to the hashes and the opaque and
transient identiers provided by the IdPs. Using Merkle Hash Trees to enforce privacy
has been already explored in other works like [101] [102] [103]. Our searching and sorting
algorithms may introduce information leakage suitable for a dierential analysis. Let us
consider a well informed attacker who performs selected searches to initiate new sorting of
the AEM tree: measuring the sorting time, the attacker can perform estimations and even
models of the attributes and relationships of parts of the EHR beyond her authorization.
To prevent such privacy breaches, we propose to introduce random delays in the sorting
algorithm. Besides the number of executions of the sorting algorithm should be limited
within a given period of time.
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have dened the privacy-enhanced user prole management model that
is implemented by the Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler component of the proposed
architecture to the privacy provisioning for federated IdM. The model is based on a novel
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Adaptive Extended Merkle structure, which allows user to have more control over their
identities and proles, by letting them to bring together identity sources comprised of
dierent medical and community health records repositories with identity information
stored in their personal devices.
Moreover, we have provided and evaluated the algorithm that allows to build enriched
compositions of the patient's medical history and to sort the tree based on patterns of
access compliance with open EHRs standards, which empowers to promote their imple-
mentation in health information systems. Implementation issues and simulations results
concerning the selective privacy-enhanced user prole management proposal are presented
in Chapter 7.
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Chapter7
Selective Privacy-Enhanced User Prole
Management Validation
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7.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter is dedicated to cover the validation of the ideas presented in Chapter 6.
Firstly, section 7.2 shows the simulation results concerning the proposed structure to
achieve a selective privacy-enhanced user prole management. Likewise, the integration of
the Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler with the rest of the Privacy Engine components
has been tested and it is described in section 7.3.
Finally, section 7.4 concludes by remarking the main results derived from all the the
validation tests performed.
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7.2 Evaluation of the Sorting Algorithm
Currently there is no standardized set of EHRs on which to test or develop or validate
algorithms or protocols. Besides, access to full EHRs is quite limited. To solve these prob-
lems, previous research, such as [196] [197] [197] demonstrated the success of synthetic data
application. Moreover, there is great value in using synthetic data over sanitized data to
ensure user's privacy. Sanitized data, particularly anonymization, is commonly miscon-
ceived to ensure condentiality of private or sensitive data [198]. A disadvantage of using
anonymized data is exemplied by the ability to cross-correlate background knowledge
with other databases to re-identify individual data records [199].
According to the McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientic and Technical Terms [200], synthetic
data are\any production data applicable to a given situation that are not obtained by direct
measurement".
Thus, synthetic data are generated to meet specic needs or certain conditions that may
not be found in the original, real data. This is useful when designing any type of system
because the synthetic data are used as a simulation or as a theoretical value, situation,
etc. In such a way, researchers may generate synthetic data to aid in creating a baseline
for their studies and testing. For instance, intrusion detection software is tested using
synthetic data [196].
For the above reasons, we have created synthetic data in order to validate our proposal.
These synthetic data include quantitative (e.g., age, weight, blood glucose, blood pres-
sure, etc.) and qualitative data (e.g., demographics and socioeconomic data, lifestyle
choices, prescriptions, patient's preferences and consents, etc.) to evaluate dierent pro-
les. Furthermore, with the aim evaluate the behavior of the sorting algorithm described
in Section 6.3.2, we have developed a prototype in Java and conducted preliminary exper-
iments on the performance of our data structure by generating sets of random requests
with dierent probability distributions. Thus, we have performed two dierent tests for
dierent tree structures:
 Biased tree structure : In this case, a few nodes have a high probability to be
requested. Examples of healthcare data that can be represented as biased tree struc-
tures, they are patients' medical records with chronic diseases, since particularly
lifestyle, current problems and medications which are continually required by query-
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ing. This kind of attributes would be located in the upper level of the AEM tree.
Regarding, the attributes consist of clinical data whose relevancy fades fairly quickly,
including most measurements made on the patients or in pathology. Attributes in
this category are thus potentially very numerous over the patient's lifetime, but of
decreasing relevance to the clinical care of the patient in time; it therefore makes
sense to place them in lower levels.
 Uniform tree structure : In which each node has the same probability to be
requested. These kind of trees can be used to manage a young and healthy person's
proles. This person will go to the doctor for her annual reviews. Therefore, the
attributes related to basic information and lab results, such as blood tests will be
consulted with similar frequencies.
Figure 7.1: The average searching and verication tree building times ( ST ) globally for
biased structures.
Likewise, in these experiments we have studied the behavior of the frequency-based adap-
tive distribution algorithm for dierent AEM tree sizes by modifying both their height and
maximum number of children permitted per node. For each operation, the average search
verication tree building times, ST , was computed over 400; 000 trials. The experiment
was conducted using a machine equipped with an Intel CORE i7 2760QM with 8G of
memory running at 4GHz. Cryptographic hashing was performed using the standard Java
implementation of the SHA-256 algorithm.
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We have summarized the evaluation results in Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 through 3D graphics
that show the obtained times for searching and verication tree building. These times are
represented by the Z axis, when dierent sizes of m-ary trees are used. To reect the
changes of the trees, the X axis, represents the number of maximum children that each
node may have (denoted by m) and the Y axis pictures the dierent heights of the trees
(parameter h) used for the experiments.
For the results depicted in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, we have used biased structures, whilst
Figure 7.3 presents ndings for uniform structures. Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 show in
red the searching and verication tree building times for the dierent m-ary trees (the
changes of m and h are represented in the axes X and Y, respectively) without applying
the proposed sorting algorithm. The ndings when the proposed sorting algorithm is
executed are shown in Figure 7.1 in blue and in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 in green.
Figure 7.2: The average search and verication tree building times ( ST ) for the frequent
queries (FQ - those that constitute the 50% of the queries).
We have taken as reference binary trees (m = 2 and h = 5, 10, 15 or 20) and m-ary trees
(e.g., m = 4, 5 or 6 and h = 6 or 8) and evaluated the average search time ( ST ) and the
average verication tree length ( V TL) for every node and for the set of nodes that are
most frequently queried ( ST (FQ) and V TL (FQ)). Note that, the ST includes searching
and verication tree building times.
In Figure 7.1, we can appreciate that our algorithm reduces the total searching and ver-
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ication tree building times over a 40.08 % and 39.73 % for m = 2 and h = 20 and 15,
respectively. Moreover, the proposed algorithm also decreases the verication path length.
For the binary tree cases, the average verication path length before reordering are equal
to 7.00 (m = 2, h = 5) and 13.05 (m = 2, h = 15), whereas the value of this parameter
is reduced to 4.50 and 5.51 after running the algorithm, respectively.
Regarding the outcome of uniform query distribution test (see Figure 7.3), the average
searching and verication tree building times are slightly enhanced especially when m
decreases and h increases (see the value of the Z axis for instance when m = 2, h = 13,
15 or 20).
Figure 7.3: The average search time and verication tree building times ( ST ) globally for
uniform structures.
It is must be noted that, the time spent by the distribution algorithm (OT ) is not signicant
when compared to the improvement over the total search time (Total ST). Although they
are not shown in Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, for instance, for m = 2, h = 15 and m =
2, h = 20, the OT are 1670.745 s and 2711.752 s, while the total search are 38,71s
and 43.57s, respectively. For m-ary trees, the OT are 1531.469 s and 1463.632 s when
m = 6, h = 8 and m = 5, h = 6; respectively. In other words, the time spent by the
distribution algorithm is about the 0.04% with respect to the total search time, whereas
the reduction of the total searching and verication tree building times after applying the
proposed algorithm reaches in some cases for biased structure around the 40%.
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On the other hand, our proposal would be dependent of the user and her/his device. It is
an application that would allow users to manage their own sensitive records in a exible
and ecient manner. In general, attributes or tags enable faster processing, especially
when they are used in a tree and the tree shape varies depending on the use thereof.
Furthermore, if they are combined with a tree, the search is predictable and bounded, what
could contribute to make attractive our contribution to be used in cloud-based healthcare
systems.
In addition, the proposed AEM tree can help to create for instance, a tree for a child in
which her basic information (i.e., allergies, blood group, etc) is frequently accessed and
has security measures dierent from other attributes that require, for instance, parental
approval.
Finally, the AEM tree can store references to other health records, by governing access
to them, but not necessarily containing them. This type of indirections may be necessary
in order to increase exibility storage and it is not incompatible with security, since the
AEM tree and its metadata as access information can be used to obtain heavy health
data protected and stored by a healthcare provider. Many test results, such as computed
tomography (CT), positron emission tomography}Ucomputed tomography (PET-CT), etc.
have their own protection and software management in order to be later interpreted by
doctors. Besides, these kind of tests take up much space size of a DVD for low resolution
results.
7.3 Implementation Issues
With to aim to test the integration of the Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler with the
other components of the Privacy Engine (the Privacy Preferences Service, the Personal
Identier Manager, the Consent/Revocation Manager, the Audit Service, etc.), we have
developed an Android application which allows the user to congure and edit her security
and privacy policies exibly in order to medical sta, emergency services, etc. can access
to various parts of the patient's medical history.
The prototype application works with medical records, which consists of a Java class that
contains an AEM tree to represent the dierent sections and subsections of a medical
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Figure 7.4: User Login and Register Pages
history. For this purpose, the type nodes described in section 6.3.2 have been used.
After installing the developed application, the rst time it displays to user a register page.
Once the user is registered, when the application is run again, a login page will be as can
be seen in Figure 7.4.
When the user is authenticated successfully, the application enables her to perform the
following tasks:
 Consulting the dierent sections that make up her medical history through
the option named See Record.
When the user selects this option, the application displays a column of buttons, as
shown in Figure 7.5.
Each of these buttons corresponds to a child node of the AEM tree. By clicking on
any of these buttons are two possible cases as follows. If the selected node has child
nodes, then the application updates the screen showing the corresponding buttons
to these children. If one of these nodes in turn has child nodes, the same behavior
is repeated. Otherwise, i.e., the pressed node has no child nodes, the application
displays a pop-up to inform the user that it has been reached the end of the branch
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Figure 7.5: View of the main menu of the prototype application.
to show. In both cases, the application updates the text called \Level", located at
the top of the screen, with the number of the level of the tree depth, being \Level 1"
the initial level.
 Creating new policies, editing existing policies and creating new policies
from other existing by means of the choice called Modify Permissions. As can be
observed in Figure 7.6, the application enables user to select a set of nodes of the
AEM tree and to dene a specic privacy policy to be applied to the chosen nodes
through the button \Create Policy". In this example, the following security levels
and entities can be congured to access to certain parts of user's medical history:
\Emergency Normal", \Emergency Severe", \Emergency Critical", \Family Doctor",
\Ambulance", \Radiologist", \Genetic Research" and \Dentist".
Once the user has selected the security and privacy policies and has pressed the
\Allow Access" button (located at the bottom of the screen) an XML-based le,
which contains the information of the security and privacy policies is created. Then,
this le is encrypted and it can be stored in either the user's device or a trusted IdP.
 Knowing which entities access her personal data by choosing the Log History
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Figure 7.6: View of a patient's medical record and options to modify permissions.
option. For this purpose, the application interacts with the Audit Service and the
Action Montoring components described in Chapter 3.
 Conguring her privacy preferences (Preferences). This option has allowed
to test the correct integration between the rest of the Privacy Engine components
explained in Chapter 3 (i.e. the Privacy Preferences Service, the Personal Identi-
er Manager and the Consent/Revocation Manager) with the Privacy-Aware User
Prole Handler module.
7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented the work carried out to validate the ideas presented in
regard to the Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler module. Validation has been performed
through the simulation experiments, implementation and testing of prototypes, as well as
through the dissemination and publication in journals and conference, as well as through
contribution to R&D projects.
After all these steps we conclude that the selective privacy-enhanced user prole man-
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agement proposal is feasible and the evaluation results for dierent m-ary trees showed
that the time spent by the distribution algorithm is not signicant when compared to
the improvement over the total search time for both biased and uniform structures. The
proposed sorting algorithm reduced the total searching and verication tree building times
until a 40.08 % when parameter values were m = 2 and h = 20 in the case of biased struc-
tures. In addition, suitable results were also obtained for other m-ary trees by reducing
both the searching times and the verication path length. In regard to the ndings for
the uniform query distribution experiments, the average searching and verication tree
building times were lightly enhanced, especially when m decreased and h increased.
Moreover, the main novelty of our proposal is that it is based on open standards to manage
user's proles and it enables to combine dierent identity information sources to be part
of a unique credential.
But also, we identify other aspects still need to be covered:
 The architecture can be further tested through its deployment in real world scenarios.
 Further research is needed to test the integration of our prole management solu-
tion using real data and including images and genetic information, as well as more
complex information models and archetypes dened by the openEHR Foundation.
 Discussing on the relationship between the actors in implementing privacy protec-
tion, particularly the accountability and liabilities of the government, the private
sector and the patient should be addressed.
 In the validation of the selective privacy-enhanced user prole management proposal
it is required to study and limit the number of executions of the sorting, since
the proposed sorting algorithm may introduce information leakage suitable for a
dierential analysis.
Chapter8
Conclusions and Future Lines
I don't try to describe the future. I try to
prevent it.
Ray Bradbury, 2005
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8.1 Main Contributions
8.1.1 Technical Contributions
The main technical contributions of this thesis towards the fullling of the goals presented
in the introductory chapter in order to contribute to the privacy-enhanced provisioning
for federated IdM platforms are detailed below:
1. Study of identity management models and gap analysis.
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Identity information, user's proles and sensitive personal data recently have become
key assets for companies and organizations. On the one hand, communications
and transactions can be more ecient. On the other hand, they enable service
personalization in a cheaper and more agile way.
Current IdM infrastructures allow identity federation and management through fea-
tures such as account linkage, and proles, as well as simple session management.
In such federation scenarios take part the following main roles: Service Providers,
that are entities consuming identity data issued by a trusted third party, Identity
Providers that are entities asserting information about a subject, and Users that are
the subjects of the assertions. In addition, enhanced clients can be introduced in
order to take part of a federation. In this sense, the user acts as an intermediary
between providers. The enhanced client also helps to empower the user's role re-
spect to the privacy, because user makes decisions over data control. Moreover, IdM
systems mediate in every users' attribute exchange, so they are the preferred target
where to deploy privacy solutions.
Due to the importance of the identity management paradigm, the industry and
research community have produced a number of standards and specications repre-
senting the fundamental building blocks to accomplish identity federation. However,
identity management is still a relatively new technology and so a number of gaps
and challenges remain open and need to be lled and solved in order to achieve ma-
turity and wide-scale deployment. With the aim to determine these gaps, Chapter 2
reviewed the state-of-the-art on IdM technologies.
There are several approaches to IdM being the most popular the federated and user-
centric models. This summary is the basis for the gap analysis, since both approaches
have benets and shortcomings, for instance, the federated model has scalability
issues which the user-centric model solves, and user centric identity requires constant
user intervention.
Regarding privacy, the federated and user centric models also present advantages
and disadvantages, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
In this dissertation, we center on the privacy problem. The actor Marlon Brandon
said: \Privacy is not something that I'm merely entitled to, it's an absolute prerequi-
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site". According to that, privacy is more than keeping sensitive information hidden.
The identities we have developed online are complex and becoming increasingly im-
portant to us. Sometimes, we seek complete anonymity and other times, we modify
our digital personalities depending on who we are interacting with. For many, full
revealing of our digital selves would be unimaginable.
However, current IdM specications lack of comprehensive privacy frameworks,
which allow users to have more control over the use, grant/revocation privileges
and disclosure of their online identities. These are key aspects, specially in sensitive
environments where improper and unsecured management of user's information may
lead to attacks, identity misuse, frauds or privacy breaches.
We decided to tackle this problem and dene new enhanced techniques to achieve
a suitable supply of the users' privacy at dierent levels while necessary security
services are encompassed. The proposal is based on the introduction of a selective
privacy-enhanced user prole management model and exibility in revocation con-
sent by including an event-based hybrid IdM approach, which enables to substitute
time constraints and explicit revocation by activating and deactivating authoriza-
tion rights according to events and it is an interesting alternative for scenarios where
revocation of consent and user privacy are critical. The combination of both models
allows to cope with both online and oine scenarios, as well as to empower the user
role, by letting users to combine the sources of identity contained in dierent identity
repositories with identity information stored in their personal devices.
2. Study of privacy aspects in identity management and sensitive environ-
ments.
In order to acquire the necessary background to design a privacy and security model
to provide users greater awareness of the use, disclosure and revocation of their digital
identity online, we started by studying how privacy aspects are taken into account
in IdM nowadays. Hence, Chapter 2, provides an overview of privacy principles; and
summarizes related work being carried out by individual researchers, international
research projects and organizations involved in standardization. Then, after this
objective review, Chapter 4 gives a comparative analysis of the privacy support in
current IdM specications by emphasizing the relevance of the revocation consent
aspect.
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The technologies analyzed manage privacy through pseudonyms which can be either
transient or permanent. InfoCards, U-Prove and SAML ECP prole address better
the principle of minimal disclosure. Current identity frameworks support partial
anonymity, since authorities, as the IdP, provides obfuscated identiers, but do not
oer appropriate mechanisms for user's consent revocation. Thus, if personal data
have been already shared, the eective revocation of consent implies an important
challenge to address.
Furthermore, another aspect not addressed by existing IdM specications, it is how
to combine several claims from distinct identity sources into a unique credential to fa-
cilitate management of user's proles and preferences and to give selective disclosure
of identity.
3. Study of structures for privacy awareness.
In the state-of-the-art revision in Chapter 2, we have also summarized the main
privacy-preserving techniques. As documented in the mentioned chapter, several
approaches have been explored. Firstly, identity and attribute-based encryption
approaches, in which each user has a dened set of attributes and access policies
to decide that the users with determined attributes have privileges to access the
shared data. Nevertheless, these approaches require a priori access policies, which
are not always ready in real IdM platforms, since the policies to access user's data are
sometimes determined after key generation. Secondly, other cloud-based approaches
propose privacy-aware schemes focused on providing secure storage, computation au-
diting, data condentiality and the query result integrity of sensitive data. Thirdly,
spatio-temporal cloaking and ADT-based approaches enable to preserve user's pri-
vacy by allowing users to disclose their personal information in a selective manner
through perturbations, spatial transformations, generalization or labels of all sibling
nodes on the path from the leaf node representing the requested data to the root
node.
In order to select the suitable structure, in this study we considered on the one hand,
the essential properties in the context of privacy in IdM and sensitive ecosystems,
such as healthcare scenarios and on the other hand, performance needs of these
environments. The following desirable features were identied:
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 It is required to have a structure that allows to assemble user's identity in-
formation in a richer and more manageable way, since user's proles do not
need to follow strict binary, ternary or quaternary structures. Regarding skip
lists, it is complicated to establish a valid criteria to sort all elements of the list
when user's proles include heterogeneous attributes and data types of dierent
nature. On the other hand, solutions based on basic structures would require
service providers must either see all of the claims or trust the providers of all
information, which is not ideal from a security and privacy perspective.
 It is desirable to verify multiple attributes self-issued and IdP-issued by means
of a single credential without divulging information related to non requested
attributes.
 In sensitive scenarios like healthcare, it is needed an agile storage structure
on read operations. The performance for insertion or modication operations
can be punished in favor of using more robust security and privacy techniques
to protect sensitive information according to regulatory and legislative frame-
works.
4. Design of an extended IdM infrastructure with privacy enabling mecha-
nisms.
Once the privacy gaps were identied, Chapter 3 contributes with the design of the
required architecture to fulll our goals. It is clear that current IdM architectures are
limited to provide appropriate tools for user revocation consent, which encompass
situations where the user is aware to grant or revoke her consent expressly without
compromising her privacy. Moreover, aspects related to how users can regulate
the use and disclosure of own identity information are not addressed suciently by
current IdM specications. Thus, based on the general architectural model that is
common to IdM systems, we introduce our extensions to extend its functionality. The
architecture is composed of a set of logical modules that separate and encapsulate
the functionalities required to achieve an adequate privacy provisioning. The pillars
of the architecture are the Consent/Revocation Manager and the Privacy-Aware
User Prole Handler modules of the Privacy Engine component, which constitute
the main contribution of the thesis. The mathematical models implemented by each
part are later developed in the subsequent chapters.
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In summary, the extension of the architecture meets the contemplated objectives,
since it enables to cope with both online and oine scenarios, while preserving user's
privacy and empowering her to better control over her online identities. In order to
validate the feasibility of the architecture, we have developed proof-of-concepts and
prototypes, which are presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7.
5. Proposal of an event-driven hybrid IdM approach for revocation consent.
Having a exible and eective consent revocation model is essential, but is not cov-
ered by none of the analyzed IdM technologies. With this premise as a foundation, we
developed the hybrid IdM event-driven model that is implemented by the Consent-
Revocation Manager component of the enhanced-privacy IdM architecture proposed
in Chapter 4. The model includes the denition of a sleepyhead credential-based
delegation protocol, which allows implicit revocation by delegating user'attributes
and rights according to events happen in the IdM system. Specically, we decided
to focus on health care scenarios the implementation and development of the main
validations of the proposed model, since they are among the most sensitive scenarios,
but it can be also used in other scenarios. For this purpose, we assumed that the
development of patients care can be divided into events. These events describe a
particular circumstance and can be related to some participant entities.
The main benets are that this credential is issued only once and would be used
any time; while time-based credentials have to be periodically re-issued, for short
windows of time in order to minimize unauthorized accesses, as required.
Basically, this contribution proposes using events to awake dormant privileges or
part of them and it incorporates new characteristics that enable better scalability,
since the emergency services are the entities which handle indirectly trust.
6. Formalization of a mathematical model to an event-driven revocation
consent.
The proposed event-driven revocation consent model that is to be included by par-
ticipants in identity management scenarios is explained in Chapter 4.
A mathematical model based on Markov's chains and theory queues is described to
determine and study dierent health care event arrivals to the system and how they
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are managed and conveyed to the corresponding consumer entities.
For this purpose, we assumed the existence of an event engine, which follows a
notication model based on the SIP-Specic Event Notify specication to send events
to entities. Furthermore, we considered that the entities persisting the medical
records act as IdPs and those requesting access to medical records take the role of
SPs. SPs, as hospitals, emergency services and even individuals, as doctors, can issue
events that will be routed to appropriate medical record holders (IdPs) in order to
unblock medical records.
In addition, we considered that events follow well know workows usually triggered
by well known trusted entities as emergency services. SPs and IdPs can act as
subscribers and notiers, in some circumstances, either subscribing to dierent events
or notifying them. Besides, each entity can be subscribed to multiple types of events,
as well as each event type can be attended by several notiers.
Finally, the proposed model considers the events arrive to the system according to a
homogeneous Poisson process with rate  and to be consistent with an exponential
distribution. Markov's chains were also included to provide support for problems in-
volving decision on uncertainties through a continuous period of time. Thus, Markov
models consider the patients in a discrete state of health, and the events may repre-
sent the transition from one state to another.
7. Implementation and validation of the proposed event-driven hybrid IdM
approach.
In Chapter 5, we presented the result tests of the event-driven hybrid IdM approach.
Validation was conducted on the one hand, with the aim to measure the SIP-Event-
Notify message performance and overhead generated during the system operation,
and on the other hand, to demonstrate the delivery process of security data and
information related to the distinct events that take place in the system. In regard to
the performance of credential issuing, it is not relevant with respect to time-based
credential issuing systems.
Concerning the assessment made through Matlab simulations to calculate the in-
troduced overhead by the subscription and notication event messages exchanged,
an event engine was simulated by creating general health care events that arrive to
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an M=M=c=K notication queueing system and they were served as described in
section 4.3.4.
For the experiments, we utilized a collection of statistical data gathered by the
Hospital Episode Statistics online service. Firstly, we discriminated a general case
where the required number of producers and consumers of events was be examined
in accordance with the mean frequency of health care events for each hour and day
of event arrival. Next, we considered two specic cases: a small-medium hospital
and a large hospital.
Both simulations results showed that:
 the event engine introduces an assumable message overhead, because whether
we take into account the huge volume of information exchanged in health care
systems, the size of the messages to handle events for implicit revocation is
small.
 the number of notiers and the maximum size of the notication queue are
important parameters to be taken into account, which must be controlled in
order to keep away from losing messages without going down the system.
Further work could be done specically in regard to this part of the thesis, as it will
be pointed out in section 8.3.
In turn, the integration of event-based revocation model within the proposed archi-
tecture was validated through the implementation of a prototype and its deployment
in the context of a national R&D project. Also, dierent modules of the architecture
were used as part of other works published in [6] [4] [7], that illustrate use-cases to
improve user's privacy in health care and cloud computing environments.
8. Formalization of a privacy-aware user prole management model.
Once the study of structures for privacy awareness was carried out, the main tech-
niques were analyzed and the requirements were identied, Chapter 6 contributes
with the design and formalization the privacy-enhanced user prole management ap-
proach. The adoption of the structure based on a novel Adaptive Extended Merkle is
justied and reasoned in sections 2.3, 2.5 and 6.2.2. The general goals of the model
are to empower the user role, by letting users to combine the sources of identity
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contained in several identity repositories with identity information stored in their
personal devices and to provide an application that would allow users to manage
their own sensitive attributes in a selective, exible and ecient manner.
Thus, we worked on the denition and development of a sorting algorithm for the
structure based on Merkle tree extensions taking into account the acquired back-
ground and that, attributes or tags enable faster processing, especially when they
are used in a tree and the tree shape varies depending on the use thereof. Valid
examples are the online tags and free text-based searches. Furthermore, if they are
combined with a tree, the search while not optimal, since it varies depending on the
type of tree; it is predictable and bounded.
The proposed sorting algorithm is also applied each time a node is inserted or mod-
ied in the AEM tree. In the case of a new node is inserted, it is located at the
\least benet" positions of the AEM tree, since it does not have a historical of access
frequency. Whether this new node is frequently accessed, it will prove itself and
its location will enhance. Regarding update operations, if a node is very frequently
consulted when the proposed algorithm is executed, it will be in a great position.
Otherwise, it will be placed at the lower levels.
Nevertheless, during the denition of the privacy-aware user prole management
model we faced the problem of how to apply our approach to a specic structure that
combines attributes of dierent nature and types in order to validate and adjust the
model, as well as to provide a solution compliant with existing standards to handle
user's proles, which leads to the following contribution.
9. Study of specications to manage personal information in sensitive sce-
narios.
We reviewed the main current e-health specications in Chapter 2 in order to ob-
tain the necessary knowledge to implement and integrate the privacy-aware user
prole management proposal within extremely sensitive scenarios according to EHR
standard formats.
E-health standards nowadays are based on a dual model architecture, which species
two conceptual levels: reference model and archetype model. The reference model
describes the set of entities that form the general building blocks of the electronic
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healthcare record. In regard to the archetypes, they characterize clinical concepts in
the form of structured and constrained combinations of the entities contained in the
reference model, so clinical knowledge is dened at this level. Both OpenEHR and
ISO EN 13606 use this modeling architecture, which has also inuenced HL7 CDA.
On the other hand, in order to facilitate the interoperability and provide integration
capabilities in the exchange of such EHRs, initiatives as Integrating Healthcare En-
terprise Proles have emerged, but holistic implementations of IHE based e-health
infrastructures to share EHRs are currently rare. IHE describes real world use cases.
Besides, it tries to deal with security and privacy issues by a modular scheme, which
includes integration proles and use cases to address several issues like recording
of the patient privacy consents, exchange formats for medical or care data and an-
nouncement the identity of an authenticated user.
However, current e-health standards do not cope with some privacy aspects, such
as ne-grained control of sensitive data or selective identity divulging that allow
controlled sharing across dierent healthcare stakeholders in a secure way.
We have chosen the OpenEHR standard to validate our user prole management
scheme, because it provides an open development of archetypes, templates, etc. to
represent health data. Due to the open nature of OpenEHR, these structures are
publicly available to be used, which empowers to promote their implementation in
health information systems.
10. Implementation and validation the privacy-aware user prole manage-
ment model.
Finally, we validated the selective privacy-enhanced user prole management contri-
bution in Chapter 7. Section 7.2 includes two simulation results for dierent kind of
tree structures: uniform, in which each node has the same probability to be accessed,
and biased, in which a few nodes have a high probability to be requested.
To this end, we worked with synthetic data to evaluate dierent proles. The use of
synthetic data and their validity to evaluate the proposal was justied and reasoned
in Chapter 7. These synthetic data included quantitative health data and qualitative
data. The evaluation results showed that the proposed sorting algorithm reduced the
total searching and verication tree building times until a 40.08 % when parameter
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values were m = 2 and h = 20 in the case of biased structures. Moreover, good
results were also obtained for other m-ary trees by decreasing both the searching
times and the verication path length. Concerning the outcome of uniform query
distribution experiment, the average searching and verication tree building times
were lightly improved, especially when m decreased and h increased. Moreover, the
integration of the Privacy-Aware User Prole Handler with the rest of the Privacy
Engine components was tested.
Summarizing, the time spent by the distribution algorithm is not signicant when
compared to the enhancement over the total search time. The proposed sorting
algorithm introduces important benets and reduction of the total searching and
verication tree building times for biased structures. Locating attributes more fre-
quently requested in the upper levels of the AEM tree, enables to obtain eciently
and securely this user's information. For instance, patients' medical records with
chronic diseases, since particularly lifestyle, current problems or medications which
are continually required by querying. Furthermore, the algorithm allows to build
enriched compositions of the patient's medical history and to sort the tree based on
patterns of access compliance with open EHRs standards. But also, we distinguish
other aspects still need to be addressed, as it will be described in section 8.3.
8.1.2 Other Contributions
Apart form the technical contributions described above, other kind of activities were also
carried out in the context of this dissertation that convey an added value to its realization.
More specically:
 Dissemination.
The dissemination tasks consisted on the publication of papers and contribution to
conferences and journals where the main ideas of the thesis were subject to peer
review, evaluation and discussion. The main publications are detailed in Chapter 1,
section 1.4.
On the other hand, we collaborated on security forums and mailing lists related
to development tools, such as Zxid, Lasso, Authentic and OpenSSL. Furthermore,
part of the contents in this thesis were developed as a research line in several
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national R&D projects, called \Espa~na Virtual"1, CONSEQUENCE2, EMRISCO
(EMergency Response In Smart COmmunities) and INRISCO (INcident MonitoR-
ing In Smart COmmunities)3. The Espa~na Virtual and CONSEQUENCE projects
included specic working packages for \Security and Identity Management", whilst
the EMRISCO and INRISCO research projects incorporated the Work Package 3 for
\Security and Privacy"; where our ideas on security and privacy were contributed.
 Identication of new research lines.
In section 8.3, considering the limitations and the points of improvement of our ideas,
we identify a set of open issues for future research works.
8.2 Conclusions
The research on the current IdM frameworks and privacy techniques that best suit the
purposes of the thesis resulted in the next conclusions:
 Identity management technologies facilitate handling of identity processes and poli-
cies among the collaborating entities. They also enable secure resource sharing
among these entities and mediate in every users' information exchange. So, IdM
systems are the preferred target where to deploy privacy solutions.
 Privacy and the way organizations treat consumers' data is becoming an increasingly
important competitive factor. The explosive innovation that occurred as a result of
the arrival of the digital age and technological progress have all changed the rules of
the game. Hence, the uses of personal data are relatively advanced- rivaling, and in
some cases surpassing, the Internet sector. Partnering and sharing data with external
parties, such as producers, consumers, retailers and other social related parties, is
not uncommon. For these reasons:
{ Companies and organizations need balanced solutions protect privacy, generate
value and create competitive advantage.
{ Consumers want more control of privacy, yet at the same time, want more con-
1http://www.espanavirtual.org/
2http://consequence.it.uc3m.es/
3http://www.inrisco.org/
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venience in the way they perform transactions and interact with organizations,
but the reality is quite dierent. Few consumers know how their data are used
and fewer can control them.
 The literature review showed the wide variety of specications and open development
tools to implement and deploy IdM-based solutions, as well as the variety of privacy
preserving techniques. The preservation of user privacy in federated IdM is a very
important factor, but as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, this factor does not
have catered suciently in current frameworks or models. More specically, on the
one hand, there is still scarce work on eective revoking consent mechanisms within
current IdM technologies. In this sense, there are currently two main options to
revoke attributes or privileges in an IdM context: to set a very short period of time
for the validity time of a given privilege; or to set the token expiration to hours,
days or months. In the rst case, the systems' usability probably is reduced since
the user have to re-authenticate to obtain a new valid security token. In the second
case, security problems may arise.
On the other hand, none of the analyzed works deal with neither building of the en-
riched structures to represent user proles based on standards nor combining identity
information from dierent sources to be in a single credential.
 Not all data is considered equal when it comes to privacy. Research studies like [2]
show that consumers consider some types to be much more sensitive than others
and accordingly, they are less willing to share it. For instance, nancial data, health
records, and social network posts are also considered very private; while location
data and past purchases less so. This led to focus on sensitive environments, mainly
healthcare scenarios, to perform the proposals and validations of this thesis.
 We have also learned about the standardizations eorts by several government bodies
and non-government organizations to implement security measures to share and
exchange electronic health records. More specically, emergency access is a necessary
part of access control and will be necessary under emergency conditions, although
these may be very dierent from those used in normal operational circumstances.
These procedures are written instructions and operational practices for gaining access
to necessary EHR during an emergency. Beforehand, organizations must decide what
circumstances would warrant emergency access to EHR information.
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However, heterogeneous nature of environments that manage EHRs, security and
privacy concerns make dicult the maintenance and deployment of these systems.
 The architecture proposed in this thesis tries to solve the above problems and en-
ables the provision of appropriate tools to manage user's privacy by including more
exible implicit consent revocation and privacy-aware prole management. The new
delegation-based revocation mechanisms allow to crowd out explicit revocation and
time constraints by activating and deactivating authorization rights in consonance
with events. The new user prole management mechanism allows to guarantee se-
lective identity information disclosure in a seamless and scalable manner. The com-
bination of the Consent Revocation Manager and the Privacy-Aware User Prole
Handler components also avoids the incessant mediation of the user and deals with
both online and oine scenarios.
 The proposed event driven hybrid IdM model for user's revocation consent provides
a quantitative formalization to determine the dierent event arrivals to the system
and how they are managed and broadcasted to the required entities; and introduces
exibility. The main features of the model are:
{ Revocation is implicit and is achieved through the delegation of attributes and
privileges that are pre-granted in advance and turned on/o according to the
sleepyhead credential-based delegation protocol and the events happened within
the IdM infrastructure.
{ The dierence with related works focused on time-based credentials is that the
sleepyhead credential is issued only once and would be used any time, without
requiring to be periodically re-issued.
Furthermore, we have developed a proof-of-concept in order to demonstrate the feasi-
bility of the sleepyhead-credential -based delegation protocol and its integration with
the rest the Privacy Engine components. Such proof-of-concept served to face some
important challenges posed by the proposal, particularly integration with identity
and SIP-based event frameworks, as well as changes and adaptations of the SAML
standard.
Finally, we performed simulations to estimate the introduced overhead by the sub-
scription and notication event messages exchanged between the entity of the pro-
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posed IdM architecture in order to awake/slumber the necessary attributes and priv-
ileges. The simulations showed that the message overhead started to grow exponen-
tially when the event arrival rate doubles the notiers. So, the parameter that
represents congestion of the system is approaching to its saturation value (  1).
However, as we will see in section 8.3, the validation of the model can be extended.
 The proposed privacy-enhanced user prole management model is based on a novel
adaptive extended Merkle tree to give users more control over their online identities,
as well as to amalgamate identity information collected in their personal devices with
sources of identity contained in dierent repositories in secure and ecient manner.
In this sense, the proposed model would be dependent of the user and her/his device.
Moreover, the AEM tree can store references to other identity data, by governing
access to them, but not necessarily holding them. This type of indirections may
be necessary in order to increase exibility storage and it is not incompatible with
security, since the AEM tree and its metadata as access information can be used
to obtain heavy data protected and stored by the providers. For instance, many
test results, such as CT, PET-CT, etc. have their own protection and software
management in order to be later interpreted by doctors. Besides, these kind of tests
take up much space - size of a DVD for low resolution results.
On the other hand, the proposed AEM tree can help to create for instance, a tree for
a child in which her basic information (i.e., allergies, blood group, etc) is frequently
accessed and has security measures dierent from other attributes that require, for
instance, parental approval. Likewise, the AEM tree can be used in another appli-
cation scenario, which contemplates experiments in patients with complex diseases
but requiring notication or conrmation to cross data like sex, race or religion, etc.
by allowing audited access.
In conclusion, we have developed an initial approach towards the privacy provisioning for
federated IdM platforms. Privacy is increasingly becoming an area of competition for
organizations, which can dierentiate themselves by providing the right privacy controls
and privacy-by-default product design. With easier-to-use privacy protection features, and
privacy education, organizations might be able to signicantly boost consumers' willingness
to share data.
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Control and convenience are important aims. They are often conicting aims, too. Bal-
ancing them will not be easy, but it will be critical. We believe indeed that individuals
are more willing to take risks when they feel more in charge. Yet while this might be
a contributing factor in their decision process, we would argue that choices and control
simply help individuals adapt their sharing to their specic preferences.
However, our proposal is a set of preliminary ideas, partially validated and, some of them,
prototyped. As a preliminary work, many limitations and weaknesses exist that open the
room for further research and improvement. With the aim to identify these lacks and open
issues, the following section presents the main future research lines that can be derived
from here.
8.3 Future Research Lines
In this thesis we have contributed to evolve federated identity management platforms
towards more exible, privacy-enhancing and secure models. Despite having addressed all
the objectives set at the beginning of this thesis, the work carried out during the process
has also opened many interesting paths to explore that can be considered as new objectives
to focus on. We recognize several areas where the architecture and components presented
here can be improved or extended, all of them explained below:
1. Study and denition of a semantics of events standard format for consent
revocation in identity management.
Event-based publish/subscribe revocation systems oer a convenient abstraction for
data producer and consumers, as most of the complexity related to addressing and
routing is encapsulated within the network infrastructure; and avoids exposing sen-
sitive information to other entities for longer than strictly necessary.
The event-based revocation model proposed in this thesis is based on the existence
of an event engine, which follows a notication model to send events to entities (by
means of broadcast or unicast to registered entities). The procedures to extract
the information of events consist on analyzing the information available for their
category in order to activate or deactivate the required attributes or privileges in the
sleepyhead credential. We developed our event driven hybrid IdM model assuming
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that this information was available.
In this sense, ontologies have the potential to become richer as the stakeholders
contribute new knowledge. However, it is almost impossible for a single ontology
to cover all the domain of complex and sensitive ecosystems like healthcare, since
medical services cover many areas such as patient care, clinical and administrative
decisions, assisting devices, patient diagnostics.
As a rst step, a domain ontological model for organizing knowledge and informa-
tion of events in the heterogeneous domain of embedded devices and emergency sys-
tems could be explored. This work could provide a conceptualization for knowledge
in emergency management and the representation of device, SPs and IdPs entities
along with their attributes that can enable information and knowledge interoperabil-
ity among other systems. Dierent reasoning tools such as Protege, Racer, Pellet
or FACT++ could be used to perform intelligent reasoning on the Web Ontology
Language (OWL) ontologies.
In a next step, other specications and techniques to provide a more generic solu-
tion to dene a semantics of events standard format to improve the revocation of
attributes in the context of identity management should be studied.
2. Further analysis of the event driven hybrid IdM model for user consent
revocation.
Further analysis is needed in the topic of self revocation of sleepyhead credentials.
We also plan to take into account dierent privacy requirements for identity at-
tributes, including biometric and health care data. Further research is also needed
in preserving user privacy during the exchange and sharing of attributes in dierent
trust domains, also considering usability of the system.
3. Further analysis of the privacy-aware user prole management model.
Developing an implementable model for user prole management is an art involving
many separate design problems and choices. We have dened the main features
for the privacy-aware user prole management model to be applicable in sensitive
environments, such as healthcare scenarios. We started a simulation testbed to prove
the benets of the model, showing the total searching and verication tree building
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times; and the verication path length reached by applying the proposed sorting
algorithm. But further work is still required.
Among others, the following aspects could be addressed:
 Study and denition of mechanisms to determine and adjust the optimal size
of the structure dynamically. Initially, this value would be precongured on
user's devices taking into account mainly their memory constraints, user pri-
vacy preferences, the number of condence IdPs with which the user interacts
more usually, default number of attributes more frequently consulted, etc. As
a future line, mechanisms that allow to adapt the values of m and h dynam-
ically, could be explored. For instance, if it is detected that the search times
and verication path lengths exceed a certain threshold, it should be taken
into consideration parameters such as, the number of more frequently accessed
nodes, their variance and dispersity, etc. to better adapt the structure size.
 Security analysis and enhancement. The proposed sorting algorithms may in-
troduce information leakage suitable for a dierential analysis. Let us consider
a well informed attacker who performs selected searches to initiate new sorting
of the AEM tree: measuring the sorting time, the attacker can perform estima-
tions and even models of the attributes and relationships of parts of the EHR
beyond her authorization. To prevent such privacy breaches, random delays
could be introduced in the sorting algorithm. In this issue a new research line
is opened in which, the number of executions of the sorting algorithm should
be studied and limited within a specic time period. This, and other possible
attacks should be simulated and investigated in order to improve the privacy-
aware user prole management model to take into account high security and
privacy considerations.
4. Further validation of the revocation consent proposal to contemplate
more event categories and dene new priority levels.
Regarding the priority queues of the event driven hybrid IdM approach, the devel-
oped prototype and simulations carried out to demonstrate the workability of the
presented ideas only classify the simulated health care events into two categories:
\Urgent Events" and \Non-urgent Events". Thus, the system will serve rst the
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events assigned with higher priority. Further research could be done to consider new
event categories and dene new priority levels. Hence, currently, we are working on
improving the event engine, by dening a Simulink model that enables to represent
our multi-server notication queueing system in a more realistic manner. Basically,
this model consists of the following components: Time-based Generators, Priority
Queues, Event-based random Generators and Servers acting as notiers.
5. Further validation of the privacy-aware user prole management model
with real data.
To validate the privacy-aware user prole management model, we created synthetic
data, which included quantitative and qualitative data in order to evaluate dierent
EHR proles and focused on studying in the AEM structure by considering issues
related to its size and measuring the performance of the proposed sorting algorithm.
Further research is needed to test our user prole management model in additional
mobile and cloud-based e-health scenarios, using real data like images and genetic in-
formation considered attached to the tree basic information, as well as more complex
information models and archetypes.
This work line could be initiated by establishing collaborations with the Spanish
Health system4, since a Digital Clinical History of the National Health system5 has
been developed recently. Its main goal is to enable users digital access to a set of
personal data by guaranteeing the security requirements established to protect such
information. Currently users can consult all primary care reports and only reports of
specialized care that have been generated in hospitals with digital support. The rest
of hospitals and clinical reports of specialized care will be gradually incorporated.
6. Additional validation and evaluation in real scenarios.
A quantitative validation in order to show the advantages obtained by the proposed
event-based revocation model with respect to time-dependent revocation solutions
has not been performed, because of the scarce deployment of consent management
systems that avoids to get mean values (e.g., mean time of credential validity) to do
a fair comparative. Although metrics are not dened yet in this area and metrics
4https://www.msssi.gob.es/organizacion/sns/libroSNS.htm
5http://www.madrid.org/cs/Satellite?cid=1142675996204&language=es&pagename=PortalSalud%2FPage%2
FPTSA pintarContenidoFinal&vest=1142675932772
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used for public key certicate revocation [201] do not apply directly to our proposal,
we could use metrics as credential issuing overhead, revocation list management cost,
etc. These metrics can be calculated without taking into account qualitative advan-
tages, such as credentials being expired when these would be required, for example.
So, as part of the validation process, it would be necessary the implementation and
deployment of a full prototype that follows the privacy-enhanced IdM architecture
in real healthcare and cloud computing scenarios. In addition, metrics related to
delegation chain length are considered as future line.
On the other hand, it must be noted that, the usage of the system also aects privacy
and should be present in users consents. The auditing processes should verify that
the design and assumptions regarding future usage match its actual usage. For
future work, we want to test this last issue on real health care scenarios in order to
demonstrate how the privacy is managed by the system actors.
7. Integration of the the privacy-aware user prole management model with
other specications to handle personal information in sensitive scenarios.
With the aim to apply the proposed privacy-aware user prole management model to
a specic structure compliant with existing standards to manage user's proles, we
carried out our validations with OpenEHR. This specication supports the creation,
storage, maintenance, and querying of complete EHRs, as well as the development
of an open and semantic-connected platform for eHealth systems.
Further work is required to integrate the privacy-aware user prole management
model contribution in other specications. As a rst step, it would be interesting to
start the integration with the ISO/EN 13606, since it is a European norm from the
CEN and it is being used at dierent public and private projects and deployments.
In addition, another remarkable feature of ISO/EN 13606 is the alignment it presents
to other relevant standards such as OpenEHR or HL7.
8. Integration of the privacy extensions for identity management in dierent
specications.
The main goal in this thesis was to dene an infrastructure generic enough to be
applicable to any federation specication. Thus, we studied the principal documents
of the distinct identity management technologies as a basis for the specication.
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Although, whenever particularization was required to go deeper on the description
of the model, we based on the SAML specications. The developed prototypes were
implemented over SAMLv2/ID-FF. So, further work is necessary to integrate and
implement the proposal in the rest of the specications.
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AppendixA
List of Acronyms
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
AAPML Attribute Authority Policy Markup Language
ABE Attribute-Based Encryption
ADL Archetype Denition Language
ADT Authenticated Dictionary Structure
AOM Archetype Object Model
AP Attribute Provider
API Application Programming Interface
ARML Attribute Requirement Markup Language
CENIT Consorcio Estrategico Nacional de Investigacion Tecnica
CIMI Clinical Information Modelling Initiative
CoT Circle of Trust
ECP Enhanced Client Proxy
EHR Electronic Health Record
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
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FIM Federated Identity Management
GDL Guideline Denition Language
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
HITSP Healthcare Information Technology Standards Panel
HL7 Health Level Seven International
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
IBE Identity-Based Encryption
IdM Identity Management
IdP Identity Provider
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IGF Identity Governance Framework
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITU-T ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector
JCR Journal Citation Report
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
Lasso Liberty Alliance Single Sign-On
OASIS Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developments
PII Personally Identiable Information
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PMAC Privilege Management and Access Control
QID Quasi-IDentier Attribute
REST Representational State Transfer
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RIM Reference Information Model
RM Reference Model
RP Relying Party
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language
SDO Standards Developing Organization
SLA Service Level Agreement
SLO Single LogOut
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol
SP Service Provider
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
SSO Single Sign-On
SSTC Security Services Technical Committee
STS Security Token Service
TLS Transport Layer Security
UI User Interface
UPT U-Prove Token
URI Uniform Resource Identier
WSS Web Services Security
XACML eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
XML eXtensible Markup Language
XRI eXtensible Resource Identier
XSD XML Schema Denition
ZKPK Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge
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